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ABSTRACT 
 
In the course of a decade, two record-breaking hurricanes made landfall in Atlantic 
Canada: Juan (2003) and Igor (2010). During each hurricane, mobility networks central 
to the movement of people and goods (i.e. road, marine, air and rail) were disrupted, 
interrupting emergency services, commercial operations and personal transport. In some 
cases, alternate transport modes and routes emerged, while in other cases people and 
goods were rendered immobile.  
 
The anchoring idea for my research is that fossil fuel-powered transport contributes to 
climate change and climate change disrupts transport. The energetic boomerang comes 
full circle with severe weather events disrupting complex, weather-exposed transport 
networks. While linking specific weather events to climate change is tenuous, I explore 
these hurricanes as examples of the type of conditions (e.g. high winds, intense 
precipitation, storm surges) that are expected under a changing climate. To build societal 
resilience to extreme weather events, we need both theoretical and applied approaches to 
transport that incorporate recognition of climate change. 
 
Through this project I ask what responses and frames, particularly related to social-
ecological interactions, emerge when mobility networks are impacted by hurricanes. I 
examine sources of resilience and vulnerability (e.g. social, ecological, infrastructural), as 
well as ask how greater social and ecological resilience can be achieved. Using an 
inductive case study approach and drawing on media articles, legislative transcripts, 
policy documents and semi-structured interviews with key informants, I identify and 
analyze the resulting responses and frames as they pertain to social-ecological resilience 
and vulnerability. 
 
This research is grounded within the mobilities literature and informed by the disaster 
literature to elaborate an ecopolitics of mobility. I complement the applied areas of 
sustainable mobility (i.e. climate change mitigation) (Banister 2008) and resilience (i.e. 
transport, infrastructure, social-ecological) (Brown 2014; Folke 2010), with the 
theoretically oriented mobilities paradigm (Sheller and Urry 2006), including the politics 
of mobility (Cresswell 2010). Further, I inflect the politics of mobility, which provides a 
nuanced approach to the analysis of power within mobility systems, with Foucault’s work 
on governmentality and circulation of societies and ecologies.  
 
In terms of practical contributions, I find that in the aftermath of Hurricanes Juan and Igor, 
reinstatement of mobility was an uppermost priority with a dominant tension between the 
frame ‘we’ve never seen anything like it’ and ‘we need to get things back to normal as 
quickly as possible.’ I develop a list of practices used for managing mobility in the 
preparation, response, recovery and mitigation phases of disaster, as well compare the 
resiliencies and vulnerabilities of Nova Scotia and Newfoundland’s mobility networks.  
 
In the case of Nova Scotia, a key source of vulnerability in the context of Hurricane Juan 
was the entanglement of trees and power lines. Key sources of resilience include the 
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cultural instinct to batten down the hatches, the adaptable role of transit and the 
coordination of emergency services. Residents successfully, if somewhat precariously, 
governed their own mobility (i.e. governmobility). Further, the experience of successive 
intentional, technical and ecological adversities fostered a culture of all-hazards disaster 
readiness. 
 
In the case of Newfoundland and Labrador, a key source of vulnerability in the context of 
Hurricane Igor was the scale of road washouts combined with limited routes, modes (e.g. 
car, truck), fuel types and fuel storage. Key sources of resilience were coordination and 
cooperation among different levels of government, the private sector and residents 
demonstrating a high capacity to restore the road network to functionality within ten days 
and coordination among residents to cope in the interim. 
 
Based on the empirical case studies, I develop and elucidate three ideas that are valuable 
in reconceptualizing the social and environmental power dynamics inherent in transport 
networks: mobility webs, the ecopolitics of mobility and climate routing. I describe this 
set of concepts as an ecopolitical approach to mobility. Borrowing from the ecological 
concept of food webs, I use the term mobility webs to reflect the environmentally exposed, 
but also diverse and adaptable dimensions of contemporary transport networks arguing 
for an approach that cooperates with, rather than dominates, the environment.  
 
To underscore the view that transport networks and ecological flows are interwoven and, 
in an anthropogenic age, co-constructed, I forward the concept of an ecopolitics of 
mobility. Adapting Cresswell’s (2010) six elements of the politics of mobility – motive 
force, velocity, rhythm, route, experience and friction – to the interface of the 
environment and contemporary social-technical assemblages of mobility, I analyze social-
ecological power dynamics, including related sources of resilience and vulnerability to 
disrupt and reframe interactions between mobility and the environment.  
 
Informed by the disaster sociology of Freudenburg (2009), Klinenberg (2004) and 
Murphy (2009), I consider the possibilities for an ecologically reflexive modernization in 
the field of transport, extending the focus of transport resilience from restoring the status 
quo to include reflecting on the role of mobility in contemporary society (Beck 2015). I 
adapt the marine navigation concept of weather routing – the practice of altering a ship’s 
course to take maximum advantage of tidal, current and wind conditions to reduce the 
physical resistance of the ship moving through water – and posit the concept of climate 
routing. As conceived, climate routing involves six measures: creating a transport 
resilience task force, deliberating decentralization, internalizing externalities, planning for 
green and blue flows, rebranding redundancy and thinking flex. Primary considerations 
are lessening social-ecological contention, increasing resilience, questioning mobility 
practices and maintaining or increasing quality of life.  
 
In sum, my research offers innovative contributions by orienting mobilities research to 
social-ecological considerations – extending previous work on sustainable mobility even 
further – and orienting disaster sociology to mobility and related transport considerations.  
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And when I sleep that final sleep 
I can only hope and pray 
That someone’s life will brighter be 
Because I have passed this way 
 
Allen Duffett 
This Thing Called Life 
1930-2010 
 
 
… 
 
 
Newfoundland and Labrador 
 
Allen Duffett 
 
 
Nova Scotia 
 
Stephen Munro 
 
John Rossiter 
 
Mary Sack 
 
Zachary Sack-Amro 
 
Samia Sack-Amro 
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To the woman in Paris – 
per aspera ad astra. 
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There is a whirlwind in southern Morroco, the aajej, against which the fellahin defend 
themselves with knives. There is the africo, which has at times reached into the city of 
Rome. … These are permanent winds that live in the present tense. There are other, less 
constant winds that change direction, that can knock down horse and rider and realign 
themselves anticlockwise. The bist roz leaps into Afghanistan for 170 days — burying 
villages. … As well as the other “poison winds,” the simoom, of North Africa. … 
The harmattan, which blows and eventually drowns itself in the Atlantic. Imbat, a sea 
breeze in North Africa. … Herodotus records the death of various armies engulfed in the 
simoom who were never seen again. One nation was “so enraged by this evil wind that 
they declared war on it and marched out in full battle array,  
only to be rapidly and completely interred.” 
 
Michael Ondaatje 
The English Patient 
1993 
 
 
 
A Cape Verde-type hurricane is an Atlantic hurricane that develops near the 
Cape Verde islands, off the west coast of Africa. 
 
Wikipedia 
2014 
 
 
 
Risk is said to derive from the Italian word risco which meant ‘that which cuts,’ 
hence ‘reef’ and consequently ‘risk to cargo on the high seas.’ 
 
Ewald 
Insurance and Risk 
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[Governmentality] means to safeguard the population, as if it was ‘the government of a 
ship’ taking care of the ship, its sailors and its cargo, taking care of things, navigate safely 
and ‘establishing a relation between the sailors’ (Foucault 1994: 235). 
 
Bærnholdt 
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2013
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1  SETTING SAIL: INTRODUCTION 
 
…And what a hurricane of a question! 
What a tidal wave of disruption. It got worse 
 
when we walked into it and let it taste us. Courtship! 
We had never heard of marriage let alone ceremony. 
 
When we wrote our names in the soft sand of its back, 
we didn’t know the first thing about commitment 
 
or about being out of our depths. 
 
Sue Goyette 
One 
2013 
 
 
Alex Colville 
Couple at Beach 
1957 
  3 
Studying the responses and frames used to navigate mobility disruption caused by severe 
weather events is a ‘hurricane of question,’ bringing together in new ways the spheres of 
climate change, transport and disaster. Just as the couple on the beach is in a 
relationship, society is ‘out of its depth’ in its relationship with the environment, 
grappling with an era defined by profound climatic change. 
 
 
Situating the study 
 
Two intersecting trends help define our times: an intensification of transport and an 
upsurge in severe weather events. Movement is central to our society. Like oxygen, we 
both rely upon it and take it for granted. From commuting to work to shipping freight, 
from school buses to ambulances, from destination weddings to academic conferences, 
mobility punctuates the story of our lives. The transport sector is a fast growing source of 
greenhouse gases, with global emissions projected to double by 2050 due to growth in the 
passenger and freight sectors (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 2014).1 
Likewise, problematic severe weather events are increasingly prevalent; the United 
Nations (2013) reports a doubling of extreme weather events in the past two decades. 
The trends of intensifying transport and increasing severe weather events are 
related. Fossil-fuelled mobility contributes to climate change and climate change disrupts 
mobility; climatic disruptions entail mobility disruptions. Almost all of global transport 
energy, 95 per cent, is derived from fossil fuels such as oil, gas and diesel (Urry 2013). 
The atmospheric accumulation of greenhouse gases released during the course of fossil-
fuelled transport increases global average temperature and triggers a cascade of climatic 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1
 There is preliminary evidence of ‘peak travel’ and specifically ‘peak car’ – a phenomenon akin to peak oil 
 where transport demand abates – particularly in terms of private car ownership and use in Western 
countries (see Goodwin 2012 for a research agenda). However, growth rates in aviation and freight show no 
sign of abatement.  
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changes, such as intensifying weather, rising sea levels and acidifying oceans. The 
energetic ‘boomerang’ comes full circle with severe weather disrupting the complex 
transport networks upon which societies rely (Beck 1992). The fifth assessment of the 
Intergovernmental Panel of Climate Change states that: “it is extremely likely that human 
influence has been the dominant cause of the observed warming since the mid-20th 
century” (emphasis in original) (2014: 17).  
The links between climate change and hurricane activity are less clear, in part due 
to the lack of historical data and confounding meteorological events such El Niño and the 
multi-decadanal North Atlantic Oscillation. The current state of knowledge suggests an 
overall trend of decreased hurricane frequency, but increased hurricane intensity (e.g. 4 to 
6 per cent) (Environment and Climate Change Canada 2016). However, in any given year 
there will be variation. For example, 2016 is projected to be slightly above average in 
terms of hurricane activity. Regardless of hurricane trends, rising sea level will exacerbate 
all storm impacts (Sobel 2014). 
In this research I explore what happens when the two trends of intensifying 
transport and severe weather intersect, studying the cases of two record-breaking 
hurricanes: Hurricanes Juan (2003) and Igor (2010). I focus on two regions that were 
heavily impacted by each hurricane, the Canadian provinces of Nova Scotia and 
Newfoundland and Labrador (Figure 1). I explore ways that resilience can be enhanced in 
the face of increasing severe weather events such as Hurricane Juan and Igor.  
 
 
 
  5 
Juan and Igor 
Both events share important commonalities and differences (Table 1.1). While most 
North Atlantic hurricanes dissipate in the open ocean, these hurricanes made landfall 
(Sobel 2014). Energetic movements of wind and water collided with the fossil-fuelled 
movement of people, goods and services. Transport networks were exposed to, and tested 
by, extreme coastal conditions. States of emergency were declared. Lives were lost. In 
recognition of the hurricanes’ severity, the names Juan and Igor were retired by the 
World Meteorological Organization. Hurricane Juan was defined by higher wind speeds, 
ranking a category 2 event according to the Saffir-Simpson Hurricane Wind Scale (Figure 
1.2). By contrast, Hurricane Igor was defined by precipitation, ranking as the third wettest 
hurricane in Canadian history. Indeed, while its wind speeds only ranked a category 1 
hurricane, the slower moving storm allowed for greater damage from precipitation to 
amass (Masson 2014).2 
The two impacted jurisdictions – Nova Scotia and Newfoundland – share not only 
a coastal geography, but are defined by peninsular and island geography that further 
complicate transport logistics (Figure 1.1).3 Hurricane Juan impacted Atlantic Canada, 
making landfall in Nova Scotia, which is a peninsula (together with the island of Cape 
Breton), and Prince Edward Island. Within Nova Scotia, the capital city and my home, is 
located on Halifax Peninsula. I focus my research on Nova Scotia, with an emphasis on 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2
 See Sobel (2014) for a discussion on the limited ability of current meteorological tools to adequately 
communicate risk to governments and populations. 
3
  The province of Newfoundland and Labrador consists of an island in the North Atlantic (Newfoundland) 
and a portion of the continent that borders the province of Quebec (Labrador). Both have limited transport 
options due to their remoteness. However, I focus on the island portion, Newfoundland, as this received the 
brunt of Hurricane Igor’s impact. 
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Halifax, given my familiarity with the province and because its transport profile is more 
varied compared to Prince Edward Island. While Hurricane Igor impacted American 
states, I focus on its landfall in the island portion of Newfoundland, which heavily 
impacted the Bonavista and Burin Peninsulas. As a doctoral candidate at Memorial 
University in Newfoundland conducting research on Igor was convenient as well as 
theoretically and practically relevant. Consequently, I tether my research in these areas 
while also maintaining a regional focus (i.e. Atlantic Canada).  
Nova Scotia is a regional passenger and freight hub in Atlantic Canada. The Port 
of Halifax is a node in a global shipping network, receiving and distributing cargo via 
marine, road and rail networks. Nova Scotia has a population of approximately 943,000 
and a Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of $39 billion (Statistics Canada 2015, 2014).4 
Newfoundland is geographically and commercially more peripheral than Nova Scotia. 
Further, its coastal communities are connected by one major highway and secondary 
roads, or in some cases, connected by ferry.5 Cars and trucks, both passenger and freight, 
are the main mode of transport on the island, while off-highway vehicles are an informal 
means of transport. The island itself is accessed by air, ferry and other marine transport. 
Newfoundland and Labrador has a population of approximately 528,000 and a GDP of 
$33 billion (Statistics Canada 2015, 2014).6 The two provinces are interconnected. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4
 During the years that Hurricanes Juan and Igor hit, Nova Scotia and Newfoundland’s population were 
slightly smaller: Nova Scotia (2003) 936,000 and Newfoundland (2010) 522,000. Likewise, provincial GDP 
in 2005 was $31 billion and $29 billion respectively. 
5
 Such as Bell Island, profiled on the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation’s (2015f) Ideas as part of the On 
the Move work-related mobilities research project. 
6
 As of 2015, the oil and gas sector accounts for about one-third of Newfoundland’s GDP (Government of 
Newfoundland and Labrador 2014). However, with recent declines in oil prices Newfoundland’s GDP is on 
a downward trend (Canadian Broadcasting Corporation 2015b). By contrast, the oil and gas sector accounts 	  
  7 
Figure 1.1: Map of coastal case study regions: Nova Scotia and Newfoundland, 
including TransCanada highway and ferry routes (Wikimedia 2015) 
                                  
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
for only a sliver of Nova Scotia’s GDP, with exports declining 98 per cent between 2003 and 2012 (Ivany 
2014).	  
  8 
Table 1.1: Statist ical comparisons of Hurricanes Juan and Igor for case study 
regions 
 HURRICANE JUAN7 
 
HURRICANE IGOR8 
Date September 29, 2003 September 21, 2010 
Saff ir-Simpson  
Wind Scale (Figure 1.2) 
2  
(154-177 km/h; 83-95 knots)  
1  
(119-153 km/h; 64-82 knots) 
Storm width n/a 1,480 km 
Highest sustained 
wind speed 
151 km/h 130 km/h 
Highest wind gust 176 km/h 172 km/h  
Precipitation  25-52 mm 90-238 mm 
Ocean surface 
temperature 
18°C (versus normal of 15°C) 
Gulf stream: 24°C to 28°C 
(unseasonably warm) 
(Warmer than average) 
Peak stream flow n/a 600m3/s  
(versus mean of 10m3/s) 
Peak wave height 9-20 m 13-25 m 
Storm surge9 100-150 cm (Combined with 
high tide for 290 cm total) 
70-100 cm 
Barometric pressure10 973 hPa 952 hPa 
Epicentre Halifax Regional Municipality Bonavista and Burin Peninsulas 
Lives lost11  6 1  
Cost (provincial) 12 $100 million $100-200 million  
Last storm of equal 
or greater magnitude 
- Groundhog Day Gale (1976) 
- August Gale (1893): 
Category 3; 25 deaths 
 
- Burin Tsunami (1929):  
- 27 metre waves; 28 deaths 
- Great Independence Hurricane 
(1775): ~4,000 deaths 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7
 Data in column from Environment Canada (2003a, 2003b, 2003c and Novaweather.net 2003). 
8
 Data in column from Environment Canada (2011). 
9
 Between lower barometric pressure and leading winds, hurricanes result in temporarily higher water levels, 
that in turn, can be exacerbated by tidal cycles and lunar activity. These are the conditions for a storm surge, 
defined as water levels one metre or more above normal levels. Hurricane Juan hit when these forces 
aligned to produce high water levels, though had the storm hit two hours earlier or ten hours later the storm 
surge could have been as much as one metre greater  (i.e. 3.9 metres) (Environment Canada 2003c). 
10
 Standard atmospheric pressure is 1013 hectopascals (hPa) (Environment Canada 2003b) 
11
 During Hurricane Juan, two people died when trees fell on vehicles and two fishermen were lost at sea. In 
the aftermath of the storm a mother and two children died in a house fire caused by the use of candles. 
Notably, the electricity-powered smoke detectors did not function during the power outage. One man died 
while assisting with relief work (Environment Canada 2003c). In Newfoundland, one man lost his life when 
the driveway upon which he was standing was washed out (Environment Canada 2011). 
12
 Costs for Hurricanes Juan and Igor are estimates that include insurable and uninsurable costs, as well as  
costs recovered under the Federal Disaster Financial Assistance Arrangement (DFAA). They do not include 
indirect costs, nor ecological and social costs not reflected in the market.  
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Figure 1.2: I l lustration of the Saff ir-Simpson Hurricane Wind Scale  
(Pensacola News Journal 2013)13 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13
 The Saffir-Simpson scale uses sustained wind speed to classify hurricane intensity, ranging from 1 to 5: 1 
(119-153 km/h), 2 (154-177 km/h), 3 (178-208 km/h), 4 (209-251 km/h), and 5 (252 km/h or higher). 
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in terms of transport networks, including air and marine passenger and freight transport. 
A quintessential example is the diversion of flights to Halifax, Nova Scotia and Gander, 
Newfoundland and Labrador, among other Canadian airports, following the closure of 
American airspace due to the events of 9/11. Halifax and Gander were key nodes in an 
impromptu and massive reconfiguration of global air traffic. Environmentally both 
provinces are situated in the North Atlantic and have common issues related to fisheries 
and offshore oil and gas development 
Extreme weather events, such as Hurricanes Juan and Igor, illustrate the types of 
conditions that are projected to increase under a changing climate (i.e. high winds, intense 
rainfall, storm surges exacerbated by sea level rise) (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change 2012a; Sobel 2014). Such conditions highlight societal reliance on the movement 
of people and goods and our vulnerability when people and goods fail to move. Such 
disruptions can mean that basic, life-supporting necessities are missing in action. Specific 
to transport, road, marine, air, rail, as well as walking and cycling networks experienced 
severe damage, disrupting numerous systems, including emergency services, personal 
transport and commercial operations. In Nova Scotia, fallen trees and electrical lines 
blocked streets, making it treacherous for emergency and power crews to navigate, 
nonetheless average community members (The Chronicle Herald 2003). In 
Newfoundland, communities isolated by Igor experienced difficulty accessing food, water 
and fuel, as well as health-related supplies such as oxygen and insulin (The Telegram 
2010a).  
The hurricane impacts brought daily life to a standstill. In some cases, alternate 
transport modes (i.e. helicopters, boats) and alternate transport routes (e.g. cabin roads, 
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decommissioned bridges) emerged, while in other cases immobility was the optimal or 
only option. Cruise ships destined for Halifax were diverted to Saint John in advance of 
the storm as the tourism industry changed course in response to weather warnings. 
Further, global flows of travellers and highly integrated supply chains that operate 
according to ‘just in time delivery’ principles were disrupted. The crux of this research is 
an exploration of social and ecological implications that emerge when heavy weather 
meets populations that are heavily reliant on mobility for accessing goods and services. 
 
Hurricanes and climate change 
Hurricanes originate in the warm water of the tropics when clusters of thunderstorms, 
shaped by the Coriolis effect, coalesce and rotate, reaching minimum sustained wind 
speeds of 119 kilometres per hour (Hyndman et al. 2008).14 While linking discrete short-
term weather events to long-term climate change trends is tenuous, I explore these 
hurricanes as examples of the type of conditions (i.e. high winds, intense precipitation, 
storm surges) that may be expected under a changing climate. While there is a high level 
of scientific certainty regarding specific impacts of climate change, such as increased 
precipitation intensity and more frequent heat waves, given a lack of historical data and 
changes in monitoring technologies, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
notes the difficultly in assessing long-term variations in hurricane frequency and severity: 
“There is low confidence in any observed long-term (i.e., 40 years or more) increases in 
tropical cyclone activity (i.e., intensity, frequency, duration), after accounting for past 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14
 The terms hurricane, typhoon and cyclone are regional terms for the same weather phenomenon. The 
Coriolis effect also shapes ocean gyres. 
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changes in observing capabilities” (2012a: 8).15 The World Meteorological Organization, 
drawing on National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration data, observes that 2001 to 
2010 was a record-breaking decade in terms of hurricane activity: 
 
[it] was the most active decade since 1855 for tropical cyclones in the Atlantic 
Basin. An average of 15 named storms per year was recorded, well above the 
1981–2010 long-term average of 12 named storms per year. The most active 
season ever recorded was 2005, with a total of 27 named storms, of which 15 
reached hurricane intensity and seven were classified as major hurricanes. 
(Category 3 or higher) (World Meteorological Organization 2013) 
 
The World Meteorological Organization identifies that such anomalous weather is due to 
natural climatic variation and anthropogenic climate change, and that distinguishing 
between the two is a key challenge for climate scientists (World Meteorological 
Organization 2013). Such scientific uncertainty about climate change generally, and the 
impacts of climate change on hurricanes specifically, is indicative of the range of 
uncertainties related to how best to adapt to a changing climate.  
Of relevance to Atlantic Canada, there is evidence of shifts in hurricane activity 
towards the polar regions and away from the equator, due in part to the warming of ocean 
waters which fuel hurricanes into higher latitudes (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change 2012b). Further, there are indications that maximum hurricane wind speeds and 
precipitation levels will increase, with higher sea levels exacerbating storm surge impacts 
(Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 2012b). Critically, even if hurricane activity 
remains the same or even weakens, sea level rise will exacerbate impacts (Sobel 2014). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15
 See Peréz (2001) for an historical documentation of, and related social-economic impacts of, hurricanes 
in Cuba. 
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Rather than focusing on long-term storm trends – data that will emerge over time – severe 
weather events provide an opportunity to focus on short-term disaster prevention, 
preparedness and response strategies (Sobel 2014). My research explores the area of 
overlap between recovering from a severe weather event on one hand and adapting to 
climate change on the other hand. 
 
Research questions  
 
My research was guided by the overarching question: what responses and frames, 
particularly related to social-ecological interactions, emerge when transport networks 
are impacted by hurricanes? I focus on shorter and longer term responses of transport 
providers, as well as the frames presented by key informants including transport providers, 
in addition to the media and government. I define response as an action taken in response 
to unfolding events. I define frame as a discursive means to provide meaning to the same 
unfolding events (Chong and Druckman 2007). To examine the intersection of transport 
networks and hurricanes as a climate change-related risk, I address three questions: 1. 
What sources of resilience emerge? 2. What sources of vulnerability emerge? 3. How can 
greater social and ecological resilience be achieved with respect to transport networks? I 
examine sources of resilience and vulnerability (e.g. social, ecological, infrastructural, 
etc.), as well as ask how greater social and ecological resilience can be achieved. Using 
an inductive case study approach and drawing on media articles, legislative transcripts, 
policy documents and semi-structured interviews with key informants, I identify and 
analyze the resulting responses and frames as they pertain to social-ecological resilience 
and vulnerability. 
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Analytical framework 
This research is grounded within the mobilities literature and informed by the disaster 
literature to elaborate an ecopolitics of mobility (Table 1.2). I complement the applied 
areas of sustainable mobility (i.e. climate change mitigation) (Banister 2008) and 
resilience (i.e. transport, infrastructure, social-ecological) (Brown 2014, Folke 2010), 
with the theoretically oriented mobilities paradigm (Sheller and Urry 2006), including the 
politics of mobility (Cresswell 2010). I inflect the politics of mobility, which provides a 
nuanced approach to the analysis of power within mobility systems, with Foucault’s work 
on governmentality and circulation of societies and ecologies. Informed by the disaster 
sociology of Freudenburg (2009), Klinenberg (2004) and Murphy (2009), I consider the 
possibilities for an ecologically reflexive modernization (Beck 1992) in the field of 
transport, extending the focus of transport resilience from restoring the status quo (e.g. 
technical fixes) to include critically reflecting on the role of mobility in contemporary 
society (Beck 2015). I consider how environmental impacts of mobility can be mitigated, 
and conversely, how disruptions to mobility webs caused by environmental conditions 
can be managed. 
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Table 1.2: Analytical framework combining mobil ity and disaster l iteratures to 
create an ecopolit ical approach to mobil ity 
THEORY THEORISTS/PRACTITIONERS16 
MOBILITY 
Mobilities paradigm 
   Politics of mobility 
Sheller and Urry 
   Cresswell 
 
Sustainable mobility Banister, Schwanen, Anable 
Resilience (with a mobility focus) 
   Transport 
   Infrastructure 
   Social-ecological 
 
Transport Canada; UK Department of Transport 
Brown 
Folke/Adger/Berkes/Holling 
 
Governmentality  
    Social and ecological circulations   
 
Foucault 
 
+ DISASTER 
Disaster sociology Freudenburg/Klinenberg/Murphy 
Reflexive modernization  
   Emancipatory catastrophism 
 
Beck 
= ECOPOLITICAL APPROACH TO MOBILITY   
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16
 As transport and infrastructure are applied fields, I opted to include practitioners to get a sense of how 
these concepts are operationalized. The academic fields are so new that there is little sense of coalescence. 
For example, articles referencing infrastructure resilience typically have no or only citation. In terms of 
transport resilience, Reggiani et al. (2015) and Mattsson and Jenelius  (2015) are more frequently cited (five 
and six citations respectively). Both articles conceptualize transport resilience and vulnerability from 
engineering and economic perspectives. 
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Sheller and Urry (2006) developed the mobilities paradigm to theorize the 
prevalent, but traditionally overlooked, role of mobility in contemporary society. Sheller 
and Urry refer to the recent mobility turn in the social sciences, including ideas from 
“anthropology, cultural studies, geography, migration studies, science and technology 
studies, tourism and transport studies, and sociology” and other fields, as a paradigm 
(2006: 207). A paradigm is an “exemplary way of conceptualising and intervening in 
particular situations” (Schwanen, Banister and Anable 2011: 996). 
For the purposes of this research, and informed by Sheller and Urry’s work on the 
mobilities paradigm, I define mobility as the co-constructed, dynamic movement of 
people, goods and services via transport modes (e.g. airplanes, cars, ferries, rail, transit, 
walking, cycling) as supported and limited by a myriad of social and environmental, as 
well as infrastructural, organizational, informational and technological systems. The 
mobilities paradigm is used in dynamic and diverse ways, including analysis of the 
mobilities and immobilities that resulted from the 2010 Icelandic ash cloud event (see 
Mobilities (2011) special issue) and conceptualizations of post-carbon transport futures 
(Urry 2013, 2011, 2008).  
I draw on Cresswell for an elaboration of the power dynamics expressed via 
mobility, what I term an ecopolitics of mobility, exploring and articulating the social-
ecological power dynamics expressed in transport networks. I incorporate a Foucauldian 
analysis of governmentality, often used in the mobilities paradigm (see Manderscheid, 
Schwanen and Tyfield 2014; Sheller 2016b), exploring how the concepts of circulation, 
surveillance, discipline and security apply to societal interactions with ecological systems. 
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What comes to light is a picture of contemporary mobility as inseparably intertwined with 
flows of fossil fuels and greenhouse gas emissions, iceberg calving and hurricane tracks. 
Transport resilience, as currently practiced, pertains largely to the ability of 
transport networks to withstand disruptions caused by severe weather with a goal of 
minimizing economic and social disruption. Other types of disruption, related to labour 
strife and terrorist threats are also considered but are less central. The field of transport 
resilience tends to focus on restoring the status quo as quickly as possible using largely, 
though not exclusively, engineering-based technical solutions (e.g. raising rail track 
heights, investing in infrastructure maintenance and identifying priority routes). The 
transport resilience literature is fledgling and at this point largely focuses on resilience (as 
compared to transformation to a low-carbon society), namely minimizing economic 
disruption during severe weather events (see Transport Canada 2015, UK Department of 
Transport 2014). My research broadens this focus by questioning societal reliance on 
mobility in the first place. A closely related field is that of infrastructure resilience (i.e. 
next generation infrastructure, green infrastructure) which aims to work with, rather than 
dominate, ecological systems (Brown 2014; see also, for example, Choi et al. 2016). 
Social-ecological systems (SES) theory originates from the discipline of ecology 
and focuses largely on understanding and managing integrated social-ecological systems. 
Within SES, resilience is a complex and emergent concept that varies in terms of both 
theoretical and applied understandings (see Brand and Jax 2007). Resilience refers 
generally to the capacity of a community and/or ecosystem to withstand challenges either 
by returning to its original state (passive resilience), adapting within its current state or by 
transforming into a different state, such as a low-carbon or post-carbon society (Folke et 
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al. 2010; Frantzeskaki et al. 2010). What emerges in my research is the necessity of all 
three in the context of severe weather events: with resilience needed to regain basic 
functioning, adaptability needed to respond to changing climate dynamics and 
transformability needed in terms of transitioning to a post-carbon mobility system for 
long-term resilience. Vulnerability refers broadly to the reduction or absence of these 
capacities and specifically to “the susceptibility to extreme strains on a dynamic system” 
(Reggiani et al. 2015: 1). Social-ecological systems theory informs the disaster risk 
reduction and climate change adaptation fields.  
My research augments the existing literature by foregrounding the environmental 
impacts of transport and, reciprocally, the impacts of severe weather on transport 
networks. I situate mobility not only as socially-technically co-constituted, but also as 
environmentally contingent. I bridge sustainable mobility, with its focus of climate 
change mitigation, descriptive analyses of the contemporary mobilities paradigm, such as 
used in the Icelandic ash cloud event, and imagined social futures, namely Urry’s (2008) 
conceptual work on mobility in a carbon-constrained future. 17  
 Given the intrinsic weather-sensitivity of transport networks and the fact that such 
sensitivity is compounded by increases in severe weather events, I situate this research 
within the disaster literature, including disaster sociology and reflexive modernization (i.e. 
emancipatory catastrophism) (see Andrey, Kertland and Warren (2014) on the interface 
between transport and weather). During extreme weather events, such as hurricanes, the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17
 The Icelandic ash cloud event was a geological phenomenon to which anthropogenic emissions from the 
transport sector are not a contributing factor. However, ash cloud events are related to climate change in 
that the particulate matter released temporarily mitigates the effect of global warming. 
  19 
co-constructed relationship between the human and non-human environment, normally 
taken for granted, is exposed. Concepts of prevention, preparedness, response and 
recovery, as well as risk, hazard and social-technical dimensions are central 
considerations in disaster sociology. Freudenburg et al. (2011) distinguish between 
natural disaster and tragedy: natural disasters are unpreventable, whereas tragedies result 
from human error or hubris. However, in an age of anthropogenic climate change, that is, 
the Anthropocene, what constitutes a ‘natural’ hazard is obfuscated. I draw on Beck’s 
theorization of reflexive risk (1992), as well as his more recent work on the emancipatory 
potential of catastrophe to explore anthropogenic risk.18 
Disasters such as the 2010 BP oil spill (Gramling and Freudenburg 2012), the 
1998 North American ice storm (Murphy 2009) and the 1995 Chicago heat wave 
(Klinenberg 2002) are understudied in terms of mobility considerations. Mobility 
dimensions and implications – such as demand for energy, including transport fuel, that 
contributed to the BP oil spill, treacherous roads caused by the ice storm, and the role 
neighbourhood safety concerns related to mobility (e.g. walking) played in exacerbating 
the vulnerability of seniors during the heat wave – are often described, but are not the 
primary topic of analysis. A notable exception is Hurricane Katrina (2005), in part 
because its mobility implications and failures were starkly apparent in terms of both mass 
and failed evacuations (Cresswell 2008) and the resulting long-term diaspora (Weber and 
Peek 2012).   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18
 ‘Anthropocene’ was coined to describe the current geological epoch, defined as the point at which 
humans have a discernable impact on global ecosystem functioning. Given the social and technical lock-in 
of carbon-intensive mobility pathways, the Anthropocene is taken as a given for the purposes of this 
research,. 
  20 
Reflexive modernization considers the fact that much of the risk managed by 
society is, in fact, created by society (Beck 1992). Beck (2015) forwards the possibility of 
emancipatory catastrophism – what disaster sociologists refer to as windows of 
opportunity – where negative effects of disaster can be leveraged to create positive 
societal change. I also draw on governmentality to explore techniques for managing social 
and environmental circulations – and related risks (e.g. scarcity, inundation) through the 
concepts of surveillance, discipline and security. In sum, my research offers innovative 
contributions by orienting mobilities research to social-ecological considerations, 
particularly climate change and severe weather events, and orienting disaster and risk 
theorization to mobility considerations. I explore the concept of resilience in the context 
of turbulent climatic conditions and disrupted mobility systems. 
 
Theoretical contribution 
From a Foucauldian perspective, discourse matters. It not only describes, but actively 
constructs, the art of government and the orientation of research agendas (Bærenholdt 
2013). Therefore, through my research I developed and elucidated three concepts that are 
valuable in reconceptualizing the social-ecological power dynamics inherent in transport 
networks, as reflected at the interface of the mobilities paradigm, disaster sociology and 
resilience literatures: mobility webs, the ecopolitics of mobility and climate routing. I refer 
to this group of concepts as an ecopolitical approach to mobility. Informed directly by 
empirical data collection and analysis, these concepts offer considerable analytical 
purchase in addressing my research questions. First, they position social-ecological 
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contention as a key source of vulnerability. Second, they position societal adaptation as 
central to increasing resilience and reducing vulnerability. 
 
Mobility webs 
Drawing on my case studies, I combine the concept of network society, which considers 
global linkages forged by information and communication technologies (Castells 2009), 
with the ecological concept of food webs. While the emphasis in network society theory 
is often on information and communication, transportation also plays a role and is key to 
this dissertation including the possibility for virtual mobility to supplant physical mobility. 
I developed the term mobility webs to refer to the integration of mobility via nodes in 
complex and adaptable social-technical-ecological assemblages. The concept of 
ecological webs is used to describe the complex interactions between animals, birds, 
insects and nutrients that allow for ecosystem functioning (Figure 1.3). Disruptions to the 
web, up to a certain threshold, can be accommodated. Likewise, the image of a spider 
web is useful – the design of a spider’s web is tailored to available anchors (e.g. tree 
trunks and poles) and breakages in the web can be worked around, repaired or, alternately, 
the web abandoned. Lastly, the image of the worldwide web given its global reach and 
potential to supplant physical mobility is useful (see Graham (2010) on physical ruptures 
of fibre optic cables in the context of urban infrastructure disruptions). My intention is not 
to overstate the parallels between food and spider webs on one hand, and the socio-
technical-ecological assemblages that constitute human mobility on the other hand, but 
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rather to reframe mobility as environmentally contingent as well as adaptable. What 
emerges is a type of transport ecology and web ontology.19,20 
I differentiate mobility webs from the conventional term, transport networks, 
which can be defined as structures and systems that permit the movement of people, 
goods and services (Graham and Marvin 2001). The term mobility web adds purchase to 
the term transport network by drawing ecological considerations into theorizations of 
human mobility. This phrasing acknowledges and cooperates with, rather than excludes 
and dominates, the environment.	  Such mobility webs often include multiple scales, from 
the local to the global, and may be routine or temporary. These webs may exist within the 
same transport mode (e.g. transit system) or between transport modes (e.g. freight 
container moved from ship to rail to truck). I augment the mobilities paradigm by 
exploring traditional and potential social-ecological power dynamics inherent in mobility 
webs, as well as potential for adaptation and transformation. Further, informed by the 
measures taken in the aftermath of Hurricanes Juan and Igor, I forward the concept of 
shadow webs to describe the materialization of alternative mobility webs in the face of 
disruption to the dominant web. 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19
 See Scott (2015) for work on experiential cycling habitats. 
20
 Deleuze and Guattari’s (1987) concept of rhizomatic formations also offers conceptual purchase (e.g. 
mobility rhizome). 
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Figure 1.3: Schematic of food web as analogy for mobil ity web  
(Panther Science 2015) 
 
 
What emerged in my research is profound recognition on the part of transport 
operators of the environmental contingency of contemporary mobility. This reinforced a 
shift away from the persistent, but continually proven fallible, modernistic notion of 
transport as isolated feats of design and engineering. From the Titanic’s decisive 
interaction with an iceberg in 1912 to the derailment and explosion of a train carrying 
crude oil in the town of Lac-Mégantic, Quebec in 2013, examples of the risks inherent in 
isolating ecological considerations abound. Beck observes that in an era of climate 
change, “the idea that we are masters of the universe has totally collapsed and has turned 
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into the opposite” (2-15: 75). By contrast, what surfaces through my research is the 
possibility of an ecopolitics of mobility under a changing climate.  
By way of cursory illustration, I share two examples reflected in regional transit 
system maps. The first was created by a citizen volunteer who redesigned the London 
tube map to include the River Thames, albeit in a highly stylized format (Figure 1.4). This 
conscientious inclusion was in response to the traditional exclusion of the dominant 
environmental feature by Transport for London. While the intention of the volunteer was 
to facilitate way finding by including the landmark, it simultaneously serves to bring 
nature ‘back in’ to the representation of human mobility (Latour 2004). A second, more 
dramatic example is illustrated in a depiction of the inundation of seawater into the New 
York subway system following Hurricane Sandy (Figure 1.5). In this case, conceptions of 
the ecological as separate from society are washed away, raising questions about the 
wisdom of locating high cost and high demand infrastructure in flood prone regions 
(Sobel 2014). 
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Figure 1.4: Map of the London Underground (Alex Blog 2015) 
 
 
Figure 1.5: Map of New York’s subway system in the aftermath of Hurricane Sandy 
(greyed out portions represent damage caused by storm surge) (Huffington 2012) 
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Ecopolitics of mobility 
 
As I engaged in data collection and analysis, it became apparent that I required a more 
nuanced language to describe the nature of the mobilities and immobilities that resulted 
from both Hurricane Juan and Igor. Cresswell’s six elements of the politics of mobility – 
motive force, velocity, rhythm, route, experience and friction – provided just such a 
language. I adopted the politics of mobility to describe the interface of the environment 
and contemporary social-technical assemblages of mobility. To underscore the view that 
networks and ecological flows and turbulences are interwoven and, in an anthropogenic 
age, co-constructed, I forward the concept of an ecopolitics of mobility. Foucault’s theory 
of governmentality complements the ecopolitics of mobility, particularly as it relates to 
attempts to discipline and secure the circulation of societies and ecologies. Here I use the 
term politics to refer to the complex and co-constructed relations between the social and 
ecological, grounding the broad politics of climate change in specific case studies an 
specifically the framing and management of these relations. 
Given the stark disparities highlighted by extreme events such as Hurricane 
Katrina and the Haitian earthquake, a ‘traditional’ approach to the politics of mobility is 
critical in identifying how different people are differently impacted by the same event (e.g. 
class, age, gender, race). Such social-economic disparities are present though arguably 
less pronounced in Atlantic Canada, idealistically this is due to a more (though far from) 
equal society and realistically due to a more homogeneous population than, for example, 
New Orleans. Examples of such dynamics that emerged in the cases of Hurricane Juan 
and Igor include tensions involving youth, frictions between urban and rural communities, 
and adverse impacts on lower-income households and individuals who are precariously 
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employed. Research into these issues, as well as issues of longer-term recovery, is 
valuable and necessary. I opt to focus on one particular political dimension of the storms, 
social-ecological dynamics, not to discount the import of other intersectional politics but 
to foreground environmental considerations.  
 
Climate routing 
Elaborating an ecopolitics of mobility and informed by the work of Beck (1992), 
Freudenburg (2012) and Murphy (2009) on environmental risk, I consider the possibilities 
for an ecologically reflexive modernization in the field of mobility, extending the current 
focus of transport resilience from restoring the status quo to include, first, critically 
reflecting on the role of mobility in contemporary society, and second, considering how 
environmental flows (e.g. hydrology) and systems (e.g. forest regeneration) can be 
accommodated in concert with mobility webs. How can the environmental impacts of 
mobility be mitigated (e.g. decarbonization), and conversely, how can disruptions to 
mobility networks caused by environmental conditions be managed?  
To this end, I adapt the marine navigation concept of weather routing, which 
refers to the practice of altering a ship’s course to take maximum advantage of tidal, 
current and wind conditions to reduce physical resistance of the ship moving through 
water. I posit the concept of climate routing. As conceived, climate routing involves six 
measures – creating a transport resilience task force (i.e. creating a forum to discuss social 
response to severe weather), deliberating decentralization (i.e. countering a push to 
centralization of services such as education and health care), internalizing externalities 
(i.e. pricing fossil fuels to reflect the environmental costs of carbon emissions), planning 
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for green and blue flows (i.e. incorporating natural processes such as forest regeneration 
and river hydrology into the built environment), rebranding redundancy (i.e. countering a 
push to streamline supply chains and services) and thinking flex (i.e. fostering a culture 
that accommodates disruptions and delays due to environmental forces) – where primary 
considerations are lessening social-ecological contention, increasing resilience, 
questioning mobility practices and maintaining or increasing quality of life (see Chapter 
7: Navigating Transition).   
 
Practical contribution 
In terms of practical contributions, I find that in the aftermath of Hurricanes Juan and Igor, 
reinstatement of mobility was an uppermost priority with a dominant tension between the 
frame ‘we’ve never seen anything like it’ and ‘we need to get things back to normal as 
quickly as possible.’ I develop a list of measures used for managing mobility in the 
preparation, response, recovery and mitigation phases of disaster that emerged out of 
interview and document analysis, as well as compare the resiliencies and vulnerabilities 
of mobility webs in Nova Scotia and Newfoundland with reflections on future 
implications. For example, officials in both Nova Scotia and Newfoundland responded 
with a suite of short-term preparedness, response and recovery measures specific to 
mobility, including monitoring weather, reconnecting roads and increasing redundancies. 
In the case of Nova Scotia, a key source of vulnerability in the context of 
Hurricane Juan was the entanglement of trees and power lines. Key sources of resilience 
include the cultural instinct to batten down the hatches, the adaptable role of transit and 
the coordination of emergency services. Residents successfully, if somewhat precariously, 
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governed their own mobility (i.e. Bærenholdt (2013) on governmobility). Further, the 
experience of successive intentional (e.g. 9/11), technical (e.g. SwissAir crash 1998) and 
ecological (e.g. White Juan blizzard 2004) adversities fostered a culture of all-hazards 
disaster readiness. In the case of Newfoundland, a key source of vulnerability in the 
context of Hurricane Igor was the scale of road washouts combined with limited routes, 
modes (e.g. car, truck), fuel types and fuel storage. Key sources of resilience were 
coordination and cooperation between different levels of government, the private sector 
and community members demonstrating a high capacity to restore the road network to 
basic functionality within ten days and coordination between community members to 
cope in the interim. 
Each jurisdiction embraced varying long-term responses. Nova Scotia, which 
experienced diverse extreme events leading up to and following Hurricane Juan, took the 
opportunity to reflect critically on disaster preparedness, climate change and mobility. By 
comparison, my analysis finds that while Newfoundland changed its approach to 
emergency preparedness, it adopted voluntary climate change measures and did not 
question the mobility status quo, skirting critical reflection on the implications of mobility 
disruptions in the context of severe weather.  
 Officials in both provinces advocated the frame ‘stay at home and off the roads’ 
and provided regular updates on the status of infrastructure reconnections (electricity in 
Nova Scotia; roads in Newfoundland). In terms of the governance of mobility, a tension 
arises between what I term charismatic mobility, that is the compulsion of some to 
experience the approaching storm by travelling to coastal sites or viewing the aftermath 
of the storm in a form of disaster tourism, and strongly-worded advisories for immobility 
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promoted by emergency management officials. Particularly in Nova Scotia, officials 
expressed frustration at residents who opted to venture out into the weather. By contrast, 
Newfoundland officials praised the resilience and initiative of community members in 
meeting their own needs, diverting attention from larger picture issues such as disaster 
preparedness, infrastructure design and maintenance, as well as climate change mitigation 
and adaptation.  
 
Travelogue 
 
Given my subject matter, I infuse my writing with a sense of the movement and precarity 
involved with both physical and academic journeys. To this end, I have opted for a 
travelogue format – a recording and telling of a journey. As Lockie states in the inaugural 
issue of Environmental Sociology: 
 
This is, of course, a journey without end. No matter how much effort has been 
expended attempting to apprehend the relationships between environment and 
society, there will always be gaps to be filled, unexpected problems to resolve, 
new travellers to welcome and fresh insights to consider. We have only begun to 
think through the implications of more ecologically sophisticated social theory 
for the practice of sociology more generally and, as environmental sociology 
develops, new challenges will emerge. (2015: 2) 
 
This journey is both through time and space in the form of two case studies, or ports of 
call, of coastal regions impacted by Atlantic hurricanes. The journey is also intellectual, 
reflecting the process of expanding or charting spheres of knowledge. I start the journey 
with Canadian novelist Michael Ondatjee’s inventory of African winds, the incubator of 
Atlantic hurricanes, including Juan and Igor. I begin each chapter with excerpts of poems 
by ‘ocean biographer’ Sue Goyette (1964-) who lives in Halifax and paintings by the 
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Nova Scotian realist artist Alex Colville (1920-2013) for whom the tension entailed in 
movement was a central theme. Select illustrative photos and figures from media sources 
are also included. These pieces echo and enrich the academic writing, providing an 
auditory and visual dimension to the travelogue. The poems, paintings and text work in 
concert to convey the research findings. 
The dissertation is organized to echo a sea voyage. We have already ‘Set Sail’ in 
this the Introduction. In ‘View from the Crow’s Nest: Literature Review,’ I provide a 
bird’s eye view of the academic literature. In ‘Charting Course: Methods,’ I justify the 
research methods selected. Moving from these foundational chapters, I detail the research 
findings. In the two Ports of Call, I detail the mobility webs for each storm-impacted 
region and give an example of the ecopolitics of mobility entailed therein, before I 
explore the responses and frames used in each hurricane event as they pertain to mobility. 
Moving in chronological order, the first ‘Port of Call: Results’ is Hurricane Juan, 
characterized by extensive tree falls that blocked roads. The second ‘Port of Call: Results’ 
is Hurricane Igor, characterized by extensive flooding and road washouts. Material 
related to Hurricane Juan was previously published in Between the Issues (Sodero 2014a). 
Material related to Hurricane Igor was previously published in the Newfoundland 
Quarterly (Sodero 2014b) and Environmental Sociology (Sodero and Stoddart 2015).  
In ‘Zone of Imperfect Visibility: Analysis,’ I compare responses and frames, 
examining the theoretical insights and applied lessons that are yielded in terms of the 
social-ecological resilience of mobility webs in a changing climate. I summarize best 
practices, as well as elaborate on mobility webs and an ecopolitics of mobility as useful 
reconceptualizations of the social-ecological power dynamics expressed in mobility webs. 
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In ‘Navigating Transition: Conclusion,’ I reflect on my methodological and analytical 
approaches, and detail climate routing as a conceptual way forward.  
 
Captain 
Given my literary orientation, this positions me as captain. My background as a 
researcher provides important context in terms of both my interest in, and entry points to, 
this topic. The seed for this research was planted in 2003 when I was an intern for 
UNICEF in Central Asia. During the course of six months overseas I heard only two 
references to Canada on the television news media; both related to severe weather events 
that caused states of emergency to be declared in Halifax: Hurricane Juan (September 
2003) and a blizzard dubbed White Juan (February 2004). The fact that I had travelled 
around the world to help others when my own community was in need of assistance made 
an impression. Upon my return, I saw how Hurricane Juan devastated (but also 
rejuvenated via disturbance ecology) Point Pleasant Park, an expansive green space in my 
neighbourhood. The impact of severe weather was literally starting to hit home. Years 
later, walking to work daily along the waterfront I gained familiarity with the tidal range 
and harbour dynamics – some days the tide was almost high enough to top substantial 
wharves. The vulnerability of Halifax’s downtown coastal infrastructure, where I enjoy 
the Farmers’ Market, the Al Fresco Film Festo, restaurant patios and an expanse of 
bikeable boardwalk, became increasingly apparent. Notably, I did not directly experience 
either of the hurricanes that are the focus of this research. 
 My academic and professional work also informed this project. As a Master of 
Environmental Studies student (MES Dalhousie 2001), I studied Transportation Demand 
  33 
Management, which employs a suite of infrastructural, financial and behavioural 
incentives and disincentives to curb transport demand and decrease related emissions and 
infrastructure investments. I later worked for the Ecology Action Centre, one of Nova 
Scotia’s most prolific environmental organizations, where I advocated for sustainable 
transportation, including the implementation of university and workplace transit pass pilot 
projects. Through the Ecology Action Centre, colleagues and I conceived of and 
developed a small-scale transportation infrastructure grant program funded by Conserve 
Nova Scotia. In its first of four years, nine projects across Nova Scotia were funded. 
 I also worked closely with a colleague to develop a comprehensive Green 
Mobility Strategy. We conducted dynamic and interactive public and stakeholder 
consultation sessions in eight urban and rural communities. Our goal was to work with 
community members to learn about their transportation needs and vision, as well as to 
identify opportunities to decrease environmental degradation and increase accessibility. 
The Green Mobility Strategy was launched in 2008 and informed the Nova Scotia 
Sustainable Transportation Strategy (2013), one of the documents included in the policy 
review for this project. I know a number of individuals who participated in interviews for 
the Nova Scotian case study component of this project due to past professional 
engagement.  
After working at the Ecology Action Centre, I researched the development of 
British Columbia’s carbon tax with a focus on the transport sector (MSc Oxford 2010). 
Having worked in the nexus of climate change and transport from a mitigation standpoint, 
including both incentives and disincentives, it was a natural progression to study how 
transport networks are impacted by, and respond to, climate change. Therefore I 
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embarked on this journey with a firm grounding in transport and climate policy, and 
immersing myself in the mobilities and disaster literatures. 
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2  VIEW FROM THE CROW’S NEST: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
We woke one morning and the ocean was gone. Some of us 
were relieved. Who can blame it if it had been our audience? 
 
We kept forgetting our lines and driving into the props. 
If we were the audience then its dramatic monologue was going on 
 
forever. It was either all plot or all character. Setting, 
if you were a landscape artist. You can see how difficult 
 
a relationship it was. We’d never met anything so stoic. 
Decisive yet meandering.  
 
Sue Goyette 
Fifty-two 
2013 
 
Alex Colville 
Family and Rainstorm 
1955 
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In the poem the ocean is gone – “turns up missing” to borrow Latour’s (2004) phrase – 
frustrated by its inept human audience. In the painting the family leaves, a day at the 
beach ended by an approaching storm. Traditionally, sociology turned its back on 
ecological considerations causing Beck (2015) to ask: “How can we reinvent sociology 
for the 21st century?” 
 
 
Introduction  
 
In this leg of the journey, I explore how social-ecological dynamics are treated in the 
literature. By combining the mobilities and disaster literatures I developed an ecopolitical 
approach to mobility. First, I survey the conceptual and empirical literatures, starting with 
sustainable mobility and resilience as pragmatic concepts. Second, I draw on the 
mobilities paradigm including governmentality and circulation as theoretical approaches 
to mobility. Third, I examine disaster sociology and reflexive modernization as 
theorizations of disaster risk in tightly coupled social, technical and ecological systems. I 
conclude with a discussion of theoretical fits and tensions between these complementary, 
but diverse, literatures. 
 
 
Sustainable mobility  
 
What constitutes sustainable mobility and how such a desired state can be achieved, are 
central questions addressed by the interdisciplinary field of transport studies. The 
literature focuses predominantly on how to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions (i.e. 
decarbonization) (Schwanen, Banister and Anable 2011). More recently (i.e. since 2011), 
there has been a growing emphasis in the literature on climate change adaptation, 
transport and infrastructure resilience and the intersection between transport and disaster. 
Transport studies, as it relates to climate change, tends to be technically oriented and 
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focuses on five main areas: technology uptake and diffusion, economic instruments, 
transportation infrastructure and land use planning, behaviour change and policy 
(Schwanen, Banister and Anable 2011). There is a predominant emphasis on “physical 
infrastructure, price and technology and extensive reliance on forecasting models” 
(Schwanen, Banister and Anable 2011: 999). The literature is “vibrant and varied, 
exploring multiple pathways in which carbon use can be reduced” (Schwanen, Banister 
and Anable 2011: 996). Morency (2015) discusses the challenge of evaluating the 
sustainability of mobility systems, including the number and weighting of numerous 
indicators (i.e. an overemphasis on carbon emissions), data availability issues and lack of 
understanding of causal chains. It is generally recognized that decarbonization “can only 
be achieved (if at all)” through the implementation of multiple and diverse interventions 
(Schwanen, Banister and Anable 2011: 996). Less prevalent, and key gaps I address 
through my research, is the circular relationship between transport and climate change, as 
experienced through disruptive severe weather events, as well as critical reflection on the 
centrality of mobility to contemporary society.  
Schwanen, Banister and Anable call for greater engagement with the social 
sciences: 
 
Techno-economic and psychological thinking provides compelling insights into 
transport’s decarbonisation. Yet, like all scientific perspectives, techno-economic 
and psychological approaches are inevitably partial; they articulate the objects of 
knowledge/government in particular ways, expelling certain of their facets into 
invisibility. Examples of sidelined facets include the societal embedding of new 
transport technologies, the inherent uncertainty and novelty of new technologies 
and such economic instruments as PCT [personal carbon trading] insert into travel 
behaviours, the semi-conscious more-than-rational dimensions of those 
behaviours, and the non-linear and catastrophic dimensions of climate change. 
(emphasis added) (2011:1002) 
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Even the examples cited are strongly anchored within technical, economic and 
psychological concerns. It is the last point, the “non-linear and catastrophic dimensions of 
climate change,” that is the greatest departure in terms of the current sustainable mobility 
research agenda and the starting point for my research.  
Schwanen, Banister and Anable (2011) argue for a pluralism of theoretical and 
methodological approaches, observing that different perspectives trigger different 
questions. They posit that the social sciences are more suited to answer questions such as: 
 
• What is the kind of world that we would like to live in and find desirable and 
how should mobility be configured in that world?... 
• Will business models in manufacturing and leisure/tourism based on current 
global production chains and aviation networks remain feasible? 
• Is mobility in principle a right to which people are entitled? (2011: 1004). 
 
Bringing to the fore severe weather events of the type anticipated under a changing 
climate, my research uses a social science perspective to analyze social, ecological and 
technical disruption and transition. A socio-technical transition is a  
 
major shift or step change, in which an existing socio-technical system – a cluster 
of aligned elements including technology, regulations, consumer practices, 
cultural meanings, markets, infrastructure, scientific knowledge, supply and 
maintenance networks – is durably reconfigured (emphasis added) (Schwanen, 
Banister and Anable 2011:1003). 
 
While Schwanen, Banister and Anable (2011) focus on the example of the innovation, 
adoption and diffusion of electric vehicle technology, I focus on the ecological 
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phenomena of severe weather events.21 Further, my use of a case study approach with a 
focus on societal responses and frames complements the model-oriented field of transport 
studies (Schwanen, Banister and Anable 2011). 
 My research builds on contrasting approaches to transport planning (Table 2.1). In 
the 20th century, transport planning focused on roads and cars, on engineering and 
economics. In recent decades, a gradual (and far from fully realized) shift towards 
sustainable mobility gained momentum. Sustainable mobility humanizes traditional 
approaches to transport planning, incorporating social dimensions of transport decisions 
(e.g. liveability).  
To this, based on my empirical case study research, I add my own iteration: an 
ecopolitical approach to mobility. This approach more consciously accommodates and 
integrates ecological circulations and flows. For example, in traffic planning, a street is 
viewed one-dimensionally as a road for car use; under sustainable mobility a street is 
viewed as a space with potential to be liveable and vibrant (see Appleyard 1969); while 
under an ecopolitical approach to mobility, the street is viewed as a component of an 
ecological system, including urban forests and hydrology. Likewise, in terms of velocity, 
traffic planning focuses on facilitating flows of car traffic; sustainable mobility focuses on 
slowing movement down (e.g. traffic calming); while an ecopolitical approach to mobility 
accommodates both fast (e.g. storm surge) and slow (e.g. sea level rise) ecological 
processes. Based on my case studies, I forward an ecopolitical approach to mobility as the 
next iteration of transport planning. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21
 With the recent emergence of UAVs (unmanned aerial vehicles or drones), driverless cars and trucks, ride 
sharing services (e.g. Uber), the transport sector is rapidly innovating. 
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Table 2.1: Contrasting approaches to transport planning  
(Adapted from Banister 2008 and Marshall 2001) 
TRAFFIC 
PLANNING 
(MARSHALL 2001) 
SUSTAINABLE  
MOBILITY 
(BANISTER 2008) 
ECOPOLITICS OF 
MOBILITY  
(SODERO 2016) 
Physical dimensions Social dimensions Ecological, social and physical 
dimensions 
Mobility Accessibility Human accessibility and non-
human mobility 
Traffic/ car focus People focus, either in (or on) 
a vehicle or on foot 
People as part of larger 
ecosystem 
Large scale Local scale Interscalar 
Street as road Street as space Street as ecological corridor  
Motorized transport All transport modes in 
carbon-intensity hierarchy  
Ecological flows included 
within considerations of all 
modes of human mobility 
Forecasting traffic Visioning cities Transforming social-
ecological relationship 
Modelling  Developing scenarios and 
modelling 
Imagining futures (e.g. 
utopian, dystopian) 
Evaluating economic criteria Analyzing multiple criteria, 
including environmental and 
social  
Analyzing multiple criteria, 
including environmental (e.g. 
carbon budgeting), social, 
safety (e.g. disaster relief), 
economic (e.g. infrastructure 
maintenance)  
Travelling as derived demand Travelling as derived demand 
as well as a valued activity  
Travelling as derived demand, 
valued (in)activity and 
environmentally contingent 
Demand-based Management-based Ecologically-constrained 
Speeding up traffic Slowing down movement  Accommodating fast and slow 
social, ecological and 
technical movements  (e.g. 
tipping points, turbulence) 
Minimizing travel time Aiming for reasonable travel 
times and travel time 
reliability 
Recognizing timeless time 
including “longue durée” or 
“glacial time (Castells 2009) 
Segregating people and 
traffic 
Integrating people and traffic Incorporating ecological flows 
and turbulences with flows of 
people and traffic 
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Resilience 
Resilience is a burgeoning literature. There are numerous resilience typologies, from 
individual/psychological (e.g. Ungar 2015) and community (e.g. Fleming 2014), from 
material (Meza et al. 2015) to climate (Adger et al. 2011). I focus on just three strands: 
social-ecological systems theory, transport resilience and infrastructure resilience. Social-
ecological systems theory originates from ecology (see Holling 1973), while transport and 
infrastructure resilience are newly emergent applied fields. In combination, they provide a 
suite of concepts valuable in articulating ecologically contingent mobility webs. 
 
Social-ecological systems 
 
Social-ecological systems theory emphasizes the inextricable links and reciprocal impacts 
between social and ecological systems, highlighting the potential for adaptive and 
transformative change (Folke et al. 2010; Folke, Colding and Berkes 2003). The social-
ecological systems literature examines how relationships between the human and the non-
human environment contribute to, or undermine, social-ecological resilience (Folke et al. 
2010). Social-ecological systems are defined as having three trajectories: resilience, 
adaptability and transformability. Resilience in this context refers to returning to a normal 
state as quickly as possible, that is, getting things back to normal or bouncing back 
(Holling 1996). The term transport resilience, as employed by the Canadian and British 
governments, constitutes a combination of passive and adaptive resilience. Similarly, in 
the case of the Icelandic ash cloud there was a strong discursive push to ‘get Europe 
moving’ (Budd et al. 2011). The term basin of attraction is used to describe the rigidity or 
propensity of systems to remain or return to the status quo (Figure 2.1). 
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Adaptability and transformability refer to leveraging the disruption caused by an 
event as an opportunity to implement systemic changes that reflect a greater consideration 
of ecological limits (i.e. ecological resilience; bouncing back even better). Adaptability 
occurs within the dominant paradigm or development trajectory, while transformability 
shifts to a new paradigm or development trajectory (Adger et al. 2011; Folke et al. 2010). 
The latter aligns with the mobilities transition, a term used in the mobilities literature to 
describe efforts to shift to post-carbon (i.e. decarbonized) mobility systems (Caletrio 
2015). Social-ecological systems theory focuses on understanding social-ecological 
dynamics as well as exploring the potential for adaptive and transformative change in the 
relationship between the human and non-human environment (Frantzeskaki et al. 2010). 
Extreme weather events, such as hurricanes, provide windows of opportunity to “navigate 
social-ecological transitions,” such as switching from high carbon to low carbon 
development trajectories (Folke et al. 2010: 20).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  43 
Figure 2.1: Visualization of passive (engineering) versus transformative 
(ecological)  resi l ience (The Royal Society 2015) 
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There are numerous, albeit similar, definitions of resilience in academia and beyond. The 
Stockholm Resilience Centre uses an accessible and descriptive definition:  
 
The capacity of a system be it a landscape, a coastal area or a city – to deal with 
change and continue to develop. This means the capacity to withstand shocks 
and disturbances such as a financial crisis or use such an event to catalyse 
renewal and innovation. (No date: 3) 
 
 
The American National Academy of Sciences succinctly defines resilience as “the ability 
to prepare and plan for, absorb, recover from, and more successfully adapt to adverse 
events” (2012: 1). The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change elaborates upon this 
definition, referencing the anticipation of such events, timely recovery and the possibility 
of improving services:  
 
The ability of a system and its component parts to anticipate, absorb, 
accommodate, or recover from the effects of a hazardous event in a timely and 
efficient manner, including through ensuring the preservation, restoration, or 
improvement of its essential basic services. (2012a) 
 
 
(see Binder et al. (2013) and Cutter et al. (2008) for comparisons of resilience 
frameworks).  
In general public discourse, resilience is defined as bouncing back or bouncing 
back even better. For the purposes of this research, I define resilience as the capacity of 
stakeholders of an integrated human-environment system, such as a mobility web, to 
anticipate, prepare for, respond to, recover from and improve upon quality of life in the 
face of an adverse event. This definition includes the specificity of the Stockholm 
Resilience Centre’s definition, as well as the variety of instructive verbs included in the 
definitions of the American National Academy of Sciences and Intergovernmental Panel 
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on Climate Change. I opted, however, to exclude references to ‘timely and efficient 
recovery,’ as though while important, they occur in the Hurricane Juan and Igor case 
studies as characteristic of passive resilience rather than transformation. 
Social-ecological systems theory holds that experimentation and intervention at all 
scales can have knock-on effects that precipitate adaptive and transformational change in 
support of resilience on broader scales (Folke et al. 2010, see Gunderson and Holling 
2002 on panarchy). As linear prediction models become less viable under changing 
climatic conditions, a dynamic approach may foster heterogeneous resilience initiatives. 
Such adaptation and transformation can be proactive or forced upon a community, but in 
either case may be hindered by social constraints such as habits, identities, values, power 
dynamics or budgets (Brand and Jax 2007). Central to my research is exploring the extent 
to which the experience of a hurricane was viewed, and pursued as an opportunity to 
initiate change. 
In opposition to notions of equilibrium in both social and ecological systems, 
social-ecological systems theory recognizes and incorporates the “cycles of organization, 
collapse, and renewal” (Ommer 2007: 14). Such cycles may include emergent trends, 
abrupt changes, tipping points and regime shifts (Brand and Jax 2007). The “interplay of 
disturbance and organization” – or flow and turbulence – are central to social-ecological 
systems theory (Brand and Jax 2007: 27).  
 Highly optimized tolerance refers to a system that is resilient in the face of certain 
types of disturbances (e.g. snow storms), but are rendered vulnerable by infrequent (albeit 
increasing) disturbances (e.g. ice storms) (Folke et al. 2010). Jensen refers to the 
“experience of difference between ‘normal use’ and an ‘abnormal situation’” (2011: 70), 
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while Brown describes the risk that a “narrow focus of optimizing the various parts of 
complex systems may undermine the sustainability of the whole” (2014: 2). 
Dynamics, uncertainty and variability underpin social-ecological systems theory, 
making it amenable to the issue of climate change generally and hurricanes specifically. 
The global climate is complex. Confounding factors such as anthropogenic climate 
change and the related cascade of positive feedback effects contribute further 
complications. Likewise, hurricanes are variable in terms of frequency, intensity and 
storm track, and the impacts of climate change on hurricane activity is unclear, fostering 
uncertainty for decision-makers and community members alike (Intergovernmental Panel 
on Climate Change 2012a).  
Social-ecological systems theory focuses on local resilience initiatives that draw 
on the experience and expertise of the local community, government and ecologists 
(Folke et al. 2003). Adger et al. (2005) assess resilience in the context of coastal disasters, 
arguing that participation from multiple levels of government is critical. Adger explores 
the complexities entailed in trying to actualize an ecological resilience approach. For 
example, Adger et al. (2011) through an assessment of nine climate change initiatives (e.g. 
biofuel production) find substantial variability in the effectiveness of such interventions 
on overall social-ecological resilience (e.g. industrial-scale biofuel production 
compromises resilience).  
  In a study of social-ecological practices in response to climate change in an 
Inuvialuit community in northern Canada, Berkes and Jolly (2002) identify two types of 
transitions undertaken by community members: short-term coping mechanisms, such as 
changing where and when they hunt, and longer-term cultural and ecological adaptation, 
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such as diversifying hunting practices and adapting food sharing customs. From a policy 
perspective, Ommer (2007) uses a social-ecological health approach to study the social 
and ecological stress that results from economic restructuring in rural coastal 
communities in Newfoundland and British Columbia. Adopting a comparative historical 
lens, Ommer examines how policies in different sectors and at different scales intersect to 
either enhance or undermine resilience. Mobility is an underexamined dynamic of both of 
these studies: hunting-related movement in the former case and work-related migration in 
the latter case. 
One of the main critiques of the resilience framework is its insufficient treatment 
of social power. Davidson (2010), for example, questions the comparability of social and 
ecological systems due to the differentiating factor of human agency. Such critiques are 
also raised in terms of Latour’s Actor-Network Theory, which assigns symmetry to 
human and non-human actants. Latour’s work is akin to resilience theory in that 
ecological dynamics emerge from the background (see Latour (1996) on the failed 
personal rapid transit system Aramis). Such strongly ecological and material approaches, 
I argue, shed light upon processes of social power, as well as social vulnerability. Despite 
these concerns about the applicability of resilience theory in terms of social contexts (see 
Davidson 2012, 2010; Weichselgartner and Kelman 2014), the intersection of climate 
change, hurricanes and mobility provides a ripe opportunity to further elaborate social-
ecological systems theory. 
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Transport resilience  
What does resilience look like in the face of two intersecting trends that help define the 
contemporary era: the increase in severe weather events and the intensification of 
mobility in our daily lives? Transport resilience is an emerging field. By briefly profiling 
applied work underway in Canada and the United Kingdom, I highlight how, from a 
Foucauldian perspective, the dominant approach to transport resilience is ensuring the 
continuation of circulation. While important, I enlarge such conversations, questioning 
assumptions of our societal reliance on fossil-fuel intensive circulation to meet basic 
needs.  
Transport Canada is broaching the topic of resilience within the context of climate 
change. A nation-wide assessment of risks and adaptation practices in the transport sector 
is being developed, with an anticipated publication date of March 2016, organized by 
region and with a chapter dedicated to urban issues (Transport Canada 2015). Given the 
rapidly changing climatic conditions in the Arctic, there is a Northern Transportation 
Adaptation Initiative that focuses on melting permafrost and increases in navigable water, 
as well as assessment of three northern airports “to identify those components of the 
specified airport infrastructure that are/may be at risk of failure, damage, loss of service 
and/or deterioration from extreme climatic events” (Transport Canada 2015). 22 
Simultaneous efforts to mitigate the impacts of climate change on transport, as well as 
efforts to leverage environmental changes (i.e. increasing navigable waters) to enable 
greater fossil-fueled mobility are evidenced. 	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 Climate change impacts are exacerbated in polar regions. 
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More broadly, the Economic Analysis group studies supply chain disruptions in 
terms of labour, global supply, capacity and demand, while the Marine Security Group  
addresses the issue of transport resilience by, for instance, promoting the development of 
regional marine commerce resilience plans (the Canadian marine sector generates 
approximately $10 billion per year). These are examples of supply chain resilience, a 
counterpart of transport resilience that has an even greater economic emphasis: 
“contemporary efforts to protect supply chains invest logistical systems with biological 
imperatives to flow and prescribe “resilience” as a means of sustaining not only human 
life but the system itself” (Cowen 2014: 3).  
Foucault, too, acknowledges this self-fulfilling or self-propelling nature of 
circulation: 
 
By ‘circulation’ we should understand not only this material network [e.g. of 
roads, rivers, and canals] that allows the circulation of goods and possibly of 
men, but also the circulation itself, that is to say, the set of regulations, 
constraints, and limits, or the facilities and encouragements that will allow the 
circulation of men and things in the kingdom and possibly beyond its borders. 
(2007: 235) 
 
Current transport resilience work focuses on the maintenance of circulation, a practice 
that, on one hand, directly responds to extreme weather and changing environments that 
result from climate change, and on the other hand, appears divorced from the contribution 
of the transport sector to climate change. Transport resilience as currently framed is 
insufficient in the context of anthropogenic climate change. 
The focus of transport resilience on minimizing economic disruption is not limited 
to Canada. In response to a series of flooding events in the winter of 2013/14, the United 
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Kingdom (2014) developed a comprehensive analysis of transport resilience which 
explores vulnerabilities by mode: national highways, local roads, rail, marine and ports. 
The report defines resilience as “the ability of the transport network to withstand the 
impacts of extreme weather, to operate in the face of such weather and to recover 
promptly from its effects” (2014: 8). The authors identify three components of resilience: 
physical, organizational and communicative: 
 
It is about increasing the physical resilience of transport systems to extreme 
weather, so when extreme weather is experienced, people and goods can 
continue to move. It would be both very difficult and prohibitively expensive to 
ensure total physical resilience, so secondly it is equally about ensuring 
processes and procedures to restore services and routes to normal as quickly as 
possible…. Thirdly, as part of this, it is essential to ensure clear and effective 
communications to passengers and transport users so that the impact of 
disruption on people and businesses is minimised. (2014: 8-9) 
 
The guiding analysis centres on minimizing disruption to the economic system in the face 
of growing transport demand. To this end, the report identifies a series of short-term 
measures to be implemented in 2014/15 (e.g. raising track height; flood-proofing 
electrical equipment; testing communication plans), as well as longer-term measures (e.g. 
developing Asset Management Plans; identifying a priority critical transport network; 
improving the granularity of weather forecasting). While such efforts are laudable, they 
are framed in isolation, distinct from complementary efforts to mitigate both emissions 
and transport demand. 
Atun (2014) frames ‘transport resilience’ in a more satisfying fashion, titling her 
book: Improving Societal Resilience to Disaster: A Case Study of London’s 
Transportation System. Through this framing, societal resilience, rather than transport 
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resilience, arises as the goal. Transport is one sector through which larger social resilience 
can be achieved. Therefore, what emerges are two interdependent fields: transport 
resilience which focuses on the functionality of transport systems and social resilience 
which focuses on the functioning of society. In term of mobility webs, transport resilience 
pertains to improvisations and adaptations within the web, while societal resilience 
questions the extent and flexibility of the web, examining options for making nodes 
within the web more robust and self-sufficient. My research builds on these preliminary 
efforts in transport resilience, particularly infrastructural and informational resilience 
practices, questioning the mobility status quo in a time of anthropogenic climate change. 
Rather than focusing on maintaining carbon intensive mobility webs, how can we 
mitigate their climatological impact (Cowen 2014)? How can extensive mobility webs be 
decarbonized? 
 
Infrastructure resilience  
Transport resilience is closely related to the field of infrastructure resilience. Brown 
(2014) describes the concept of next generation infrastructure. Such an approach views 
infrastructure systems as tightly coupled with each other (e.g. electricity systems and road 
networks), as well as tightly coupled with ecological processes and, by extension, 
potential environmental harms. In the past, in line with conventional approaches to 
transport planning, 
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the designers of industrial infrastructure presumed an inexhaustible supply of 
cheap energy, the efficacy of simple and single-purpose solutions to complex 
problems, and the necessity of brute-force mastery of nature, all executed with 
bullet proof confidence in endless economic growth on an finite planet. (Orr in 
Brown 2014: xi).  
 
Next generation infrastructure, in line with sustainable mobility and ecopolitics of 
mobility (Table 2.2), aims to work with, rather than dominate, ecological systems. The 
next generation infrastructure approach is closely related to the field of green 
infrastructure and eco-DRR (ecological disaster risk reduction), which embrace the use of 
ecological methods (e.g. restoring wetlands as storm buffers, planting trees to absorb 
urban stormwater) in contrast to hard, infrastructural approaches (United Nations 
Environment Program 2013).23  
Brown argues for decoupling critical infrastructure (e.g. transport, water, power) 
from both “carbon-intensive and ecologically harmful technologies” (2014: 3). Rather 
than avoiding or denying ecological processes, next generation infrastructure 
practitioners asks, “how can we capitalize on the connectedness of our critical systems to 
nature and to each other?” (2014: 7). Following environmentalist Wendell Berry, 
proponents ask: “What will nature let us do here? What will nature help us do here?” (Orr 
in Brown 2014: xii). The result can be infrastructure that is both more resilient to climate 
change, as well as more cost-effective. In a similar vein, Zimmerman (2012) advocates 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23
 See also the Environmental Commissioner of Ontario (2014) for a discussion of infrastructure resilience 
and climate readiness, with an emphasis on stormwater management. Nova Scotia’s Clean Foundation and 
the Insurance Bureau of Canada are examples of other organization that have stormwater management pilot 
projects. Nova Scotia’s Ecology Action Centre (2015) has a Living Shorelines projects which promotes and 
pilots ecological approaches to coastal erosion. 
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for the simultaneous consideration of transport, environment and security (including 
terrorism and natural hazards), leveraging synergies between these matters of concern. 
By advocating for a “self-conscious” approach to infrastructure design, Brown 
practices a reflexive and emancipatory approach to resilience (Beck 1992). Brown 
identifies five guiding principles to reimagine society’s approach to infrastructure: 
 
1. Systems should be multipurpose, interconnected, and synergistic. 
2. Infrastructure should contribute few or no carbon emissions. 
3. Infrastructure should work with natural processes. 
4. Infrastructure should improve social contexts and serve local constituencies. 
5. Infrastructure should be resilient and adapt to predicted changes brought along by 
an unstable climate. (2014: 11) 
 
Brown raises the possibility of a “future-proof” public works that will withstand climate 
change impacts (2014: 12), contrasting with Urry’s (2008) dystopian scenarios based on 
resource scarcity (see page 59). 
Examples of next generation infrastructure exist in the transport sector. For 
example, Brown (2014) describes a 10-kilometre traffic tunnel in Kuala Lumpur, 
Malaysia. The majority of the time the tunnel is a major transport route, diverting traffic 
from the city centre and reducing travel time and related emissions. However, as needed, 
the tunnel serves as a stormwater retention facility diverting up to 90 per cent of water 
during severe rainfall events. By using one site for dual infrastructure purposes (i.e. co-
location), two infrastructure services (e.g. transport, stormwater management) are tightly 
coupled. The project was recognized by the United Nations for its intelligent approach to 
multiple urban design challenges (Brown 2014). Similar examples exist, such as 
underground parking facilities in the Netherlands and public parks in Brazil that double as 
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flood reservoirs (State of New York 2013). Brown also cites intermodal connectivity 
supported by integrated passenger and transit hubs as another example of coupled 
infrastructure (e.g. a terminal that connects rail, truck and air freight transport).  
Such projects have merit, however they do not fundamentally question the role of 
mobility in society. Brown acknowledges the need to manage transport demand:  
“emphasiz[ing] proximity so that supply chains are mostly local or regional.” Instead 
examples such as those provided from Malaysia and the Netherlands focus on 
infrastructure, often mega projects (Orr in Brown 2014: xii). This echoes a “predict-and-
provide” tendency in transport studies that emphasizes infrastructure provision 
(Schwanen, Banister and Anable 2011: 997). The projects Brown profiles aim to 
accommodate existing mobility demand in a more environmentally sensitive manner.  
Further, while there are examples of next generation infrastructure, a “policy and 
development framework” to systematically adapt and transform infrastructure design is 
lacking (2014: 3). In response to Hurricane Sandy, the State of New York (2013) 
developed a toolkit profiling 18 community resilience measures implemented globally. 
Though not specific to infrastructure nor transport, it provides seven focal areas for 
resilience: conserve, enhance, restore natural protective features; resilient construction; 
structural defences; land use planning and regulation; market-based methods; awareness, 
information and preparedness; and systemic resilience (Table 2.2). In Chapter 7: 
Navigating Transition, I build on this frame to develop the concept of climate routing, 
which questions societal reliance on mobility. 
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Table 2.2: Categories of community resi l ience measures (State of New York 
2013) 
MANAGEMENT 
MEASURE 
DESCRIPTION SUB-CATEGORY 
 
1. Conserve, 
enhance, restore 
natural protective 
features 
 
Use the landscape to promote 
safety and liveability by preserving 
and expanding natural protective 
features for their capacity to reduce 
hazardous impacts and increase 
capacity to absorb impacts 
- Beach protection 
- Wetland restoration 
- Vegetation use and management 
- River protection 
2. Resilient 
construction 
 
Use construction techniques and 
technologies to provide an 
enhanced level of safety for 
structures and occupants  
- Elevation, change in design, 
inputs, etc. for homes and 
infrastructure 
- Use of standards to regulate 
construction 
3. Structural 
defenses 
 
Use structural defenses to resist 
hazardous impacts by reducing and 
eliminating exposure to hazard 
- Engineered defenses (e.g. levees, 
storm surge barriers, sea gates, 
flood walls, revetments) 
- Natural defenses (e.g. barrier 
islands and reefs, dunes) 
4. Land use 
planning and 
regulation 
 
Use land use management 
approaches to reduce exposure to 
hazards by removing assets and 
increase resilience through 
regulatory requirements 
- Development rights 
- Zoning 
- Development activities (e.g. green 
belts) 
- Relocation of assets and 
infrastructure 
5. Market-based 
methods 
 
Use market-based methods as 
incentives to promote and 
encourage activities that increase 
resilience and reduce vulnerability 
- Incentives (e.g. taxes, fees, 
subsidies) 
- Buyout of assets or infrastructure n 
exposed areas 
- Insurance programs 
6. Awareness, 
information and 
preparedness 
 
Use education and outreach 
materials to better prepare citizens 
and businesses on potential risks, 
emergency responses, community 
preparedness, etc. 
- Education and training 
- Community preparedness 
- Emergency-response systems and 
capacities 
- Vulnerable populations 
7. Systemic 
resilience 
  
Use methods that increase the 
overall strength of the community 
and supporting systems by lowering 
the extent of damage a single event 
has and increasing the ability to 
respond 
- Redundancies and backups 
- Information to enable learning and 
foresight 
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Mobilities paradigm  
 
The mobilities paradigm examines the importance of mobility and immobility to 
contemporary society, exploring intersections of people, goods, machines, information 
and communication technologies, as well as non-material entities such as ideas and 
images. The mobilities paradigm lies at an interdisciplinary crossroads, incorporating 
social analysis of power, geographical analysis of space, cultural analysis of discourse 
and technological analysis of materials: “tracking the power of discourses, practices and 
infrastructures of mobility in creating the effects of both movement and stasis” (Sheller 
2011: 2).  
Sheller and Urry (2006) forwarded the mobilities paradigm to explore the 
interaction of social and spatial dynamics, animating a sedentary social science that 
tended to overlook the role of mobility.24 Or, as put more colourfully by Cowen: 
“interrogating the radically undervalorized role of movement and circulation in everyday 
life.” The mobilities paradigm analyzes flows and blockages of people, materials and 
information – with power as a central consideration. In their agenda-setting editorial, 
Hannam, Sheller and Urry (2006) mention global warming, hurricanes and oil wars as 
potential research trajectories. However, while events such as Hurricane Katrina and the 
Icelandic ash cloud are research lightening rods, overall the link between mobility, 
disaster and climate change is undertheorized. In a tenth anniversary editorial on the 
mobilities paradigm, Schwanen et al. (2011) call for greater engagement of the social 
sciences with the mobilities literature, including the non-linear and catastrophic 	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 See Cresswell (2010) for examples of historical treatments of mobility, though he argues these tended to 
focus on place rather than movement per say. 
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dimensions of climate change. The mobilities paradigm, as with the politics of mobility, 
is a versatile concept that is applied in myriad ways, including migration, commuting and 
tourism. The focus can range from the dynamics of international migratory law to detailed 
ethnographic work on the lived experience of mobility. The intersection of mobility and 
disaster is a small but growing segment of the literature (see below on 
‘Geomorphic/biospheric disaster and mobility’). My research begins to address this gap. 
Sheller (2011) is careful to distinguish the mobilities paradigm from metaphors of 
flow, such as Bauman’s discussion of liquid modernity where individuals experience 
continually shifting economic, geographic and personal conditions, and Castells’ spaces 
of flow where social connectedness is permitted via flows of technology rather than 
physical proximity. This is in part to avoid totalizing narratives and in part to allow space 
for the blockages that are viewed as an intrinsic and integral component of pervasive 
movement; the mobilities paradigm is “concerned with frictions, turbulence, immobility, 
dwelling, pauses and stillness, as much as speed or flow, and examines how these 
textured rhythms are produced, practiced and represented” (Sheller 2011: 3).  
Urry (2007) elaborates on the co-dependence of flows and fixities, or mobilities 
and moorings.25 Trans-Atlantic air travel, for example, requires a fixed web of airports, 
air traffic controllers and customs officials. Further, the mobilities paradigm interrogates 
a grey area where mobility systems or regimes teeter between entrenchment and evolution, 
between full functioning and operational shutdown (Sheller 2011). A hurricane can 
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 Mooring is a nautical term referring to means of holding boats or buoys in place (e.g. anchors, ropes, 
chains). 
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transform a bustling mobility web operating at full capacity to system-wide stoppage in 
the course of hours.   
I ground the mobilities paradigm within a flow and turbulence analysis – an 
approach that complements Foucault’s (2007) focus on the circulation and governance of 
societies and ecologies. While Foucault does not address issues of mobility specifically, 
he applies the lens of circulation to a variety of phenomena: “circulation of ideas, of wills, 
and of orders, and also commercial circulation … fastening them together and mutually 
reinforcing them” in an assemblage (Foucault 2007: 15). Foucault’s theorization of 
circulation provides an alternative to the mobility/immobility dichotomy. Rather 
circulations, as with pulsations of blood through veins, may be strong or weak (Salter 
2013).  
Further, a flow analysis expands Marx’s conception of circulation, whereby the 
mechanisms of capitalism are always in process and in motion; “when circulation stops, 
value disappears and the whole system comes tumbling down” (Harvey 2010: 12). Take 
as an example, the continent-wide circulation of oil and gas via networks of pipelines, 
ships, refineries and gas pumps, and the concomitant flow of greenhouse gas emissions 
from the wellhead to the tail pipe to the atmosphere. These flows are entrenched and 
precarious, both technologically economically and ecologically (Hesse 2013; (Sassen 
2014).  
Economic and material flows parallel and entwine with global ecological cycles 
characterized by flows of energy, nutrients and water, as well as pollution. Ingold reflects 
on the nature of wind: “Almost always, it is in a state of flux. Sometimes these fluxes are 
barely perceptible; at other times they are so strong they can uproot trees and bring down 
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buildings. They can power mills and send ships around the world” (2007: S28). Climate 
change, and other contemporary environmental issues, such as biodiversity loss, ocean 
plastics and electronic waste disposal epitomize such global transboundary networks 
(Giddens 2003). Beck refers to “new maps of the world where the key lines are not 
traditional boundaries between nation-states and social classes, but rather elevation above 
sea  - a whole different way of conceptualizing the world and the ‘life’ chances, the 
chances of survival within it” (2015: 76). Salter’s (2013) analysis of how surveillance is 
used to both facilitate and police circulation post-9/11 helps theorize a form of ecological 
surveillance, whereby through meteorological data collection and climatological 
projections (e.g. downscaling of global projections to local communities to aid in 
infrastructure planning), data at increasingly finer grains is desired to provide a sense of 
security through knowledge in the context of a changing climate and extreme weather 
events. 
Flows, and concomitant turbulences, can be both material (e.g. freight) and 
structural (e.g. policy networks) in nature, with each co-constructing the other 
(Spaargaren, Mol and Bruyninckx 2006). The nature of this co-construction is fluid, both 
metaphorically and, as in the case of hurricanes, literally. I draw on Cresswell and 
Martin’s (2012) turbulence analysis, which is apt for atmospheric and oceanic 
disturbances characteristic of hurricanes. Turbulence is useful for capturing the 
intertwining and co-constituted circulations and blockages of social and ecological 
movement, and particularly the power dynamics therein. Turbulence exposes the inner 
workings of often smoothly or correctly functioning mobility webs. Cresswell and Martin 
use the example of the MSC Napoli container ship, which broke open off the coast of 
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England, to argue that turbulence is an integral component of mobility, critical to 
exposing the inner working of seemingly effortless, or at least unobserved processes, and 
sparking creative re-orderings. They conclude that “to some, turbulence is a threat and to 
others an opportunity” (2012: 518). Emancipatory catastrophism falls into the latter 
category. 
The closer one looks, the more order and disorder are co-present. For example, 
“the internal operation of a hurricane may be seen as illustrative of spontaneous, emergent 
order, whereas the external consequences (environmental destruction, loss of property, 
human life, etc.) are clearly disorderly” (Cresswell and Martin 2013: 519). Following the 
break-up of the MSC Napoli, two assessment reports recognized “systemic failings [but] 
still promote a worldview premised on the potential for smooth laminar flow, and 
stabilisation,” reflecting a transport resilience emphasis on minimizing economic 
disruption (Cresswell and Martin 2012: 525). Through my research, I find that under a 
changing climate, there is need for greater expectation and accommodation of turbulence 
in the movement of people, goods and services. A paradigmatic shift where smooth 
mobility is considered the exception and turbulence the rule may be a warranted 
recalibration of expectations. 
There are various elaborations of the mobilities paradigm. Elliott and Urry, for 
example, outline a global mobility complex characterized by speed and integration: 
 
the contemporary scale of movement around the world; the diversity of 
especially fast mobility systems now in play; the especial significance of the 
self-expanding automobility system and its risks; the elaborate interconnections 
between physical movement and communications; the development of mobility 
domains that bypass national societies, especially shipping, aeromobilities and 
future space travel; the significance of movement across borders to 
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contemporary governmentality; the development of places of leisure that mostly 
have to be travelled to from afar; the development of a language of mobility; the 
capacity to compare, contrast and collect places from around the world; and the 
increased importance of multiple mobilities for people’s social and emotional 
lives. (2010: 9-10) 
 
The mobilities paradigm recognizes such a mobility complex, but also examines 
experiences of immobility and interrogates frames that align mobility with desirability 
and immobility with stagnation. Cresswell (2010) uses the term mobility constellations to 
capture historically and geographically situated mobility dynamics, including the 
physicality of the movement itself, the representation and meaning ascribed to movement 
in discourse, and the experience and practice of movement (e.g. as filtered through the 
lenses of class, gender, race, etc.).  
Continuing from Sheller and Urry’s uses of mobilities paradigm, Elliott and 
Urry’s use of the mobility complex and Cresswell’s use of mobility constellations, and 
based on my case study findings, I adopt the term mobility web to capture both the 
informal and diverse networks that constitute contemporary mobility and to highlight how 
mobilities are exposed to, and function within, the context of environmental change.26 
The term references two types of webs. First, drawing on the field of ecology, I reference 
ecological food webs – the interdependent chains of plants, insects and animals that 
constitute ecosystems – which when faced with a disturbance (i.e. invasive species, forest 
fire) can adapt or collapse. Second, I draw on the imagery of a spider web as a structure 	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 The concept of mobility constellations is an apt alternative to mobility webs, given that the etymology of 
‘disaster’ is derived from Latin for ‘ill-starred event.’ In the context of the Anthropocene, however, humans 
actively construct risk rather than simply being the passive recipients of the fates (i.e. what the insurance 
industry refers to as an Act of God) (see Steinberg 2000 for a discussion of the “unnatural history of natural 
disaster”). 
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that is simultaneously adaptable and locked-in, sticky and fragile. I use the term mobility 
webs to reflect the environmentally exposed, but also diverse and adaptable dimensions of 
contemporary transport networks, characteristics emphasized by research participants. 
Traditionally, large-scale mobility projects, such as passenger travel across the 
Atlantic, the Canadian Pacific Railway and the TransCanada Highway were modernizing 
projects that “took the domination of nature as a necessary condition of human 
emancipation” (Harvey 1989). Castells summarizes the goal of collapsing the duration of 
a journey with the term “timeless time,” as expressed, for example, in the ‘no’ time it 
takes to send an email around the world or to complete a transaction on an international 
currency market (2009: 35). In contrast to such transient experiences of time, 
environmentalists propose a “longue durée” or “glacial time” that considers the needs of 
future generations and non-human species (Castells 2009: 35). Since space is a ‘fact’ of 
nature, this meant the “conquest and rational ordering of space became an integral part of 
the modernizing project” (Harvey 1989: 259). The informal motto of the United States 
Postal Service epitomizes this mentality: “Neither snow nor rain nor heat nor gloom of 
night stays these couriers from the swift completion of their appointed rounds.” While 
such dedication to service provision promotes a heroic dependability – a commitment 
usurped by same day parcel delivery services and lean supply chains – in the face of 
growing climatic extremes moderated expectations and greater focus on redundancies in 
terms of both supply and delivery options arise from the dataset as key considerations.27  
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 As evidenced by Fed Ex during the 2015 holiday season, when demand for a two-day Christmas delivery 
service was outmatched by winter weather. 
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Writing at the intersection of oil, climate change and mobility, Urry develops four 
hypothetical scenarios, ranging from the familiar – transitioning to a low-carbon-society 
and virtual societies mediated by digital technology – to reliance on magic bullet 
technological solutions and regional warlordism resulting from resource conflicts (Urry 
2013, 2008; see also Bridge and Le Billon 2013). Transitioning to a low carbon society 
(i.e. decarbonizing) includes reducing emissions associated with current transport modes, 
while a focus on digital technology questions the role of mobility in society, asking how 
much the demand for mobility can be supplanted by virtual interactions. Some scenarios 
rely on the development of clean technologies for decarbonizing (e.g. as in the case for air 
travel where compared to other transport modes there are currently few viable prospects 
for low emission fuels) and post-apocalyptic communities operating under extreme 
resource stress. These typologies align with Urry’s two dystopian scenarios, Hobbesian 
climate chaos and Orwellian control of carbon pollution (Urry 2008).  
My investigation of the social-ecological interactions that underlie the mobilities 
and immobilities that result when severe weather intersects with mobility webs provides 
an important contribution in the face of a changing climate by bridging contemporary 
experiences of everyday mobility with the mobility futures developed by Urry. Further, 
while transport modes serve to protect humans from the elements, their construction and 
operation require flows and assemblages of resources in the form of fossil fuels, metal 
and rubber (see Hawken, Lovins and Lovins 1999).28 Sheller (2014) juxtaposes the 
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 Informed by the mobilities paradigm and Latour, I use the term ‘assemblage’ to describe the social, 
technical and material flows that constitute mobility. I do not formally draw on assemblage theory, 	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infrastructures of mobility enabled by aluminum and the transnational regimes of 
immobility resulting from its mining and energy-intensive production. What occurs is an 
iterative process of the social construction of the technological and the technological 
construction of the social.  
I focus my analysis on the infrastructural and environmental scale, examining the 
socio-material assemblages that constitute mobility networks and the interface between 
such assemblages and environmental forces and thresholds, such as hurricanes and 
climate change. Of particular interest is the capacity of mobility webs to be reconfigured 
in the short-term, as part of disaster preparation, response and recovery processes, and in 
the medium to long-term as part of disaster mitigation processes in the face of climatic 
and resource limits.  
 
Geomorphic/biospheric disaster and mobility 
Research is emerging on the impact of biospheric and geomorphic hazards, and by 
extension disasters, on mobility.29 Hurricanes, as a form of intense movement through 
space and time, underscore the power of non-human nature and the frailty of human 
aspirations for control. While the “human ‘mastery’ of nature has been most effectively 
achieved through movement over, under and across it,” non-human nature easily exposes 
the fallibility of such claims (Elliott and Urry 2010: 18-19). An iceberg demonstrated how 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
including constellations, as forwarded by Deleuze and Guattari (1987) as this encompasses territorialization 
which is beyond the scope of this research. 
29
 In the disaster literature a distinction is made between a hazard (e.g. a hurricane) and a disaster (e.g. 
widespread loss of mobility and electricity with adverse societal impacts caused by a hurricane). The former 
is a potential risk that need not necessarily be realized, the latter is risk that has manifested social impacts. 
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non-human power sinks human hubris with the Titanic disaster (Harvey 1989). A century 
later, a special issue of Mobilities journal was dedicated to exploring the impacts of the 
2010 Icelandic volcano eruption that forced the closure of European airspace, resulting in 
“the cancellation of 108,000 flights, disrupted travel plans of 10.5 million passengers, and 
cost to the airline industry in excess of $1.7 billion in lost revenue” (Budd et al. 2011: 31). 
The article titles tellingly include words such as chaos, disruption, uncertainty and 
stillness (see for example Adey et al. 2011, Jensen 2011).  
In the case of Iceland, the extensive socio-technical assemblages that permit 
global travel were framed as vulnerable to environmental risk and slow to adapt and 
recover: “Just as the 2008 financial crisis shook the global economy, exposing the 
fragility of the foundations of global banking and finance, the eruption exposed the 
weaknesses of European institutions and the governance framework that regulates the free 
flow of people, labor and cargo by air” (O’Regan 2011). Concepts such as ‘mastery’ and 
‘control’ echo hollowly. 
Empirical research on the ash cloud event had an impromptu quality as a number 
of academics took advantage of their disrupted mobility to reflect on social-technical 
assemblages. A spontaneous workshop was organized to further reflection on this unusual 
atmospheric/aviation event (Birtchnell and Büscher 2011). Jensen (2011), for example, 
describes his experience of the event from afar as he tried to return to Europe from the 
United States via air. He focuses on the emotional navigation of disruption – emotional 
eruptions – ranging from anxiety to joy, and what the experience of ‘being stuck’ means 
in contemporary society. He concludes that such experiences have the potential to be 
tremendously stressful for anyone travelling under added pressures of time commitments 
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(e.g. wedding) or status limitations (e.g. visa). Also using a reflexive approach, Barton 
(2011) details his overland journey by bus from Norway to Britain. He identifies how 
travellers who spoke more than one language and who were fluent in social media 
gravitated to the centre of informal information dissemination networks. He extends his 
experience to social literacy more broadly, arguing for more complex representations of 
social navigation in a “fluid, global, mobile, mediated and uncertain” context (2011: 64). 
Such navigation of social literacy is growing area in disaster research. 
Responding in a later issue of Mobilities, Lin (2013) highlights the improvised 
aeromobilities that occurred following the Icelandic eruption in Singapore and Australasia. 
He emphasizes the human ability to adapt complex mobility networks and cope with 
disruption. For example, Lin details how the Singapore Airport Authority capitalized on 
the disruption as a public relations opportunity to demonstrate its hospitality. Further, Lin 
contrasts the blanket closure of European air space with Australia’s laissez-faire approach 
when it experienced a regional ash event, with governments letting individual air carriers 
determine what environmental thresholds they could tolerate. In contrast to a focus on 
transport resilience, Budd et al. (2011) question the mobility status quo. Through analysis 
of media and policy documents, Budd et al. (2011) find that the framing of the impact of 
the Icelandic ash cloud event on the aviation sector as a political and administrative 
“fiasco” diverted attention away from “safety, our over-dependency on aviation and 
mobility, [and] the impact of aviation on climate change” (2011: 39). In my research I 
find that during Hurricane Igor a focus on praising individual resilience diverted attention 
from more critical policy concerns. 
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Moving from ash clouds to earthquakes, Sheller examines how humanitarian 
response to the 2010 Haitian earthquake exacerbated uneven mobility access. “Natural 
disasters,’ she writes, “bring to the fore the astounding interdependence and fragility of 
the complex mobility systems and infrastructural moorings that make up contemporary 
transnational geographies” (2013: 87). Sheller finds that issues of mobility justice, already 
problematic in Haiti, were exacerbated with a militarized American aid response, impacts 
of which included increased friction at the Dominic Republican border. The result was an 
islanding effect whereby both physical and political barriers further isolated citizens.  
Hurricane Katrina, due to issues of mobility justice, namely the failure to evacuate 
residents leading up to and following the event, is a lightening rod case in terms of the 
interface of mobilities and hurricanes (Hannam, Sheller and Urry 2006). Stewart and Ray 
(2007) use the metaphor of “race flood” to describe the intersecting catastrophes of acute 
flooding on one hand and chronic racism on the other hand. Cresswell (2008) explores the 
intersection of race, class and mobility, refuting claims that attempt to isolate failure to 
evacuate to a lack of private car ownership.  
Similarly, Haney, Elliot and Fussell (2010) explore the complex intersection of 
numerous factors, such as race, resources and risk, which influenced the decisions made 
by families regarding whether to remain or evacuate. Haney, Elliot and Fussell find, for 
example, that due to the fact that Katrina coincided with the end of the month, a time 
when the resources of low-income households receiving social support are depleted, the 
risk of evacuating unnecessarily and losing income was a consideration. Consequently 
residents of working age were less likely than older residents to evacuate. In the case of 
Hurricane Juan, the storm hit just after low-income households received social support 
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cheques. As a result, many households lost full fridge and freezer loads of recently 
purchased groceries contributing to food insecurity. These two scenarios highlight the 
human dimensions of mobility, illustrating the complex intersection of income and 
disaster as well as the importance of temporal considerations. Access to socio-technical 
mobility webs (i.e. means and opportunity to evacuate and lodge elsewhere) is a critical 
determinant of the experience of a severe weather event. While Haney, Elliott and Fussell 
(2010) focus on the lived experience of mobility, following Sheller, I situate my research 
within the emerging area of the social, ecological and technical interface of mobility and 
disaster.  
 
Mobilities and power 
Governmentality 
The mobilities paradigm draws on a Foucauldian power analysis, including the concept of 
governmentality (Manderscheid, Schwanen and Tyfield 2014; Sheller 2016b, 2011). 
Biopower governmentality refers to the state’s ‘conduct of conduct,’ analyzing how 
through persuasive, rather than coercive, means the act of governing is achieved 
(Foucault 1991). Through governmentality the population internalizes of rules of ideal 
behaviour, governing their own conduct; “human practices have been institutionalized 
with certain understandings and routines, whereby the population governs itself” 
(Bærenholdt 2013: 25; Schwanen, Banister and Anable 2011). Critically, the population 
shifts from passive recipients of sovereign protection to active participants, “defending 
society against whatever kinds of threats which were defined as anti-social, not only war 
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but also environmental problems, hazards, diseases and antisocial behaviour” 
(Bærenholdt 2013: 24).  
Governmentality takes on particular import during times of disaster, where the 
calm, helpful, self-disciplining citizen is celebrated (Hage 2009). Gerth and Mills (1958) 
in their analysis of Weber observe that the state is looked to for security in times of risk 
and danger. In this vein, Tiryakian argues that 9/11 “produced a massive national 
solidarity” overcoming, for a period, a particularly divisive phase of relations between 
Republicans and Democrats (2005: 314). Hage provides a colourful example of 
governmentality in the context of in-flight safety: 
 
I go on the plane and I am told that there is always a possibility of a ‘crisis’ and I 
need to be prepared, know about the oxygen masks, exits, etc… so that if a crisis 
comes I am prepared to self-govern myself in such demanding times. Even when 
possibly facing death I should learn to act in an orderly fashion. (2009: 105)  
 
Such conduct of conduct is a theme in disaster literature.  
Rather than static or set, Foucault perceived power generally, and governmentality 
specifically, as relational, mobile and always in transit, never arriving at a final resting 
point (Foucault 1991). Such precarity or uncertainty is apt for the study of climate change, 
which is characterized but uncertainties. And yet, within this tenuous landscape, there are 
“momentary stabilisations of collective identities as publics” (Sheller 2004: 50), such as 
in the initial collective calm after the storm where the population surveys and processes 
the scale of damage and takes initial steps to recover. 
Bærenholdt (2013) further develops theorizations of governmentality, forwarding 
the concept of governmobility. He argues that mobility rather than just a subject of 
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governance is a technique or technology of governance. Drawing on network society 
theory, he defines governmobility as the “self-government of connections, enabled 
through mobile technologies and the environment” (2013: 31). Governmobility has an 
addictive, hyper-social quality akin to the compulsion to check social media, whereby 
“people cannot escape mobilising mobility to live with mobility” (Bærenholdt 2013: 29).  
Reflecting on the experience of the Icelandic ash cloud event, Birtchnell and 
Büscher conclude that “needs and desires to be somewhere else are never sated,” 
consequently mobile society is “eternally stranded in mobility” (2011: 7). Hage (2009) 
discusses the existential compulsion towards mobility – a social and material sensation of 
advancing or progressing. Like the positive feedback effects spurred by climate change 
(e.g. albedo effect, melting permafrost), activating mobility webs perpetuates their use 
(e.g. if a person travels to a different country and establishes social contacts it is more 
likely that further travel will be instigated). Therefore the positive feedback loops of 
fossil-fuelled mobility on one hand and climate change impacts on the other hand are 
tenaciously interconnected, revealing the challenge of altering mobility and climate 
trajectories.  
Circulation is the lifeblood of governmobility and borders or edges are the source 
of both guidance and resistance:  
 
Borders attract and organise mobility around certain routes and regularities … 
to prevent, regulate, direct or facilitate the mobility of specific assembled 
groups of humans, materials and information. And borders must be studied 
along with practices of resistance, with people’s tactics and strategies in coping 
with, transcending, ignoring, overcoming, using and not least building borders. 
(Bærenholdt 2013: 31)  
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Usher employs a governmentality analysis of circulation of water in Singapore, 
leveraging Foucault’s interest in the “naturalisation of the urban,” that is, circulations of 
people, resources and waste (2014: 551). Usher traces a shift from the disciplining of 
water through canalization projects to a focus on water security and working with 
ecological dynamics to meet human needs (i.e. as promoted by the Next Generation 
Infrastructure approach). Discipline is characterized by efforts to “concentrate, contain 
and control” nature, while security “adapts to the reality of natural processes, respects 
their autonomy and seeks to identify, optimise and work through nature’s discernable 
laws rather than stifle them” (Usher 2014: 558). New Orleans’ investment in 
canalization and dams is a contemporary expression of disciplining water (Freudenburg 
et al. 2011), while the Netherlands’s Room for the River (2015) project marks a recent 
turn in ecological governance towards accommodating rather than suppressing flood 
potential.30 In short, discipline is akin, literally and metaphorically, to a concrete wall, 
while security is akin to a flood plain. 
Similarly, after Hurricane Sandy New York City committed to planting one 
million trees and growing one billion oysters, among other resilience initiatives, in an 
effort to realize security by enhancing ecological systems. In fall 2015, the planting of 
one million trees was celebrated. By increasing the urban forest by 20 per cent, the 
initiative aims to realize a variety of environmental benefits including storing carbon, 
retaining stormwater and cooling streets and by extension reducing the use of caron-
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 Based in the Netherlands, Room for the River (2015) aims to complete engineering interventions (e.g. 
deepening floodplain, relocating dykes, constructing a bypass channel) at 30 locations that will allow the 
river to flood safely. 
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intensive air conditioning (Million Trees NYC 2015). The Billion Oyster Project (2015) 
eponymously aims to create a living breakwater south of Staten Island in an effort to 
dissipate wave height and speed during severe weather events. To date, 11 million 
oysters have been restored to their native habitat through an ecosystem restoration and 
education project. Illustrating the interface between social, ecological and technical 
systems, historical oyster populations were degraded by an increase in shipping mobility, 
while contemporary populations are additionally threatened by ocean acidification 
(Lewis 2015).31  
However, a challenge moving forward is that under a changing climate, nature’s 
laws are less discernable and therefore appropriate courses of action more difficult to 
determine; the rules of the game are changing as the game is in play. Discipline, used in 
the past to prevent food scarcity, is emerging as a tactic (e.g. in the form of regulation) 
for managing surplus carbon emissions.32 Adding an environmental lens, Bærenholdt’s 
(2013) discussion of borders and Usher’s (2014) discussion of circulation, may be 
enlarged to include ecological limits to the circulation of carbon in the atmosphere and 
oceans (e.g. 2 degree Celsius threshold for dangerous climate change), as well as 
resulting improvised circulations created by the impacts of severe weather events (e.g. 
fallen trees, road washouts). 
Foucault frames political representatives as responsible for the management of the 
natural environment upon which the population, as members of the human species, rely: 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31Acidification results when the ocean absorbs excess atmospheric carbon, the impacts of which include 
inhibiting the formation of shells in species such as oysters. 
32
 For example, Nova Scotia’s Sustainable Prosperity Act (2007) requires the province to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions by 2020. 
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“the sovereign deals with a nature, or rather with the perpetual conjunction, the perpetual 
intrication of a geographical, climatic, and physical milieu with the human species insofar 
as it has a body and a soul, a physical and moral existence” (Foucault 1991: 23). 
Governmentality, with its focus on the regulation of (mobile) subjects, is particularly 
useful in the analysis of liminal states of disruption and emergency that characterize acute 
events such as hurricanes or chronic climate-related migration (Sheller 2011). Declaring a 
state of emergency, as was done in the cases of Hurricane Juan and Igor, allows the state 
to impose coercively exceptional restrictions on the movement of the citizenry, such as 
enforcing curfews. Foucauldian analysis is useful in identifying and articulating the 
meanings ascribed to, and responses prescribed for, various states of mobility, such as 
disruptions caused by hurricanes.  
 
Politics of mobility 
I complement the high-level Foucauldian power analysis with Cresswell’s (2010) politics 
of mobility, which provides a finer grain approach to the description and analysis of 
mobility beyond the dichotomous mobile and immobile. A politics of mobility, that is an 
analysis of the power dynamics at play within the mobility paradigm, is premised on 
recognition of the “entanglement of movement, representation and practice” (Cresswell 
2010:17). Physical movement is the ‘raw material’ of mobility. All physical movement is 
experienced through identity categories such as class, gender and race: “tourists, jet-
setters, refugees, illegal immigrants, migrant labourers, academics” (Cresswell 2010: 26). 
Further, physical movement is represented and attributed with meaning and worth 
through discourse. For example, in some spheres the act of driving or flying is associated 
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with social status (i.e. a kinetic elite), while in others it is a source of environmental 
shame (i.e. large carbon footprint). In short, “all forms of mobility have a physical reality, 
they are encoded culturally and socially, and they are experienced through practice” 
(Cresswell 2010: 20). Analysis of the co-construction of movement, meaning and practice, 
permits analysis of the politics inherent in mobility, that is, “in the production of power 
and relations of domination” (Cresswell 2010: 20). Following from Kwan and Schwanen, 
a politics of mobility replaces the “cold fact” of movement with a well-rounded sense of 
mobility that includes experience and representation (2016: 245). 
To this theorization I bring an ecological perspective, analyzing how the politics 
of human mobility intersect with the power of the environment. Hurricanes as a source of 
intense disruption temporarily revert contemporary mobility, seemingly fixated on 
immediacy, to an earlier, slower and smaller-scale mobility constellation that exists in the 
present rather than straining for the future (Benediktsson, Lund and Huijbens 2011; 
Birtchnell and Büscher 2011). Disruption is a reminder that we can function “without 
mobility and vast resources” (Birtchnell and Büscher 2011: 7). Further, such an approach 
asks how the discursive subject positions of  “tourists, jet-setters, refugees, illegal 
immigrants, migrant labourers, academics” (2010: 26) morph when issues of climate 
change and resource depletion are added to the mix. What counts as “appropriate 
movement” in a carbon-constrained, and potentially decarbonized, society (Cresswell 
2010: 27)? 
Informed by Latour (2005), I inflect Cresswell’s politics of mobility with a strong 
socio-material lens. According to Latour’s Actor Network Theory, humans do not exist in 
isolation but are enrolled in “imbroglios of people and things,” that result in the co-
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construction of humans and non-humans” (Latour 2011: 4). Human mobility is achieved 
in concert with networks or assemblages of machines, technologies and information, as 
well as environmental systems and conditions. Latour observes that in the context of 
climate change, humans are engaged in a real time climate experiment “happening on us, 
with us, through the action of each of us, on all of us, with all the oceans, the high 
atmosphere, and even the Gulf Stream” (2011: 3). Given the symmetry that a materialist 
perspective assigns the human environment, non-human environment, as well as science 
and technology, such an approach is particularly relevant to the study of climate change. 
Latour argues for an overthrow of the hierarchy of human over nature, “a snail can 
block a dam; the Gulf Stream can turn up missing … Nothing can line up beings any 
longer by order of importance” (2004: 25). Likewise, Barnes employs a wide-ranging 
definition of power: “Natural forces and phenomena have it, as when we speak of 
powerful currents or magnets…animals may have it, or even plants – as when tree-roots 
undermine buildings” (1988: 1). A hurricane, though it lacks intention – moves but does 
not act – powerfully influences society. Lockie asks: “What happens if we accept that 
despite the technological advances of the industrial age, human society has never 
transcended its ecological roots? If we accept that social change today is as much about 
ecosystem and climate processes as it is about institutions and power?” (2015: 2). For this 
research, I define power as the reciprocal, continuous, often invisible and shifting 
influence and co-construction of the human and non-human environment. In this journey, 
I focus on social-ecological dynamics and less so differential human experiences of 
disaster such as lower versus higher income households. This focus is in keeping with my 
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interest in how transport managers and other decision-makers grapple with uncertainty 
and complexity presented by severe weather events and climate change. 
The politics of mobility is a versatile concept. Since Cresswell’s (2010a) 
influential paper in Environment and Planning D – it is among the journal’s most read 
papers – authors have applied the idea in diverse contexts. Examples range from the 
reflections of long-term migrants (Rogaly 2015), to the movement of sex workers 
(Andrijasevic et al. 2012), to the experience of becoming a mother (Boyer and Spinney 
2016). A common thread in such wide-ranging articles is their focus on human mobility. 
Building on this foundation, I bring an ecological perspective, analyzing how human 
mobility intersects with the environment. I develop an ecopolitics of mobility focusing on 
the ecological dynamics inherent in contemporary mobility, identifying resiliencies and 
vulnerabilities. My contribution is prefigured by Cresswell’s (2014) discussion of animal 
mobilities in the context of (yet another) food quality crisis, Lefebrve’s (2004) reflections 
on rhythmanalysis, including tidal and lunar cycles, as well as Urry’s work on climate 
change and peak oil (2013; 2011). All imply the possibility of an ecologically inclusive 
approach to the mobilities paradigm, that is, a social-ecological relational ontology (Adey 
2006; Cresswell 2010b). 
Cresswell’s politics of mobility delineates six constituent elements of mobility: 
motive force, velocity, rhythm, route, experience and friction. Each characteristic 
expresses dimensions of power. For example, imagine the following fictional scenario of 
a Philippino citizen, Riza, who travels to Canada to work at a Tim Hortons coffee shop as 
part of a temporary foreign worker program. The motive force to travel around the world 
for work is financial. When on the job, closely watched by a manager who wants to get 
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the most value out of her, Riza works at a fast pace and a constant rhythm. Riza lives in a 
low-income suburban neighbourhood that requires commuting via a convoluted transit 
route and her experience is a mix of frustrations and opportunities, all coloured by the 
internal friction she feels between working abroad to support her family and the missed 
chance to spend time with her family. Another fact of friction might be the difficulty 
entailed in processing work visas or applying for citizenship. What transpires in this 
scenario are a myriad of dynamics from the personal to the economic, from local 
commuting to transnational employment, illustrating the depth and breadth of the politics 
of mobility. 
Building on this foundation and grounded in my case study findings, I develop an 
ecopolitics of mobility by focusing on the social-ecological dynamics enrolled in mobility 
webs, and identifying related resiliencies and vulnerabilities. As conceived, motive force 
may be either internally or externally compelled, the former through choice and the latter 
through necessity. In the context of my research, motive force is most often provided by 
fossil fuels, and the resulting climatic implications are a central consideration. Motive 
force may also include curiosity. The movement of water, wind and waves is a form of 
what I term charismatic mobility, an adaptation of the ecological term charismatic 
megafauna which refers to species such as polar bears, moose, whales that humans find 
compelling (see Chapter 4: Hurricane Juan). The concept of charismatic mobility, 
particularly in reference to ecological mobility, expands Sheller and Urry’s (2006) 
conception of the mobilities paradigm, infusing analysis of social and spatial dynamics 
with ecological flows. Charismatic mobility has a counterpart of advised (i.e. voluntary) 
immobility, imposed as officials aim to mitigate risk entailed by movement in an effort to 
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protect the population. Finally, motive force may refer to the movement of wind, rain and 
waves, tracing a line from Cape Verde, where hurricanes originate, to the North Atlantic 
and the related uncertainties pertaining to storm track and force that humans forecast with 
improved, but still limited, accuracy. 
Velocity, or speed, can be a marker of power as expressed through jet setting 
kinaesthetic elites, or powerlessness, as in undocumented migrants in New York 
delivering fast food via bicycle. The velocity of the economy, the constant push to keep 
things moving and growing (see Schnaiberg (1980) on the treadmill of production), and 
the concomitant push to recover from disruption as quickly as possible arises as a central 
consideration in both case studies. In terms of hurricanes, velocities may range from zero, 
the no velocity or immobility imposed by calls from emergency and transport officials to 
‘stay at home and off the roads’ to the urgent, frenetic pace of essential workers such as 
power crews, chain saw teams and disaster managers staffing Emergency Management 
Offices. Velocity may also be considered in terms of wind and water speeds, again 
variable and a focus of meteorological forecasts.    
Rhythm may range in scale from the gait of a pedestrian to the tempo of an era 
(Cresswell 2010). Rhythm can be smooth, measured and controlled as in a practiced daily 
commute, or it can be turbulent as when atmospheric conditions make for bumpy air 
travel or severe weather events bring massive transport networks to a shuddering halt. In 
the case of disrupted mobility webs, restoring the dominant rhythm, whether of highway 
travel or public transit, as quickly as possible is a key focus.  
Mobility is channelled via more and less privileged routes, as in the geopolitical 
movement of climate migrants granted or denied entry to host countries, or the shifting 
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track of a hurricane system. Residents improvise routes due to streets blocked by trees 
and roads washed out by flooding. At a larger scale, such as the aftermath of the Icelandic 
ash cloud event, travelers “invent new and often inconvenient routes,” activating different 
modes and network/mobility capital (Birtchnell and Büscher 2011). In his framing of 
governmobility, Bærenholdt (2013) posits that with the powers of mobility, we can 
imagine societies as routes. Indeed, path dependency or technological lock-in refers to 
how past decisions – and investments – dictate the range of possible options moving 
forward; fossil fuel use perpetuates fossil fuel use (Birtchnell and Büscher 2011).  
Experience refers to the embodied sensation of movement, ranging from pleasure 
to pain, from welcomed to resented, or as in the case of hurricanes from excitement to 
fear. In media coverage of Hurricanes Juan and Igor, a number of references were made 
to the disturbing sensory experience of the storm: the sound of cracking trees, the noise of 
streams turned into rushing rivers, the sight of massive tree falls and flooded homes, and 
the unsettling sensation of being almost swept away by wind or stormwater. Transport 
and emergency managers alike expressed pride in the response of their teams under trying 
conditions. People mourned the loss of the beloved trees and, in the worst cases, mourned 
the loss of community and family members.  
And lastly, friction refers to the ceasing or resistance of movement, namely is the 
movement by “choice or is it forced” (Cresswell 2010: 26)? Hurricanes cause a range of 
frictions, including emotional, physical and financial. Hurricanes cause emotional strain, 
as one Newfoundland transport manager describes three years after Igor, “I have trouble 
with hurricane season. I watch the forecast closely.” Fallen trees and power poles, as well 
as washed out roads physically inhibit movement. Hurricanes incur large and unexpected 
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costs, adding strain to limited government and household budgets. Further, climate 
change, and by extension carbon constraint, are a source of friction that are actively 
negotiated in response to discrete severe weather events and with a view to long-term 
climate stability (Birtchnell and Büscher 2011). Climate change is transformative; the 
process of transition is frictious. Therefore, through these six elements of an ecopolitics 
of mobility, larger social-ecological power relations are reproduced and challenged.  
 
Disaster sociology 
 
The field of disaster management, as it relates to transport, focuses on the logistics of 
humanitarian evacuation procedures, supply chain management (including the movement 
of hazardous materials) and resilience (e.g. of aging infrastructure, to terrorist threats). In 
transport studies, conceptions of the environment tend to be reduced to greenhouse gas 
emissions, while in disaster studies the environment is represented as severe weather 
events. Murphy argues that disaster sociology can teach society “about errors of 
expectations concerning nature’s dynamics, about the material consequence of such errors, 
and about the social barriers to learning from the prompts of nature” (2004: 255). Social 
dimensions of disaster – such as perceptions, discourses and structures – are gaining 
recognition. Concepts of prevention, preparedness, response and recovery, as well as risk, 
hazard and social-technical dimensions are central considerations in disaster sociology. 
During extreme weather events, such as hurricanes, the co-constructed relationship 
between the human and non-human environment, normally taken for granted, is exposed. 
Freudenburg et al. (2011) distinguish between natural disaster and tragedy: natural 
disasters are unpreventable, whereas tragedies result from human error or hubris. 
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However, in an age of anthropogenic climate change (i.e. the Anthropocene), what 
constitutes a ‘natural’ hazard is obfuscated.  
 Disaster sociologists represent diverse perspectives.  I am influenced by the work 
of environmental sociologists who undertake disaster sociology, namely Freudenburg and 
Murphy. In the case of the 2010 BP oil spill, Gramling and Freudenburg (2012) trace a 
century of energy policy to illustrate that the Deepwater Horizon oil well blowout was not 
a one-off accident, but an artefact of cumulative government and industry policy 
decisions. Gramling and Freudenburg posit that the U.S. government pursued two key 
diversionary tactics that in combination perpetuated unjust and ineffective energy policies. 
The first diversion is that of public access to resources and related revenues, by 
facilitating the transfer of offshore energy resources from the public to the private sector. 
The second diversion is that of attention, by framing such a transfer as a means to foster 
domestic energy production and energy independence. Critically, while American energy 
independence has been advocated since the 1970s, oil imports increased from 
approximately 30 per cent to 60 per cent by 2005.33  
Gramling and Freudenburg (2012) argue that energy independence is an appealing 
but artificial goal – a myth – that diverts attention from the transfer of public assets to 
corporate coffers. The diversion of access needs to be paired with the diversion of 
attention to lend such a wealth transfer the gloss of legitimacy and create a permissive 
environment for industrial practices, such as deep water drilling and hydraulic fracturing 
that pose a high ecological risk. Freudenburg and Alario (2007) invoke the metaphor of 	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 Due to widespread development of hydraulic fracking, U.S. energy imports have declined since 2005 
reinvigorating aspirations for energy independence (Krauss 2015). 
  82 
magicianship to describe how public attention is intentionally manipulated. They argue 
that interrelated rhetorical techniques such as framing, blaming and activating questions 
are analogous to ‘the flourish, the smoke, the noise, the flash’ employed by magicians to 
divert audience attention (2007: 155). A central theme in Freudenburg’s disaster 
sociology is the power of an economic elite to impose environmental risk on the 
population at large through the mobilization of financial and natural resources. 
 Murphy’s study of the 1998 North American ice storm foregoes an historical 
analysis, instead exploring the devastating impact of electrical grid failures: 
 
Each wave of freezing rain coated trees, power lines, and electrical towers, 
increasing their surface area and giving the next wave of freezing rain a larger 
surface to fall upon and cling to. This positive-feedback loop of freezing drizzle 
exponentially increased the weight on trees, power lines and electrical towers. 
Trees fell on power lines, or lines fell because of the unbearable weight, and they 
in turn snapped the supporting hydro poles and towers. (2009: 64) 
 
Murphy posits that rather than detaching us from our reliance upon nature, contemporary 
social-technological systems produce an intensification of human-environmental 
relationships. Murphy draws on a New York Times (1998) editorial to illustrate his case: 
 
A storm like this reveals the shallowness of technological civilization – how 
swiftly the grid collapses. But it also reveals its depth – into how many reaches 
of ordinary life electricity has penetrated and how high above the fundamental 
concerns that allows us to float. …The wonder is not that cold is so powerful, 
but that we are so seldom aware of its power…. (2009: 139)  
 
Humans are more vulnerable given the grafting of technology to the skin of society. 
Murphy draws on the metaphor of dance to describe such a co-constructed relationship 
between the human and non-human environment; “human agents dance with the moves of 
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nature’s actants to form hybrid constructions” (2004: 254). Importantly, this dance can 
“be adroitly or ineptly performed” (Murphy 2004: 254). Murphy refers to Latour’s use of 
the term ‘actant,’ arguing that it leaves “place for the independent actions of non-humans 
that can be either beneficial or dangerous” (2004: 252). In short, according to Latour, 
“things strike back” (Murphy 2004: 251).  
Murphy (2009) effectively contrasts the devastating state of emergency 
experienced in Quebec society during the 1998 ice storm, where the majority of residents 
were struggling without heat and light, with the relative lack of impact in Amish 
communities in New York State. The Amish “live their daily lives without electricity, and 
they heat their homes with wood stoves. They spurn telephones, radios, and television and 
do not own or drive automobiles, relying instead on horse and buggies” (Murphy 2009: 
295). While mainstream society struggled with impassable roads and gasoline shortages, 
the Amish relied on literal horsepower. As a result, their quality of life was less 
compromised by the ice storm. Murphy (2004) concludes that vulnerability to disaster, 
rather than inevitable, is socially constructed. In the case of the Quebec ice storm, the 
adroit performance of the Amish yields lessons for other communities. The human desire 
to be in control of our environment is easily thwarted. It is this illusion of control and 
efficacy that Bauman claims humans will “miss most” in a mobility complex run wild 
(1998: 57). My research, which places weather-impacted mobility networks at its core, 
furthers our understanding of mobility assemblages.  
While Freudenburg (with Gramling 2012; et al. 2011) uses a predominantly 
historical lens and Murphy an infrastructural lens, disaster sociologist Klinenberg uses a 
community health lens. The three approaches overlap. Where Murphy examines the 
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hybrid relationship between society and technology, Klinenberg focuses on community 
and the health of the human body. Klinenberg explores intersections of race, class, gender 
and neighbourhood as social determinants of health, finding that the elderly and the 
isolated were hit hardest by Chicago’s 1995 heat wave:  
 
Solitary at the end of life, Laczko [an elderly man who lived by himself] was 
joined by hundreds of other Chicago residents who died alone during the heat 
wave and were assisted by two potentially life-saving interventions - attention 
from state-sponsored service providers and artificial cooling - only after their 
bodies were delivered to the Cook County Morgue. (2002: 15) 
 
 
The intersection of time, (air-conditioned) space and mobility was a matter of life and 
death. Extreme weather events, such as hurricanes, highlight the role one’s body plays in 
determining experience of a disaster and, at an extreme, one’s life chances (Klinenberg 
2002). Social capital and connectivity is a form of empowerment. What is notable about 
the 1995 heat wave is that the disaster, that is, isolated and immobile individuals were by 
definition invisible to those who could offer help, perhaps only being discovered by a 
neighbour or police after they were deceased for some time. In contrast to the highly 
visible and aesthetic charisma of hurricane impacts, heat wave impacts are insidious. 
Klinenberg’s recognition that framing, most often undertaken by elites, influences 
whether or not an event is interpreted, and responded to, as a disaster was a watershed 
moment in disaster sociology. As a result, it was not until the death toll reached a certain 
level that the heat wave was recognized as a disaster. Such framing issues are not limited 
to less perceptible disasters as heat waves. For example, in the lead up to Hurricane Sandy, 
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the Hurricane Centre’s use of the phrase ‘hurricane force winds’ rather than simply 
‘hurricane’ was a source of confusion and delayed government action (Sobel 2014). 34 
Mobility is a common, but backgrounded, dimension in disaster sociology. 
Freudenburg et al.’s (2011) work on Hurricane Katrina analyzes the interface of 
infrastructure and economy that led to the disaster, detailing how the local elite 
channelled investment into the creation of canals in an effort to position New Orleans as a 
significant port, efforts that in the long-term facilitated flooding and economic 
devastation. The authors tell how, in response to the flooding, a flotilla of private citizens 
in cars with boats in tow, travelled to New Orleans to assist those who were stranded – an 
improvised mobility lifeline. Gramling and Freudenburg’s (2012) work on the BP oil spill 
analyzes the machinations of American policy designed to meet, as well as stimulate, a 
seemingly insatiable energy demand which includes a massive, carbon intensive transport 
network. In telling the story of the social-technical entanglement with electricity grids, 
Murphy simultaneously illustrates the paralysis of transport as residents negotiated 
treacherous ice-covered roads and sidewalks overhung by ice-covered trees and power 
lines. He provides insight into the possibility of a mass evacuation of Montreal due to the 
failure of the municipal water filtration plant when electrical failures prevented processes 
that filter sediment, with the then Mayor of Montreal stating:  
 
The top managers…told me the only solution that they foresaw – and I was 
completely shocked – evacuate a million people, ask people to stockpile water 
by filling their bathtubs or buying bottled water…. I listened to their strategies 
and I thought about sicknesses, epidemics, water, the health of the people. I 
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 See ‘Chapter 3: Charting Course – Methods’ for further discussion and examples of frame analysis. 
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thought about the bridges and the people who would flee. I imagined the panic. I 
saw Montreal upside down. (2009: 194) 
 
Water and transport, sediment and electricity were enmeshed, with blockages of 
electricity spurring possible flows of people into an ice encrusted mobility web. 
Fortunately, the evacuation was averted due to a technical fix, but the spectre of 
evacuation made an impression. At the scale of the individual, Klinenberg explores the 
range of factors, from social isolation to the ongoing threat of gang violence that deterred 
senior citizens from venturing out of their homes, from economic decline to urban design, 
which fostered immobility during the Chicago heat wave. Using a disaster sociology lens, 
I bring weather-impacted mobility networks to the fore, analyzing the social, ecological 
and technical turbulence that transpired in hurricane-impacted mobility webs. 
 
Reflexive modernization 
Reflexive modernization draws attention to the invisible risks associated with, and 
perpetuated by, market expansion. Modernization, through the process of forging an 
existence based on overcoming scarcity, has manufactured risks such as climate change, 
nuclear threat and ozone depletion, that endanger the ecosystem of which humans are a 
part; “we live in a world where hazards created by ourselves are as, or more, threatening 
than those that come from the outside” (Giddens 2003: 35). The anchoring idea for my 
research epitomizes reflexive modernization: fossil fuel-powered transport contributes to 
climate change and climate change disrupts mobility webs. The energetic boomerang 
comes full circle with severe weather events disrupting the complex, weather-exposed 
transport systems (Beck 1992). 
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Reflexive modernization is grounded in risk society theory. Beck succinctly 
defines risk as adversity to a future that is to be “prevented” (1992: 33). With risk comes 
anxiety: manufactured risks “endanger all forms of life on the planet…they outlast 
generations. The affected even include those not yet alive at the time or in the places 
where the accident occurred but born years later and long distances away” (emphasis in 
original) (Beck 1992: 22). For example, Trainor et al. (2009) illustrate the spatial and 
temporal mobility of risk by describing how climate change impacts and persistent 
organic pollutants cluster in the Canadian north disproportionately impacting local 
communities. From an ecosystem perspective, and consequently from social, health and 
economic perspectives, notions of global and local space are biophysically enmeshed. 
Giddens observes “very few new-style risks have anything to do with the borders of 
nations” (2003: 34), a trait held in common with mobility webs. 
 Risk society theory is characterized by the notion of the end of nature (Beck 1992). 
The risks posed by human economic development are insidious; there is no aspect of 
global ecology left unaffected (Beck 1992). Ozone depletion and garbage-filled ocean 
gyres, persistent organic pollutants and radioactivity illustrate the pervasiveness of 
anthropogenic environmental impacts, from the outer reaches of the atmosphere to 
cellular integrity (Beck 1992). Notably, these ‘boomerang effects’ of modernization are 
invisible (Beck 1992).35 This is particularly the case in terms of climate change, where a 
lag occurs between when greenhouse gas emissions enter the atmosphere and when their 
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 Notably, even the 2010 Icelandic ash cloud event was characterized by invisible volcanic dust, which 
despite being imperceptible, damaged airplane engines (Birtchnell and Büscher 2011). In a similar way 
particulate matter from fossil fuel combustion, measured in micrometres, infiltrates human lungs. 
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warming is felt. Decades of greenhouse emissions have not yet reached their warming 
potential, making runaway climate change a possibility (Giddens 2003). Further, climate 
change yields multiple positive feedback effects. The albedo effect hastens the 
disintegration of polar ice sheets and the melting of the northern permafrost accelerates 
methane release. Ironically, sciences such as climatology are “more and more necessary, 
but at the same time less and less sufficient” to addressing resilience (emphasis in 
original) (Beck 1992: 156). Risk theory calls on civil society to critically reflect on 
acceptable levels of risk, questioning risk thresholds identified by government, industry 
and science (Beck 1992).  
Beck explores the paradoxical co-development of wealth production and risk 
production, where in some parts of the world societal concern has transformed from 
hunger to fear, from a preoccupation with the distribution of goods to the distribution of 
hazards (Beck 1992). In my research I explore how the distribution or mobility of people, 
goods and services is managed within the context of hazards. Hazards rather than 
supplanting the distribution of goods, instead further complicate their distribution. I 
explore the interactions between severe weather and mobility webs, specifically the 
resultant responses and frames in the context of a reflexive modernity.  
 
Emancipatory catastrophism 
In more recent work, Beck (2015) examines the transformative potential for risk. He uses 
the term emancipatory catastrophism to describe the windows of opportunity that occur 
during ecological, transport and technical disruption. “First,” Beck describes, “the 
anticipation of global catastrophe violates sacred (unwritten) norms of human existence 
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and civilization. Second, thereby it causes an anthropological shock, and, third, a social 
catharsis” (2015: 79).36 While I describe the relationship between climate causation in the 
transport sector and severe weather disruptions of transport networks as circular, Beck 
uses the image of a double helix to highlight “the interlocked process of the production 
and distribution of goods and bads” (2015: 78). While such images are useful, Beck 
argues that as we are in the midst of profound changes, we are “experiencing that which 
we do not have the word for, the processes we observe, reflects that reality is still 
emerging” (2015: 77). Potter and Romano, speaking to the study of recent history, refer to 
this as a “zone of imperfect visibility” (2012: 3) (See Chapter 6: Zone of Imperfect 
Visibility). Emancipatory catastrophism, and the related concept of societal 
metamorphosis, is neither revolutionary nor ideological, but like social-ecological 
systems theory, describe and constitute an in situ, experimental navigation of a complex 
and unfolding situation.  
However, Murphy (2015) in an analysis of the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina 
contests the emancipatory potential of disaster. Murphy (2015) cites the work of 
Freudenburg on the aftermath of various disasters (e.g. BP blowout) as contradicting 
Beck’s theory, stating “denial of climate change has metamorphosized into apathy and 
profitable adaptation.” Due to risk aversion and technological lock-in to fossil fuel 
dependency, society is in effect largely unresponsive to climate change science and 
impacts. In contrast, in terms of transport, Mao (2015) analyzes the 2014 crash of 
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 This approach contrasts with Klein’s (2007) observations regarding how societal shocks are leveraged in 
a form of disaster capitalism, exploiting crisis to forward unpopular policies (e.g. the creation of a 
Department of Homeland Security following 9/11). 
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Malaysia Airlines Flight 17 in the context of the economic outfall. He describes the 
discourse around risk that developed in the aftermath of the event as an emancipatory side 
effect, sparking discussion on improvements in air travel security. These two examples 
differ in scale from the climate to aviation practices, suggesting that the emancipatory 
benefits may exist but be diluted as scale increases. 
 
Weaving a theoretical net 
To inform my guiding question – what responses and frames, particularly related to 
social-ecological interactions, emerge when mobility networks are impacted by 
hurricanes? – I ground my research in the mobilities literature, as informed by the 
disaster literature. Weaving together different threads, I create a new conceptual net. 
Overall I bridge the mobility and disaster literatures, creating space to explore resilience 
and vulnerability in climate change‐impacted transport systems. I bridge fields: from 
applied infrastructure resilience to theoretical reflexive modernization. I bridge differing 
foci: sustainable mobility focuses on environmental protection, while transport resilience 
focuses on economic protection. I bridge differing futures: the mobilities paradigm 
includes conceptualizations of resource‐constrained transport futures, while emancipatory 
catastrophism focuses on the collective goods that might emerge out of collective bads. 
Throughout I weave Cresswell's politics of mobility and Latour’s Actor-‐Network Theory. 
 Given such a diverse and wide-ranging literatures tensions, complementarities and 
new theoretical insights abound. Overall, the ontological orientation of my work is 
premised on the co-construction of social-ecological spheres, including recognition of the 
  91 
Anthropocene, and the saturation of mobility and related turbulences in both social- 
ecological systems. Ontologically, the mobilities and risk literatures focus on differing 
aspects of society. Sustainable mobility, the mobilities paradigm, the politics of mobility, 
resilience, and Foucault’s work on governmentality and social and ecological circulations, 
all focus on the societal organization of movement. However, the role of power in each 
literature differs significantly. Analyses of power are peripheral to the study of 
sustainable mobility as a pragmatic transport planning tool. Similarly, transport and 
infrastructure resilience focus on managing movement, particularly economic flows in the 
case of the former, during severe weather events, and are subcategories of climate 
resilience.  
The mobilities paradigm, in contrast, often employs governmentality to describe 
the techniques and implications of the surveillance, discipline and security of movement 
from the perspective of how the state manages the responses and frames of citizens, or 
even more specifically the movement of citizens (i.e. governmobility). Circulations of 
social and ecological goods are a central consideration in terms of meeting the needs of 
the population and supporting economic development. The politics of mobility, with its 
six dimensions, provides a language to articulate and analyze power dynamics in finer 
grain detail.  
The disaster literature, including disaster sociology and emancipatory 
catastrophism, focuses on the management of risk in society. In contrast to the mobilities 
literature, the treatment of power is similar for both disaster sociology and emancipatory 
catastrophism as both focus on social, technical and ecological co-construction and 
related risks. Disaster sociologists analyze social construction of disaster at the local, 
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regional and/or bioregional scale. Emancipatory catastrophism, as a component of 
reflexive modernization, examines global, often invisible risks. However, it can be scaled 
down to explore the emancipatory potential of a specific event or series of events. 
 Overall, the epistemological orientation of my work is using in-depth case studies 
and official accounts of extreme events to provide insight into profound ruptures that 
reveal social-technical-ecological vulnerabilities. Epistemologically, both the mobility 
and risk literatures draw from diverse knowledge sources. In terms of mobility, 
sustainable mobility, transport resilience and infrastructure resilience, as dimensions of 
transport planning, are perhaps most restrictive in terms of potential knowledge sources 
given their focus on modelling and engineering approaches. In contrast, social-ecological 
resilience aims to include diverse stakeholder perspectives (e.g. hydrologists, ecologists, 
industry, recreational users, government officials, etc.) to identify more robust 
management techniques. The mobilities paradigm and politics of mobility focus on the 
lived experience of mobility examining the movements, representations and practices 
entailed in mobility. By contrast, governmentality draws on governmental practices and 
related representations of governance. In terms of the disaster literature, disaster 
sociologists embrace diverse sources of knowledge as they piece together complex events, 
including lived accounts, expert interviews, media accounts, policy documents, 
photographs and more. Reflexive modernization and emancipatory catastrophism, given 
their theorization on global issues, tend to be limited to the realm of academics. Bringing 
together the mobility and disaster literatures yields innovative and valuable synergies 
given the degree to which severe weather events, of the type expected under a changing 
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climate, impact mobility webs and, in turn, the role mobility plays in disaster prevention, 
response and recovery 
 The disaster sociology literature in particular offers diverse methods to describe 
mobility case studies, while reflexive risk and emancipatory catastrophism offer rich 
theoretical insights. With the exception of the mobilities paradigm and the politics of 
mobility, ecological considerations are central to the mobility and risk theories upon 
which I draw. Sustainable mobility, social-ecological system theory and infrastructure 
resilience, particularity next generation infrastructure, are overt in their consideration of 
environmental integrity. Transport resilience aims to accommodate severe weather 
impacts, but less with a view to accommodating environmental flows and more of a view 
to facilitating economic flows. Likewise, Foucault’s approach to circulation, which 
provides useful elaborations of intersections of social and ecological flows, does so from 
the anthropocentric motive of meeting the needs of a population. Building on a 
foundation of sustainable mobility, social-ecological system theory and infrastructure 
resilience, acknowledging the shortcomings of transport resilience, incorporating a 
circulatory approach, and applying the result to the mobilities paradigm, I develop an 
ecopolitical approach to mobility. Disaster sociology and reflexive risk inform this 
approach by providing vocabularies of social, ecological and technical co-construction 
and social response to disaster (i.e. windows of opportunity and emancipatory 
catastrophism). 
The paths forward posited by each literature are diverse and a key source of 
tension. At one end of the spectrum are transport and infrastructure resilience, which by 
design or accident, focus on restoring the status quo. At the other end of the spectrum, 
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Urry imagines potential mobility futures in a carbon and resource-constrained society 
ranging from utopian to dystopian. Brown raises the possibility of a “future-proof” public 
works that will withstand climate change impacts (2014: 12). Both reflexive 
modernization and Urry’s mobility futures challenge society to question the levels of risk 
entailed in contemporary society, while governmentality provides concepts for governing 
such risk (e.g. surveillance, discipline, security). Likewise, disaster sociology draws 
attention to the wide-ranging vulnerabilities entailed by tightly integrated social, 
ecological and technical systems. In sum, by weaving together the mobilities and disaster 
literatures, I create space to explore what resilience means in terms of mobility webs. To 
this end, I explore what sources of resilience and vulnerability emerge, as well as consider 
what transport resilience and larger societal resilience may look like moving forward, 
providing a bridge between contemporary sustainable mobility efforts and mobility 
futures as described by Urry. 
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3  CHARTING COURSE: METHODS 
 
… our pens poised like fishing rods. 
 
When it granted an interview, it refused to talk 
about its film credits or its accolades of full moons. 
 
It was more interested in talking about what we thought 
it tasted like: fish or tears, it wanted to know. 
 
… When we could 
we’d spear a good conversation and carry it, wriggling, 
 
to its mouth. We’d find the bones of what we were trying 
to say later, washed up on the shore.  
 
Sue Goyette 
Seventeen 
2013 
 
 
Alex Colville 
Departure 
1962 
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In a phone booth on the edge of a pier, this woman looks as if she might be engaged in a 
phone conversation with the ocean itself. It is possible to imagine she holds a pen ‘poised 
like a fishing rod.’ However, while the ocean ‘granted an interview,’ it turns out to be a 
difficult research participant. 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
To research what responses and frames emerge in terms of mobility webs impacted by 
hurricanes I used an inductive comparative case study. Given my concentration on issues 
of complexity and uncertainty in other overlapping spheres of mobility, climate change 
and severe weather events, I focused on collecting official and expert accounts. For both 
Hurricanes Juan and Igor, I compiled existing data in the form of media articles, 
legislative transcripts and policy documents, as well as collected material in the form of 
interviews with key informants such as transport managers, environmental managers and 
land use planners. In addition, I attended relevant conferences and training opportunities 
To strengthen my theoretical understanding and practical experience. I focus on heavily 
impacted regions within each province, drawing on provincial and to a lesser extent local 
and national frames and responses. In combination, each method contributes to case 
construction, with multiple methods increasing the validity of findings (Prior 2003; 
Snyder 2005). My goal is not to provide a detailed chronological description of the events 
(such as Murphy's (2009) treatment of the North American ice storm), but to illuminate 
and explore various facets of mobility experienced in these events.37 
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 For popular accounts of Hurricane Juan, see McLeod (2004) and The Chronicle Herald (2003), and for 
Hurricane Igor see The Telegram (2010a). 
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I analyzed the resulting data set using content and frame analysis (Neuendorf 
2002) guided by the following questions: 1. What responses were employed prior to, 
during and following the hurricane in terms of mitigating impacts on mobility networks? 
2. What frames were present and, by extension, absent in the aftermath of the hurricanes 
generally and in relation to mobility networks specifically? 3. How do the responses and 
frames used in the hurricane-impacted regions – which share similarities as well as 
striking contrasts – compare? 4. What theoretical insights and practical lessons are 
yielded in terms of the social-ecological resilience of mobility webs in a changing 
climate? 
 
Case study selection 
Case study approaches provide a thorough understanding of the particular and therefore 
lend themselves to comparative studies (Van Maanen 2011). I selected two cases: 
Hurricane Juan which hit Nova Scotia (2003) and Hurricane Igor which hit 
Newfoundland (2010). Both were record-breaking hurricanes that resulted in significant 
mobility disruption, exacerbated by coastal and peninsular geography. I focussed on 
regions that were most heavily impacted by each storm: in Nova Scotia the capital 
Halifax and in Newfoundland the comparatively rural region of the Bonavista 
Peninsula. 38  Further, Nova Scotia overall has a more complex mobility web than 
Newfoundland. Finally, while both regions were impacted by the same type of weather 
event (category 2 and 1 Hurricanes respectively), the profiles of the storms were notably 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38
 This is not to discount the heavy impacts, including transport disruptions, in other parts of each province, 
including urban Newfoundland (St. John’s) and rural Nova Scotia.  
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different. Nova Scotia was impacted by high winds, while heavy rains impacted 
Newfoundland. The result is two inductive case studies that are geographically and 
temporally closely situated, but that offer rich contrasts that yield practical and theoretical 
insights.  
My approach to case study selection and style was informed by the disaster 
sociology of Murphy (2009) and Klinenberg (2002). Both authors focus on one key event, 
but include multiple case studies at different scales. In researching the 1998 North 
American ice storm, Murphy (2009) details the severe infrastructure impacts experienced 
across several provinces and states, as well as contrasts the impact of the storm on 
mainstream society with that of Amish communities. In researching the 1995 Chicago 
heat wave, Klinenberg (2002) details the impact on different Chicago neighbourhoods 
illustrating how varying levels of community cohesion and social support have 
discernable impacts on life chances. 39 More recently, Gotham and Greenberg (2014) used 
a historical comparative case study approach to analyze redevelopment discourses in 
post-Katrina New Orleans and post-9/11 New York. 
In designing my research, based on the particular context in Atlantic Canada, I 
opted to focus on two hurricanes that impacted two regions. In both cases, I combine a 
focus on the larger provincial scale with a focus on a region that was particularly 
impacted: Halifax Regional Municipality in Nova Scotia and Bonavista Peninsula in 
Newfoundland. These regions were selected in part because of the degree of impact 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39
  I opt to focus on extreme events given the social-ecological-technical co-construction they reveal. 
However, more ‘mundane’ events such as the Halifax-Dartmouth Bridge Commission’s ‘Big Lift’ project 
(2016), which involves regularly scheduled closures over the course of a year provides a more controlled 
approach to the study of mobility disruptions (e.g. emergency services). 
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experienced, and in part, due to the availability and interest of key informants. Writ 
broadly, the unit of analysis is regional (see Perry and Ommer 2003 for a similar scalar 
approach). However, drawing on Cresswell’s politics of mobility and Foucault’s work on 
circulation permits a versatile non-linear and interscalar approach that can scale between 
local communities and the atmosphere. I opted for this approach as it captures the 
interscalar nature of mobility webs, which are often integrated across municipal, 
provincial/state and national borders. Even disruptions specific to a small geographic 
region (e.g. a train derailment, a road closure) can cause supply chain and passenger 
travel disruptions over a broad region as demonstrated by the Icelandic volcanic ash cloud 
which resulted in disruptions for the Singapore Airport Authority. 
In addition to key similarities, namely record-breaking hurricanes making landfall 
in Atlantic Canada within a decade and the island/peninsular geography of both regions, 
Hurricanes Juan and Igor also offer important contrasts.40 Firebaugh (2008) notes that the 
use of contrasting cases can be a source of telling comparisons. This is exemplified by 
Murphy’s (2009) comparison of the harsh impacts of the 1998 ice storm on large-scale 
socio-technical entanglements that defined Quebec society versus the relative lack of 
impact on simpler and smaller assemblages of Amish communities. Likewise, Tompkins, 
Lemos and Boyd (2008) compare two regions vulnerable to different climate change 
impacts: hurricane vulnerability in the Cayman Islands and drought vulnerability in Brazil. 
They find that while disaster risk reduction efforts had an effect in both regions, 
underlying structural issues that contribute to poverty in Brazil undermine risk reduction 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40
 Nova Scotia is a peninsula, and its capital Halifax is located on a peninsula. Newfoundland is the island 
portion of the province of Newfoundland and Labrador and is characterized by numerous peninsulas.  
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efforts. Tompkins, Lemos and Boyd conclude that risk reduction and poverty reduction 
efforts need to be integrated. Comparing the impacts from rural Newfoundland, 
colloquially known as ‘the Bay’, to urban Halifax illustrates the diversity and complexity 
of mobility webs and storm-related disruptions in one region in differing contexts, albeit 
both within Atlantic Canada. Further, the characteristics of the hurricanes, and their 
respective impacts on mobility webs, varied: Hurricane Juan was defined predominantly 
by wind, Igor by rain.  
 One issue that arises when studying transport networks through the lens of past 
hurricane events, rather than solely focusing on the contemporary context, is that issues of 
memory and recall arise (Freund and Thomson 2011). These concerns are particularly 
relevant in the case of Nova Scotia as Hurricane Juan occurred more than ten years ago. 
Further complications arise given that, with regard to climate change, humans are in a 
“zone of imperfect visibility” (Potter and Romano 2012: 3). We are in the midst of 
climate change and although hurricanes are discrete events, their impacts and implications 
resonate in the form of tree stumps, unexpected expenses and policy reforms. Further, 
public consciousness of climate change shifted between 2003 and the 2013/14 (when 
interviews were conducted), as discussion of climate change and the experience of 
extreme weather events became more pervasive. A key informant interviewed about 
Hurricane Juan may be more likely to raise the issue of climate change when interviewed 
in 2014 than in 2003.41 It is likely that participants reinterpreted events on an ongoing 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41
 Events such as entry into force the Kyoto Protocol on Climate Change and the occurrence of Hurricane 
Katrina, marked 2005 as a turning point in public consciousness on climate change (Lever-Tracy 2008). 	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basis as new information, particularly related to climate change, came to light. In short, 
understandings and interpretations of events are historically situated (Prior 2003).  
Law argues for the embrace of this ambiguity and the rejection of the notion that 
reality is “stable, determinate, and therefore knowable and predictable” (2008: 144). Such 
a methodological approach is apt for a time of post-normal climate, defined as a state 
where previous climatic trends and patterns are no longer a reliable basis for making 
future predictions. Flux and uncertainty ironically constitute the ‘order’ of the day – we 
are learning to live with change (Adger et al. 2005; Ommer 2007). I did not account for 
differences in participants’ perceptions of the event between the time of the event and 
present day. However, pairing interviews with the official accounts is a methodological 
strategy to address potential discordances between memory and written records. Further, 
with an issue as complex as climate change, it was anticipated that contrapuntal voices 
might surface, whereby not only key informants from different organizations, but even a 
single actor, may express conflicting views (Sorsoli and Tolman 2008). For example, a 
key informant may express concern about climate impacts while soon thereafter 
expressing the need to maximize fossil fuel-based economic growth. Rather than 
assuming coherence, this multiple narrative approach anticipates complex discourses that 
reflect divergent understandings and shifting states of mind (Sorsoli and Tolman 2008).  
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Notably, Hurricane Juan (2003) took place prior to this shift in awareness, while Hurricane Igor (2010) 
occurred afterwards. 
  103 
Data collection 
Data for the Juan and Igor case studies was collected between September 2013 and 
August 2014. Analysis of the media, legislative, policy and interview data occurred on an 
ongoing basis (Table 3.1).   
 
Table 3.1: Summary of data sources for Hurricanes Juan and Igor  
 HURRICANE 
JUAN 
HURRICANE 
IGOR 
REGIONAL 
(ATLANTIC 
CANADA)42 
TOTAL 
Media articles 51 53 n/a 104 
Legislative transcripts 53 41 n/a 94 
Policy documents 3 3 0 6 
Interviews 12 11 7 30 
TOTAL 121 107 7  
 
 
Media  
 
Media analysis is a prevalent method in disaster analysis given its timely, ongoing and 
easily accessible coverage of episodic events that includes the perspectives of community 
members, government representatives and service providers. I analyzed print news media 
articles to determine what responses and frames emerged in terms of mobility webs 
impacted by hurricanes, as well as to provide a preliminary familiarization with events for 
which I was not present. I read the articles with an eye to sources of mobility-related 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42
 Regional refers to organizations that represent Atlantic Canada as a whole or national organizations that 
include an Atlantic Canadian chapter or division. 
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resilience and vulnerability, as well as the frames used by organizations represented in the 
dataset, such as government and industry, in addition to community members. 
For Nova Scotia and Newfoundland, I conducted parallel media scans for each 
hurricane including local, provincial and national news media articles (Table 3.2). The 
Coast (Halifax, Nova Scotia) and The Packet (Clarenville, Newfoundland and Labrador) 
were selected as they cover regions directly impacted by the hurricanes in question and 
also have readily available electronic archives. Selection of the provincial and national 
newsprint media sources was also simplified as each province only has one major 
newspaper (i.e. The Chronicle Herald in Nova Scotia and The Telegram in 
Newfoundland) and Canada two major national papers (i.e. The National Post and The 
Globe and Mail).  
Given the diversity of media sources, I drew on two databases to obtain the 
sample. For The Globe and Mail and The National Post, I used Factiva database; for The 
Chronicle Herald, The Telegram and The Packet, I used each paper’s in-house online 
archive as they are not included from the Factiva database. For The Coast I scanned hard 
copy articles available at the Nova Scotia Archives; although many back issues were 
digitized, the ones I needed were not. A limitation of this approach is that each database 
may use different criteria for tagging articles, possibly affecting the uniformity of article 
selection.  
Climate change media analyses are commonly longitudinal. For example, the 
work of Canadian researchers Ahchong and Dodds (2012) and Young and Dugas (2011) 
using The Globe and Mail, The National Post and The Toronto Star spans decades, from 
the 1980s to the present, while Stoddart and Tindall’s (2015) analyses of The Globe and 
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Mail and The National Post focuses on four periods between 1999 and 2010. Boykoff’s 
analyses (e.g. 2007) of American and British coverage focus on the 2000s. Liu, Vedlitz 
and Alston’s (2008) study of news media coverage of climate change in The Houston 
Chronicle, which includes coastal issues such as hurricanes and sea level rise, covers one 
decade (1992 to 2005).  
At the other end of the scale, Driedger et al. (2009) compare ten day and one year 
analyses of media coverage of two Canadian health disasters, the 2000 E. coli breakout in 
Walkerton, Ontario and the 2003 Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE or Mad Cow) 
breakout in Alberta. They find that dominant frames are established within ten days of the 
inciting event. Quigley and Quigley (2013), in a comparative case study that includes 
Hurricane Juan, used a one-year dataset to compare article volume, rate and content. 
Given the timeframe for hurricane recovery and my interest in capturing responses, I 
started the sample one day prior to the hurricane, to include preparation measures, and 
continued it for one month to incorporate response and recovery measures. This 
timeframe captures the initial ten days when frames are established, but also captures the 
arc of preparation, response and immediate recovery practices associated with hurricanes 
in part. 
I searched articles for the keywords (i.e. Hurricane + Juan or Igor, as applicable) 
in the headlines and leads of articles and editorials. Then I reviewed the preliminary 
sample, excluding articles that cursorily addressed the hurricane (e.g. announcements), as 
well duplicates, articles later updated and articles no longer electronically accessible. 
Finally, I reduced the dataset to a maximum of 20 articles per news outlet, using 
purposive sampling to identify articles most directly related to the study of mobility and 
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resilience (Table 3.2) (Neuendorf 2002). I selected 20 articles per source as a manageable 
limit for labour-intensive connotative content analysis, as compared to detonative content 
analysis (e.g. Young and Dugas 2011) (Neuendorf 2002). However, less than 20 relevant 
articles were published for each media source (Table 3.2). Letters to the editor, television 
news coverage, radio news coverage, including phone-in shows, online reader comments 
and social media are excluded from the archive due to the lack of readily available 
transcripts and uneven coverage, and photos accompanying the articles were not analyzed, 
though all may be valuable areas for future research.43 
 
Table 3.2: Summary of print media news data archive for Hurricane Juan and Igor                                                                                                   
 HURRICANE JUAN n HURRICANE IGOR n 
Dates Sep 27 – Oct 28 2003  Sep 20 – Oct 21 2010  
Local The Coast 
 
10 The Packet 17 
Provincial The Chronicle Herald 
 
17 The Telegram 18 
National The Globe and Mail 
 
16 The Globe and Mail 11 
 The National Post 
 
8 The National Post 7 
TOTAL  51  53 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43
 See Young (2011) for an analysis of the role of letters to the editor in climate change narratives and 
DiFrancesco and Young (2010) for an analysis of photos in articles on climate change. 
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Legislative transcripts 
 
To complement the short-term focus of media coverage, I reviewed legislative transcripts 
for the year following each hurricane to gain a sense of the issues raised by elected 
officials and how such issues were framed (Table 3.3). Legislative transcripts, also 
referred to as Hansard transcripts, are verbatim written records of debates that occur in 
formal sittings of elected officials. Compared to media analysis, legislative transcript 
analysis is an uncommon method in climate change and disaster analysis. A search of the 
academic database Scopus yielded no examples, suggesting that this is an underused and 
yet readily available data source that may richly complement more traditional 
methodological approaches. 
 
Table 3.3: Summary of legislative sessions pertaining to Hurricanes Juan and Igor 
 NOVA SCOTIA 
LEGISLATURE 
 
NEWFOUNDLAND AND 
LABRADOR HOUSE OF 
ASSEMBLY 
First session after hurricane Sep 30, 2003 Dec 6, 2010  
Number of days f irst 
sessions held after landfall 
1 76 
Last session year after 
hurricane 
Sep 29, 2004 May 31, 2011 
Number of sessions 53 
 
41 
Number (percentage) of 
sessions referencing 
hurricane 
41 (77%) 20 (50%) 
Number (percentage) of 
sessions that reference 
hurricane in context of 
cl imate change 
9 (17%) 1 (<1%) 
 
  
  108 
Transcripts are in the public domain and are available online. I accessed 
transcripts for the Nova Scotian Legislature and the Newfoundland and Labrador House 
of Assembly. I entered specific search terms (i.e. Hurricane + Juan or Igor, as applicable), 
as well as broader terms (i.e. climate, warming, transport and resilience) to flag any 
relevant topical links. I scanned the articles with an eye to sources of resilience, often 
highlighted by members of the governing party, and vulnerabilities, conveniently 
highlighted by members of the opposition parties. Given the public nature of government 
sittings there was a self-consciously performative element to these texts. I coded the 
transcripts in terms of the frames used, such as economics, public health and safety, and 
environment, as well for policy successes acknowledged and policy reforms and 
proposals initiated by the experience of the hurricane. While beyond the scope of this 
research, it would be interesting to compare official Hansard transcripts with documents 
only accessible through Freedom of Information requests, possibly yielding more insight 
into the ‘offstage’ political discussion and responses to these events. 
 
 
Policy documents 
 
I scanned select policy documents produced by key organizations involved in mobility 
and environmental management to learn if, and how, the experience of a severe hurricane 
informed policy related to transport and social-ecological resilience. Policy responses to 
severe weather events are challenging given a range of uncertainties from economic to 
climatic, as well as political palatability:  
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Policy proposals in [response to severe weather events] generally involve drastic 
infrastructural works and long-term investments. They face the difficult 
challenge of framing problems and solutions in a publicly acceptable manner in 
ever changing circumstances. (Vink et al. 2013: 90) 
 
Vink et al.’s (2013) analysis of the framing of three policy proposals forwarded to address 
flooding safety issues in the Netherlands finds that each document frames climate change 
differently, varying the emphasis and consequently identifying variable timeframes and 
governance structures for taking action. By comparison, Jennings’ (2011) analysis of 
policy responses to the 2004 British floods finds that discourse in government policy 
documents centres on grassroots approaches to climate change adaptation and resilience 
reflecting a neoliberal tactic of shifting responsibility from government to individuals and 
communities. 
I identified potential documents through a two-stage process. First, through the 
media scan I flagged any references to policy documents. Second, I asked interview 
participants to identify policy implications of the hurricanes and related documents. 
Numerous documents ranging from community to national scales were identified through 
this process (e.g. climate change action plans, transport sector specific guidelines, 
infrastructure assessments). To limit the data volume, I opted to focus on provincial 
government documents produced directly in response to the experience of the hurricane 
and flagship documents pertaining to mobility in order to maintain focus on the official 
responses to the hurricanes (Table 3.4). While there are relevant national and municipal 
documents, given the regional scale I decided to focus on provincial documents 
paralleling my focus on provincial legislatures. Comparing municipal documents would 
have been a valuable area for research. Halifax Regional Municipality as a relatively large, 
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wealthy and progressive municipality is active on issues such as climate change 
adaptation and disaster preparedness. By contrast, the Bonavista Peninsula is made up of 
relatively small and resource-stretched municipalities with less capacity and traction on 
such issues. Therefore, provincial policy documents are more comparable. Analyzing 
local documents and comparing local, provincial and national documents, particularly 
areas of accordance and discordance, is a valuable area for further study. My goal is not 
to be comprehensive, but to provide a sense of the range of mobility issues and the types 
of social-ecological interactions at play. I focus on areas of resilience and vulnerability 
identified in the policy documents and related frames and policy prescriptions with the 
goal of determining how the experience of severe weather impacts mobility and reorders 
social-ecological power dynamics.  
The choice of documents is reflective of larger policy orientations and approaches 
within each province. For example, both provinces have Climate Change Action Plans. 
Nova Scotia required municipalities to undertake climate change adaptation planning in 
order to receive a portion of federal gas tax revenue, while Newfoundland developed 
voluntary workbooks to support communities in identifying and evaluating potential 
adaptation measures. By contrast, Newfoundland tied gas tax funding transfer to a variety 
of eligible project, including the development of municipal disaster plans (Government of 
Newfoundland and Labrador 2014c).44 Nova Scotia has a Sustainable Transportation 
Strategy while Newfoundland and Labrador does not, an absence that reflects a more 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44
 Through the Emergency Management Act, Nova Scotia requires municipalities to develop emergency 
preparedness plans (Emergency Management Organization 2015). Likewise, through the Emergency 
Services Act all Newfoundland and Labrador municipalities were required to develop emergency 
preparedness plans by May 1, 2012 (Government of Newfoundland and Labrador 2009b). 
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entrenched culture of automobility. Finally, reports on the government’s response to the 
hurricane are publicly available in Nova Scotia, but not Newfoundland and Labrador. 
However, in Newfoundland provincial and municipal governments did conduct 
community meetings in the aftermath of Igor. 
 
Table 3.4: Summary of select policy documents relevant to Hurricanes Juan and 
Igor and/or mobil ity 
 DOCUMENT ORGANIZATION YEAR PAGES 
HURRICANE 
JUAN 
Choose How You Move: 
Sustainable Transport Strategy 
 
Government of 
Nova Scotia 
2013a 48 
 Toward a Greener Future: 
Nova Scotia’s Climate Change 
Action Plan 
 
Government of 
Nova Scotia 
2009 44 
 A Report on the Emergency 
Response to Hurricane Juan 
 
Government of 
Nova Scotia 
2003 13 
HURRICANE 
IGOR 
Charting Our Course: Climate 
Change Action Plan 
 
Government of 
Newfoundland 
2011a 83 
 Managing Municipal 
Infrastructure in a Changing 
Climate 
 
Government of 
Newfoundland 
No date a 48 
 7 Steps to Assess Climate 
Vulnerability in Your 
Community 
Government of 
Newfoundland 
No date b ~50 
 
 
 
Interviews 
 
To complement media articles, legislative transcripts and policy documents, I conducted 
semi-structured interviews with key informants who, through their work, have specialist 
knowledge of mobility and climate change in the context of Hurricanes Juan and/or Igor 
(Payne and Payne 2004). Ranson (2005) in her study of female engineers in Calgary, 
Alberta debated the merit of researching such a privileged group. In the case of my 
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research, and informed by Murphy’s interviews with decision-makers involved with the 
1998 North American ice storm, the merit centres on the fact that decisions made by this 
group affect all others in society. Their choice of responses, as well as their framing of 
social-ecological dynamics is both pragmatically and intellectually influential. A stronger 
understanding of the social-ecological orientation of decision-makers and managers 
provides a basis for others to reflect, intervene and influence areas of climate change 
mitigation and adaptation, disaster mitigation and response, and transport resilience. 
I opted to conduct interviews so that I might query key informants for 
rationalizations of actions and approaches (Gmelch 2003; Reinharz 1992). I aimed for a 
more critical stance in interviews attempting to move beyond superficial responses on the 
part of key informants, delving into agendas and anxieties (Hathway and Atkinson 2005).  
I used a combination of purposive and snowball sampling to target individuals in diverse 
functional roles, including transport managers (e.g. provincial transport managers, port 
authority executives, public transit managers), environmental officials (e.g. climate 
adaptation specialists, meteorologists, land use planners) and secondary personnel (e.g. 
emergency services providers, fuel providers, insurance bureau representatives) (Payne 
and Payne 2004) (Table 3.5) (Appendix A). I interviewed research participants from all 
three levels of government, with an emphasis on the provincial level. The majority of 
participants were drawn from government and the private sector, with responsibilities that 
include directly and indirectly mitigating the impacts of severe weather on transport 
operations. I also interviewed representatives of non-governmental organizations, 
including humanitarian organizations, specific transport sector advocacy groups, as well 
as environmental and infrastructure advocacy organizations. While the experiences of 
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individual travellers (e.g. commuters, seniors, children, etc.) would provide valuable 
insights (Haney, Elliott and Fussell 2010), I focused on official and expert accounts to 
highlight areas of social-ecological resilience and vulnerability at the network level. The 
majority of participants lived and worked in Nova Scotia and Newfoundland, with the 
exception of representatives of national or regional organizations.  
 
Table 3.5: Summary of interview participants by sector 
 NOVA SCOTIA NEWFOUNDLAND REGIONAL 
(ATLANTIC 
CANADA)45 
Transport - Private 3 4 2 
Transport - Government 3 5 1 
Environment - Government 2 1 1 
Non-governmental 
organization 
3 1 3 
Other - Government 1 1 0 
TOTAL 12 11 7 
 
I first contacted potential participants with an introductory email and followed-up by 
phone if necessary, or vice versa (Appendices B). I attached an Informed Consent Form for 
their review (Appendix C). I communicated with potential participants to clarify any questions 
or concerns, and if appropriate, to schedule an interview time. Approximately one-half of the 
interviews were in person and one-half by phone given the broad geographic distribution of 
research participants. Two joint interviews were conducted whereby two representatives of the 
same organization were interviewed in tandem. If the interview was conducted in person, I 
reviewed the Informed Consent Form with the participant and requested their signature. If the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45
 Regional refers to organizations that represent Atlantic Canada as a whole or national organizations that 
include an Atlantic Canadian chapter or division. 
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interview was conducted over the phone, I reviewed the content and requested their oral 
consent. I then signed and dated the consent form indicating that ‘I have read and explained 
this consent form to the participant before receiving the participant’s consent, and the 
participant has knowledge of its contents and appeared to understand it.’ All participants gave 
full consent. 
 The interview consisted of two parts: 1. the experience of the hurricane; and 2. 
policy and practice implications. With regard to the experience of the hurricane, 
discussion areas addressed include: a. hurricane preparedness; b. the immediate 
experience of the hurricane; and c. coping and recovery. With regard to policy and 
practice implications, discussion areas addressed included: d. specific policy and practice 
ramifications and e. projections regarding future policy and practice, focusing on links to 
climate change and mobility. I adapted the interview schedule Murphy (2009) used in his 
research on how key decision-makers such as politicians, utility operators and senior civil 
servants navigated the 1998 North American ice storm, to the content of hurricane-
impacted Nova Scotia and Newfoundland. I posed questions that addressed matters 
related to risk perception, work-related responsibilities, coordination, key decisions, and 
adaptation and transformation in terms of policy and practice (Appendix D). The 
questions are underpinned by a focus on social-ecological resilience and vulnerability. 
Interviews averaged 45 minutes in length and were digitally recorded. Interviews were 
conducted until saturation was reached, the point at which no new themes arose (Charmaz 
2010). The recordings were professionally transcribed verbatim with the exception of 
pauses and hesitations not pertinent to the substance of the interview (Oliver, Serovich 
and Masson 2005). 
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Interview materials, including digital audio recordings and typed interview 
transcripts were stored on two password-protected computers, one belonging to me and 
one belonging to a professional transcriptionist. Files were transferred from one computer 
to the other using a password protected data stick. The full name of the participant does 
not appear on the audio file or interview transcript; a separate password protected file, to 
which only I have access, links participant names with identification codes. Data will be 
kept for a minimum of five years, as per the Memorial University policy on Integrity in 
Scholarly Research. 
The validity of the interview findings was managed via participant approval 
(Neurendorf 2002; Prior 2003). I shared my research in the form of edited transcripts, to 
give participants the opportunity to review their contributions (Shaffir and Stebbins 1991; 
van den Hoonaard 2002). One participant made a minor amendment pertaining to 
technical terminology, a few participants acknowledged receipt of the transcript, while 
most participants did not respond which I interpreted as tacit confidence in the research 
process.  
 
 
Interview considerations 
 
In terms of conducting interviews, I had four concerns: access to key informants, the 
potential homogeneity of key informants, a potential lack of transparency on the part of 
key informants and difficulty in maintaining confidentiality. In terms of access to key 
informants, I anticipated that I might have difficulty identifying and accessing select key 
informants due to busy work schedules. With regard to the former, I drew on snowball 
sampling to identify multiple individuals within a sector or organization who have 
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experience relevant to this research. With regard to the latter, I began scheduling 
interviews early in the project to allow time for repeat requests if necessary. In cases 
where key informants were no longer with the organization, I spoke with the current 
representative. In the case of Newfoundland, accessing the relevant contacts proved 
somewhat challenging, possibly reflecting a less developed relationship between 
academia and the private/government sectors and/or interviewer fatigue as other scholars 
have conducted research on Igor in recent years (e.g. Courage 2013; Masson 2014). In 
addition certain transport sectors, notably the trucking sector, proved less interested in 
participating (see Fleming (2014) for a similar experience).    
 My second concern related to the lack of diversity among key informants. The 
demographic profile of the people whom I interviewed was largely homogenous (e.g. 
older white professional males). Women were more likely to work for non-governmental 
organizations. This was the case with both case study sites. The embodied and classed 
experience of these key informants shapes their perspectives (Fontana and Prokos 2007; 
Hawkesworth 2006). Just as Haney, Elliott and Fussell (2010) conduct a gender analysis 
of decision-making during disaster at the household level, it would be valuable to 
compare approaches to decision-making undertaken by demographically overrepresented 
versus underrepresented policy makers and transport managers. In addition, the 
conspicuous absence of women in leadership roles in the transport sector is worthy of 
research and policy intervention. For example, would the inclusion of women in decision-
making result in qualitatively and/or quantitatively different outcomes, or does the 
professional training (e.g. civil engineering) dilute such difference? 
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 My third concern related to the degree to which candidates would be forthright. I 
interviewed key informants who were conscious of how they represent the organizations 
by which they are employed, and often have agendas that they are trying to advance. 
Borins (2011) observes that management stories presented to the public are “almost 
invariably upbeat and heroic, thus failing to recognize complexity and ambiguity” (2011: 
17). Likewise, Hathway and Atkinson refer to the challenge of “penetrating the public 
performance” of key informants (2005: 68). Murphy (2009), for example, opted to 
discard one key informant interview in the course of his research on the North American 
ice storm as the individual’s preoccupation with the image of his/her organization 
precluded thoughtful reflection of how the event was actually managed. I was conscious 
of the potential for superficial responses on the part of key informants during interviews 
and probed for rationalizations of actions and approaches (Hathway and Atkinson 2005; 
Reinharz 1992). To this end, I included grounded questions regarding actual work 
experiences, comparing the nature of work before and after the hurricane. 
 My fourth concern related to issues of confidentiality given the relatively small 
and regionally-based professional community that is the focus of my research. Certain 
key informants occupy unique, identifiable positions and/or are individuals with a public 
profile, such as transport managers and corporate leaders (Payne and Payne 2004). For 
example, to refer to a bridge manager in the Nova Scotia case study would for some 
immediately flag likely research participants. Therefore, when obtaining consent I 
included the following clause to alert research participants to this risk: 
 
…  because the participants for this research project will be selected from a 
small community of professionals in a specific geographic region it is possible 
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that you may be identifiable to other people (i.e. colleagues) on the basis of 
what you have said. Please keep this in mind during the course of your 
responses, should you agree to participate. 
 
 
Research participants did not express concern. I used pseudonyms combined with broad 
professional categories (e.g. Robert, municipal transport manager) to identify research 
participants. 
 
Content and frame analysis 
I used qualitative data analysis programs to analyze the content and frames identified in 
the media articles, legislative transcripts, policy documents and interview transcripts.46  I 
began with a preliminary coding tree based on key concepts (e.g. mobilities, climate 
change, weather events). I first coded the media articles, expanding the parent (e.g. 
mobility) and child nodes (e.g. mobility as essential service) as needed. I sorted data into 
emergent themes and frames using an iterative process (Neuendorf 2002; Tashakkori and 
Teddlie 1998). I analyzed content based on themes (e.g. mobility, weather events and 
climate change) and claims (i.e. related to resilience and vulnerability; related to the 
relationship between the human and non-human environment) (Neuendorf 2002). I 
incorporated a component of emergent qualitative document analysis in the exploratory 
phase, transitioning between documents, coding and preliminary analysis to flesh out key 
terms, themes and frames (Altheide et al. 2008: 137).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46
 I used NVivo10 software for coding the legislative transcripts, policy documents and interviews 
transcripts. I used Dedoose software for coding the print media articles as NVivo10 software for Mac was 
unavailable during the early stages of data collection and analysis.  
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I reorganized and consolidated the coding tree on an ongoing basis. The final 
coding tree included 18 parent nodes and 207 child nodes. I first analyzed each dataset 
quantitatively, by comparing the relative prevalence and absence of nodes. I flagged 
major themes (i.e. those that are referenced in half or more of the data set) and compared 
these across the case studies. The content analysis provided an overall picture of the 
saturation (or lack thereof) and nature of themes related to mobility webs and resilience in 
media, legislative and policy documents, as well as among key informants.  
Building on the foundation of the content analysis, I analyzed themes and frames 
to examine in greater depth the framing of issues related to social-ecological resilience 
and vulnerability in mobility webs (Neuendorf 2002; Prior 2008). Frame analysis is an 
“analytical tool for sorting out many viewpoints and stances” (Creed, Langstraat and 
Scully 2002: 38). I define a frame as an interpretative lens or conceptual scheme for 
making sense of events that have occurred and the resultant prescriptive lens that shapes 
the practices adopted in response. Each frame is defined by a “universe of words” that 
constitutes and flags the presence of a given frame (Chong and Druckman 2007: 108). I 
define frame analysis as the identification and comparison of frames, as well as the 
examination of how certain frames become dominant and perceived as common sense. 
Frame analysis is often used in the context of polarizing debates and can be associated 
with identifying a strategic elite employing frames to influence public opinion (Chong 
and Druckman 2007). While there are elements of this in the Hurricane Juan and Igor 
case studies, there are also more spontaneous reactions or unconscious tactics or reflexes 
that constitute a history and culture of social response to the impact of severe weather 
events on mobility webs in Atlantic Canada (Norgaard 2011). For example, climate 
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change emerges as a theme and different frames includes scientific uncertainty, economic 
impacts and motivation to change the status quo.  
I inflect my use of frame analysis with Norgaard’s more informal analysis of the 
“culture of talk” (2006: 375). Norgaard identifies tools of innocence, which are stories 
that a community tells itself that shape a collective identity that fosters non-response to 
climate change. One such theme is ‘Norway is a little land,’ and refers to the country’s 
relatively small contribution to global greenhouse gas emissions. Another is ‘We have 
suffered,’ which refers to the hardship experienced during WWII and prior to the rise of 
the oil economy. Norgaard (2006) argues that such tactics buffer citizens from the 
discomfiting emotions associated with climate change, such as guilt, fear and 
helplessness.47 Tierney, Bevc and Kuligowski (2006) focus not on national myths, but on 
disaster myths perpetuated by media, for example, that affected communities are at high 
risk for looting and lawlessness, observing that such frames both reflect and prompt the 
militarization of government responses. 
I identified thematic corroborations and synergies, as well as contradictions, 
discontinuities and silences (Denzin 1997; Young and Dugas 2011). I focused the 
analysis on frames (i.e. beliefs, values, actions, justifications, predictions) within the 
context of the resilience of mobility webs in order to identify and compare practices and 
frames for both case studies (Borins 2011; Jones 2012). Of particular relevance to my 
research, Budd et al. through an analysis of media and policy documents, find that the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47
 This said, Norway is not inactive in terms of climate policy, aiming for a 30 per cent reduction in 
emissions below 1990 levels by 2020 with a further goal of carbon neutrality by 2050 (Government of 
Norway 2014). By comparison, Nova Scotia and Newfoundland share a target of ten per cent 1990 
emissions by 2020. 
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framing of the impact of the Icelandic ash cloud event on the aviation sector as a political 
and administrative “fiasco” diverted attention away from “safety, our over-dependency on 
aviation and mobility, [and] the impact of aviation on climate change” (2011: 39). Young 
and Dugas’ (2011) analysis of Canadian media coverage of climate change identifies 
numerous frames: economic growth, green capitalism, political conflict, justice and 
equity, moral obligation, faith in innovation and fatalism. 
 
From data to narrative 
   
I synthesized the data from the media articles, legislative transcripts, policy documents 
and interviews using a combination of qualitative and content (i.e. counts of theme 
prevalence) comparison tables (Stoddart 2013). I developed tables that summarize the 
content analysis from each data source by hurricane, comparing coverage, including gaps, 
within and between data sources. These tables were useful in managing and analyzing 
data. Analysis carried on through the writing process, as the process of writing, inquiring 
and synthesizing sparked greater engagement with the data and research question 
(Richardson and Adams St. Pierre 2001). 
In sum, I draw on four data sources, including available documents in the form of 
media, legislative transcripts and policy documents, and new documents in the form of 
interviews with key informants. The strengths of this approach are the robustness offered 
by the range of data sets and the balancing of documented and remembered accounts for 
events that occurred up to thirteen years ago. Limitations of this approach include the 
exclusion of lived accounts of mobility and immobility by individuals, a valuable area for 
future research, and the gender bias inherent when researching a male-dominated sector. 
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Issues of case study comparability also arise when addressing regions of rural 
Newfoundland to urban Nova Scotia, however, the advantage is that such an approach 
illuminates the range and modal complexity that characterize mobility webs in Atlantic 
Canada.  
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4  PORT OF CALL I: RESULTS 
HURRICANE JUAN: CASCADING TREES, POLES AND EVENTS 
 
We realized then that we lived on a peninsula and the rocking 
for water surrounding us was actually the ocean  
 
slurping. 
 
Sue Goyette 
Fifteen 
2013 
 
 
Life, we voted, would be easier 
if we knew what was going to happen. This was the biggest 
 
flaw and became the complaint that motored 
many meetings. Exactly who was in charge? 
 
And why weren’t they letting us prepare? 
 
Sue Goyette 
Nineteen 
2013 
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Alex Colville 
Berlin Bus 
1978 
 
 
Halifax, as a peninsula, is surrounded by water, a fact that feels more apparent and 
precarious in stormy conditions: ‘the rocking for water surrounding us was actually the 
ocean slurping.’ Just as the woman sprints for the bus, there is an unsettling awareness 
that society is running behind in terms of climate change mitigation and adaptation:  
‘Exactly who was in charge? And why weren’t they letting us prepare?’ 
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Introduction 
 
The first port of call on our journey is Nova Scotia where Hurricane Juan hit on 
September 29, 2003. In anticipation of the storm, transport operators cognizant of the 
impact of weather on infrastructure, employed a ‘batten down the hatches’ frame. 
Simultaneously, some residents were drawn to feel the force of nature in a frame I term 
‘charismatic mobility,’ illustrating both mobilization in terms of preparation as well as 
movement for the purpose of getting closer to the storm. After the storm made landfall, 
there was a complementary pull to explore the immobility caused by entanglements of 
fallen trees and power poles that highlight the intensification of human, natural and 
technical systems in contemporary society – a frame I term ‘charismatic immobility.’ 
Participants framed the boreal and electrical tangle simply as a ‘big mess.’ In response to 
the risks of navigating such a disrupted mobility web, officials declared a state of 
emergency, which theoretically requires residents to stay off the roads but was actively 
negotiated by residents in a form of governmobility. The restoration of transit service 
indicated a pragmatic and symbolic ‘return to normal’ mobility. Using an ecopolitics of 
mobility lens, I analyze the motive force, speed, rhythm, route, experience and friction of 
mobility webs, observing how they contract, expand and rebound from disturbance. 
Counterbalancing a push for a return to normality was a cognizance of an 
accumulation of extreme events that occurred during the same period, involving 
numerous and complex flows and mobilities, including natural (e.g. spring flooding, 
brown spruce longhorn beetle), technical (i.e. Swissair crash), intentional (i.e. 9/11), 
political (e.g. Kosovo refugees) and health-related (i.e. BSE, SARS). Such an inundation 
of events increased the profile of disaster preparedness measures and accelerated a shift in 
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thinking about climate change mitigation and adaptation. I highlight how mobility is a 
common theme among these diverse events and explore the implications for resilience 
and vulnerability. Between the ecopolitical experience of mobility during Hurricane Juan 
specifically and other extreme events generally an adaptive and modestly transformative 
frame emerges, resulting in a shift to a new social-ecological relationship in the context of 
a changing climate through disciplining the circulation of greenhouse gas emissions and 
tempering automobility. 
 
Nova Scotia’s mobility web 
Nova Scotia is connected by road and rail, ferry and freight (Figure 4.1). The province 
benefits from multiple modes and multiple routes. Ferries connect Nova Scotia to New 
Brunswick, Newfoundland and Prince Edward Island, as well as, seasonally to Maine. 
The Trans-Canada Highway runs both northward to Cape Breton and eastward to Halifax. 
In addition, multiple roads circumscribe as well as transect the province. There are in fact 
so many roads that fragmentation of wildlife habitat is a concern (see Beazley et al. 2004). 
Via Rail offers an increasingly limited passenger service, with trains arriving from 
Montreal three times per week. Freight trains start and complete journeys in Halifax, 
supporting an active freight sector. Halifax supports a full-scale transit system that 
includes buses, ferries, bus rapid transit and dial-a-ride services. There are four other 
regional transit services, numerous dial-a-ride and private van shuttle companies, as well 
as one major private coach service, Maritime Bus (see Groszko 2010).  
The transport sector accounts for 26 per cent of greenhouse gas emissions, a figure 
that has held steady since the early 2000s (Government of Nova Scotia 2013b, Genuine 
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Progress Index Atlantic 2001). Road transport, including passenger light vehicles and 
heavy-duty vehicles (e.g. tractor trailers), accounts for 71 per cent of transport-related 
emissions (Figures 4.2 and 4.3). Total absolute emissions decreased between 2005 and 
2011, from 23 to 20 megatonnes of carbon emission equivalents (25 to 22 tonnes per 
capita) (Environment Canada 2013a).  
Circa 2003, the journey to work provincially was dominated by the car (85 per 
cent) (Statistics Canada 2001). However, Halifax as the major urban centre, enjoyed a 
more varied commuting modal split.48 In 2001, 78 per cent of commuting occurred by car 
(68 per cent drivers, 10 per cent passengers), 10 per cent via public transit, 10 per cent via 
walking and one per cent via cycling (Figure 4.4) (Statistics Canada 2001). Halifax’s 
modal split was on par with the Canadian metropolitan average, though with lower levels 
of private vehicle use (-6.0 per cent), transit use (-0.6 per cent) and cycling (-0.3 per cent), 
and higher levels of walking (+4.0 per cent), it enjoyed a more environmentally 
sustainable profile (Statistics Canada 2001). As of 2011, Nova Scotia and Halifax both 
experienced a slight decrease in car use (-1.0 per cent and -2.0 respectively), indicating 
the rigidity (i.e. infrastructural, behavioural, financial lock-in) of modal splits and the 
difficulty of instigating substantive modal shifts despite (modest) efforts at both the 
provincial and municipal levels (Government of Nova Scotia 2013b).  
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 Modal split refers to the breakdown of transport by mode used (e.g. public transit, walking, cycling) and 
is used to compare the transport profiles between regions and over time.  
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Figure 4.1: Nova Scotia’s road and ferry network  
(Community Futures Network of Canada 2015) 
 
 
 
Figure 4.2: Greenhouse gas emissions by sector, Nova Scotia, 2010  
(Government of Nova Scotia 2013a) 49 
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 The raw data for figures 4.1 and 4.2 was generated through Environment Canada’s national greenhouse 
gas inventory report (1990-2009). However, the full report has been archived with only the executive 
summary still available. Therefore, I credit the images to the secondary report in which they appear 
(Government of Nova Scotia 2013a). 
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Figure 4.3: Energy consumption within the transport sector, Nova Scotia, 2010  
(Government of Nova Scotia 2013a) 50 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.4: Commuting modal split ,  Halifax Regional Municipality, 2001  
(Statistics Canada 2001) 
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 Due to greenhouse gas accounting methods, aviation and marine sectors account for only domestic 
emissions.  
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The Halifax International Airport Authority (2015a) aims to increase passenger 
and freight traffic, as well as the number of passenger and freight traffic destinations. 
Since 2008, the number of passengers at the Halifax International Airport Authority has 
grown from just under 3.5 million to just over 3.6 million (of which approximately 80 per 
cent is domestic and 20 per cent international). Notably, the Authority attributes “extreme 
winter weather conditions” to a decline in passengers in early 2014 (2015a: 9). The metric 
tonnage of air freight traffic grew from approximately 27,000 metric tonnes in 2008 to 
30,000 in 2013 (Halifax Airport Authority 2015a). The Authority has a number of site-
specific environmental initiatives (e.g. solid waste management, public transit promotion 
and stormwater management), but the high emission intensity per passenger/freight 
kilometre for aviation relative to other transport modes is not addressed.  
The Halifax Port Authority cultivates a cruise ship industry, as well as promotes 
the shipping of freight. The Authority reported 134 cruise ship dockings in 2013 (Halifax 
Port Authority 2015). A nine per cent decrease recorded in 2014 was attributed to the 
implementation of a North American-wide low-sulphur fuel standard (Canadian 
Broadcasting Corporation 2014d).51,52 In terms of freight movement, the Port (2015) 
reported an increase in container traffic of 14 per cent between 2008 and 2013, though 
traffic decreased ten per cent in 2015 (Canadian Broadcasting Corporation 2015d). In 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51
 Sulphur dioxide contributes to smog formation as well as acid precipitation, to which Nova Scotia is 
vulnerable given its soil composition. 
52
 Environment Canada established Sulphur in Diesel Fuel Regulations, specifying limits for marine, rail, 
heavy-duty road vehicles and stationary sources that went into effect June 1, 2014 (Environment Canada 
2015a). 
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2014, the Port invested in technology to permit docked ships to run on electricity rather 
than diesel (Canadian Broadcasting Corporation 2014).  
In terms of freight mobility, the Atlantic Gateway, a federal-provincial initiative to 
facilitate global trade, is made up of the Port of Halifax, the Halifax International Airport, 
CN Rail and the provincial highway system. It positions Halifax as a hub integrated in the 
global freight sector. The Gateway is designed to facilitate the movement of goods:  
 
Strategically located on North America’s east coast, the Halifax Gateway can 
save you time, money and frustration when moving goods and people between 
North America and the globe. Built for speed and volume, the Halifax Gateway 
offers a winning combination of multimodal transportation and logistics 
services, modern infrastructure, exceptional service, and global reach that will 
make your experience hassle free. (Halifax Gateway 2015) 
 
 
The Gateway concept relies on the integration of truck, rail and shipping modes (see 
Hesse (2013) for a discussion of the interaction of flows and place in urban ports). With 
an emphasis on modal integration comes recognition of the economic risks if one 
component of the transport chain is disrupted. A port manager observes that: 
 
ports are critical connectivity points. But you have to be moving the goods and 
cargoes, etc., to and from locations. So that means your arterial connections - your 
roads, your rail - are very important. So if those are damaged in any substantive 
way by weather perturbations, then you’ve got a problem. Then your port becomes 
immediately congested. You do not have the ability to get that product moving. 
(NS Transport 115) 
 
 
In terms of managing the logistics of multi-part journeys – whether for freight or 
passengers – seamless connections are the industry ideal.  
 Through trade agreements such as the Comprehensive Economic and Trade 
Agreement (2014) between Canada and Europe, projected to increase bilateral trade by 20 
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per cent, and the Canada-Korea Free Trade Agreement (2014), projected to increase 
exports by 32 per cent, as well as other ongoing trade partnerships, such as with China, 
the movement of goods is positioned to further increase (Halifax International Airport 
Authority 2015a). The Atlantic Gateway facilitates market expansion through the 
movement of more goods to more markets. Like Freudenburg et al.’s analysis (2011) of 
the growth machine mentality that spurred investment in extensive canal infrastructure in 
New Orleans, the Atlantic Gateway is positioned as a high-return, low risk initiative. Just 
as the New Orleans industrial elite promoted the movement of goods via canals as 
common sense, so too the Halifax Port Authority and the Governments of Canada and 
Nova Scotia promote the movement of goods via rail, road and water. 
For Marx, the mechanisms of capitalism are always in process and in motion; 
“when circulation stops, value disappears and the whole system comes tumbling down” 
(Harvey 2010: 12). This was exemplified for Harvey by the experience of 9/11,  
 
…everything came to a standstill. Planes stopped flying, bridges and roads 
closed. After about three days, everybody realized that capitalism would 
collapse if things didn’t get moving again. So suddenly, Mayor Giuliani and 
President Bush are pleading with the public to get out their credit cards and go 
shopping, go back to Broadway, patronize restaurants. Bush even appeared in a 
TV ad for the airline industry encouraging Americans to start flying again. 
(2010: 12) 
 
This resumption of service was advocated “even when the open, networked character of 
civil aviation, airports, and border security radically failed” (Salter 2013: 10). The 
economic and symbolic benefits of circulations were perceived as outweighing the risks 
of immobility. Urry (2010), citing Marx and Engels, refers to precarious state of 
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capitalism as a phenomenon, much like the climate, that is within human influence but 
beyond human control. 
More recently, in 2012 the New York Stock Exchange closed for two days due to 
Hurricane Sandy and, in 2010 air travel was halted for ten days in Europe when the 
Eyjafjallajökull volcano erupted. In sum, “capitalism is nothing if it is not on the move” 
(Harvey 2010: 12). Hurricane Katrina disrupted oil processing plants with continent-wide 
ramifications for fuel distribution and pricing (Brown 2014). With an international 
logistics supply chain, delays in one region can cause back-ups on a global scale 
(Birtchnell, Savitzky and Urry 2015; Cowen 2014). Just-in-time delivery means that 
regions do not store goods but bring them in as needed. Disruption results in shortages. 
 However, just as mobility paralyzes capitalism, capitalism also has a tendency 
towards hypermobility. Bauman depicts capital as highly mobile,  
 
[it is an] unanchored power, able to move at short notice or without 
warning, is free to exploit and abandon to the consequences of that 
exploitation. Shedding the responsibility for the consequences is the most 
coveted and cherished gain which the new mobility brings to free-floating, 
locally unbound capital. (1998: 9) 
 
 
Such vulnerability to immobility and such an inclination to hectic mobility speak to the 
crisis-ridden nature of capitalism. Weber addresses the “irresistible force” of 
industrialization: “perhaps it will so determine them until the last ton of fossilized coal is 
burnt.” Capitalism moves forward, periodically lurching under the self-induced crises of 
recessions and depressions, labour strife and environmental harm (Weber 1958: 181). In 
Nova Scotia, this is expressed as ongoing competition from other North American ports 
for a share of the passenger and freight markets.  
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This complex and varied mobility web – some parts thriving and others fledgling 
– exists in the context of overall economic decline in Nova Scotia. In 2014 a provincial 
commission released a report assessing Nova Scotia’s economy. The basis for the report 
is sobering:  
 
As we explored current economic and population trends we became more and 
more alarmed. The evidence is convincing that Nova Scotia hovers now 
on the brink of an extended period of decline. Two interdependent factors — 
an aging and shrinking population and very low rates of economic growth — 
mean that our economy today is barely able to support our current standards of 
living and public services, and will be much less so going forward unless we 
can reverse current trends. (Ivany Commission 2014: vi) 
 
The Commission speaks generally to the need for improved transportation infrastructure 
and the role of expanding trade in bolstering the economy: “free trade with Europe and 
expanding markets in Asia offer exciting opportunities to leverage our advantages as a 
global trader if we can shift to higher value products and build stronger trade linkages” 
(Ivany Commission 2014: 18). Nova Scotia’s mobility web is positioned to grow both 
within and beyond provincial borders. There is a tension, if not contradiction, between 
economic goals of expanding market share and environmental goals of reducing 
greenhouse gas emissions. As a discursive tactic, this separation works to maintain an 
image that mobility is unproblematic in relation to parallel, but separate, discourses about 
climate change (Sodero and Stoddart 2015).  
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Hurricane Juan 
 
Battening down the hatches 
 
Hurricane Juan formed off the coast of Africa on September 14th, traveled across the 
Atlantic Ocean hitting Bermuda on September 23rd, and then tracked up the Eastern 
seaboard where it made landfall in Nova Scotia at 12:10am on Monday September 29, 
2003 (Government of Nova Scotia 2003). The Canadian Hurricane Centre started issuing 
statements regarding the severity of the storm on Thursday, September 25 and the 
provincial Emergency Management Office (EMO) initiated preparations on Friday, 
September 26 (Government of Nova Scotia 2003). ‘Batten down the hatches’ emerged as 
a frame in the data set, a nautical expression that refers to closing the entry holes used by 
sailors to access a ship’s hold to prevent the vessel from swamping during a storm.  
An article in Nova Scotia’s provincial newspaper, The Chronicle Herald, 
describes the retraction of mobility webs in light of the pending storm: 
 
People on the Halifax waterfront were preparing for the storm Sunday morning. 
Leading Seaman T.J. Peric and Ordinary Seaman Alex Zaslavskiy, taking care 
of HMCS Sackville, had to call for help to slacken the vessel's moorings. 
Already stretched tight by the morning's high tide, they needed to be looser for 
the surge. Peter Murphy of Murphy's on the Water cancelled all harbour tours 
and had Theodore Too and the Mar II moved to more sheltered wharves. The 
Halifax-Dartmouth Bridge Commission was preparing to restrict access to the 
bridges when winds hit 75 km/h and shut them completely when they reached 
100 km/h. By late Sunday afternoon, all flights in and out of Halifax 
International Airport had been grounded. … Workers with the airport and 
airlines were busy Sunday afternoon securing equipment to prevent items from 
flying around in the high winds that were on the way …. (Gillis, September 29, 
2003) 
 
The Halifax-Dartmouth Bridge Commission, responsible for two major connective links 
in the regional mobility web, followed the guidelines set out in its then new wind 
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threshold policy, closing bridges that in turn prompted the transit authority to wind down 
its operations: 
 
Once the winds came up to the point where the hurricane hadn’t quite struck 
Nova Scotia, we were getting reports back from Bridge Commission that the 
bridges were going to close and that the winds were sustained at X amount of 
kilometres. And at that point in time on Saturday night we began bringing our 
equipment back into the garage. Again, for the most part the authorities here were 
telling people to stay off the roads, batten down the hatches, and all that kind of 
stuff. We pulled it all in, we had the equipment safely off the road, with the 
exception of our service staff (they were out there doing their thing), and strategic 
areas, trying to stay out of the weather (NS Transport 128). 
 
A Port Authority representative highlights the decision-making acumen needed to assess 
how to best respond to severe weather: 
 
Most vessels are capable of putting out extra lines, particularly heavy lines that 
are intended specifically to withstand these abnormal weather conditions, such 
as hurricane-force winds. The real question for the master of the vessel to 
determine is: is it safer for that vessel to remain alongside? Or should it ride at 
anchor or in the outer harbour? Or should it proceed to sea and do a slow loop 
around? And taking advance time, before the extreme weather hits, to safely 
navigate the harbour and then ride out the storm. Again, professional mariners 
have to make judgments on this. (NS Transport 115) 
 
Amending and/or cancelling service as in the case of the Halifax International Airport and 
the Halifax-Dartmouth Bridge Commission, as well as preventing damage to 
infrastructure by mooring naval ships and storing or tying down loose objects are all 
strategies for managing both mobility webs and unintentional mobilities of stationary 
objects, during severe weather events. In response to weather warnings, the mobility web 
contracts as needed to prevent injury and infrastructure damage. At a certain threshold, 
the normal rhythm of mobility is abandoned. Both formal mechanisms such as the 
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Halifax-Dartmouth Bridge Commission’s wind threshold policy, as well as informal 
practices, such as observing the tautness of mooring lines, are employed. 
A Government of Nova Scotia report states:  
 
the fishing industry, well aware of its need to take weather warnings seriously, 
battened down the hatches and was generally “very well prepared.” And while 
there was extensive infrastructure damage to wharves and other facilities during 
the storm, the fact that there was no loss of life is significant. (2003: 4) 
 
However, two fishermen were lost at sea near the Anticosti Islands, Quebec. Due to the 
timing of the storm, arriving just after midnight, most people were home – a circumstance 
to which lower rates of fatality and injury is attributed (Government of Nova Scotia 2003: 
1). However, six people in Nova Scotia died during the storm: two direct and four indirect. 
A paramedic died when a falling tree struck his parked ambulance and a motorist died 
when debris his vehicle. In the aftermath of the storm a mother and two children died in a 
house fire. Critically, the electricity-powered smoke detectors in their public housing did 
not function during the power outage (The Chronicle Herald 2003). One man died while 
assisting with relief work (Environment Canada 2003c). 
 
Charismatic mobility  
The movement of water, wind and waves is a form of what I term ‘charismatic mobility,’ 
an adaptation of the ecological term charismatic megafauna, which refers to species such 
as polar bears, moose, whales that humans find compelling. In the case of Juan, people 
were drawn to watch and feel the approaching storm, as well as to explore its aftermath. 
Ingold, reflecting on the interface of humans and weather, observes: 
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To feel the wind is not to make external, tactile contact with our surroundings 
but to mingle with them. In this mingling, as we live and breathe, the wind, light, 
and moisture of the sky bind with the substances of the earth in the continual 
forging of a way through the tangle of life-lines that compromise the land. 
(2007: S19) 
 
 
For example, a fisherman describes being able to taste the salt in the air (The Chronicle 
Herald 2003). Humans navigate a world continuously ‘in-formation,’ rather than simply 
traversing a static surface, and for some the opportunity to feel the power of the weather 
– perhaps held in contrast to more static environment of the office or the ubiquitous 
screen – holds appeal (Ingold 2007: S32). Such uncertainty or newness is even more 
resonant in the context of an anthropogenic post-normal climate.  
The frame ‘charismatic mobility,’ particularly in reference to ecological mobility, 
expands Sheller and Urry’s (2006) conception of the mobilities paradigm, infusing 
analysis of social and spatial dynamics with ecological flows. Storm watching illustrates 
how humans are both drawn to observe unusual mobility and to undertake mobility to 
this end. One Chronicle Herald article records impressions of the approaching storm, 
from the sombre reflection of an adult to the enthusiasm of a child: 
Farther down the coast, Marina Fregeau stood watching the turbulent sea in 
Broad Cove. "It's so powerful. . . . It makes you feel pretty small," she said as 
waves pounded the rocks. Dozens of people spent much of the afternoon at 
Crescent Beach, many of them bodysurfing. "It's great," said 10-year-old Luke 
Rosborough of Hebbville. (Gillis and Grevatt 2003) 
 
For one person the storm is humbling, for the other it is a playground. The slogan on 
Nova Scotian licence plates is ‘Canada’s Ocean Playground.’ Surfers, for example, 
anticipate big storms and the waves and adrenaline rush that they promise. In terms of 
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both purposeful and recreational mobility, there is a fine line to be negotiated between 
safety and precarity, exhilaration and hazard (see Benediktsson, Lund and Huijbens 2011 
for a discussion of how Iceland leveraged the volcanic risks as an opportunity for tourists 
to play). The ocean playground in the context of climate change takes on a more ominous 
tenor.  
‘Charismatic mobility,’ while it centres on the appeal of movement, also has a 
counterpart of managing this movement especially when it involves risk. On the night of 
Hurricane Juan, the municipal Emergency Management Organization (EMO) issued an 
advisory to stay indoors, but the charismatic experience of the storm prevailed and a 
small but visible number of people were drawn to coastal areas like the Halifax waterfront 
to experience the force of the storm. The atmosphere was like a “carnival” (The Chronicle 
Herald 2003 n.p.). As the hurricane approached, there was: 
almost a celebratory mood in the city on Sunday, even as Juan was picking up 
speed over the Atlantic on a collision course with the Nova Scotia capital. 
People flocked to the beaches to watch the huge waves pushed ashore by the 
pressure of the approaching storm. Even in the minutes before the height of 
the storm at 1 a.m. Monday, cars, pedestrians and even the occasional cyclist 
could be seen pelting through the wind and rain. (McLeod 2003) 
 
One transport manager recalls the precarious movement of residents: 
 
 
… the public generally had a lack of knowledge of what to expect. It was just a 
nice windy night for people. We all saw the images of ... young adults down on 
the waterfront with their shirts flapping open and the water breaking over them. 
That’s not safe to do. We shake our heads, at the same time we see people 
standing on the waves down at Peggy’s Cove [a scenic coastal area known for 
large waves that sweep people into ocean]. People die that way. (NS Transport 
125) 
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A pedestrian describes his precarious navigation of a Halifax street in the hours before 
Juan made landfall: 
 
Out on Barrington [Street], the top of a street lamp rattles down the street. Venus 
Envy’s sign breaks free from its chains and crashes onto the pavement. As I run 
out to recover it, the wind rips my glasses off my face. Passers-by stop to help me 
search for them. Suddenly there’s an awful noise and a hail of debris. As we dive 
into an ATM [automatic teller machine] for cover, fragments of the Green 
Lantern building’s roof slam into the Plexiglas. (Ferguson 2003) 
 
(see de Certeau (1984) on the tactics of walking). Emergency officials endeavoured not 
only to manage the movement caused by the storm (e.g. tree blow downs; fallen 
electrical lines), but also the mobility of humans drawn to experience the approaching 
storm and observe its aftermath via a form of neighbourhood disaster sightseeing or 
citizen surveillance that combines “a feeling of mortal danger with a certainty of being 
safe and having things under control” (Benedikktsson, Lund and Huijbens 2011: 81) (see 
Silver and Conrad (2010) on public perception of and response to storm warnings). Just 
as the expectations of transport and emergency professionals were exceeded by the force 
of the storm, so too was were the expectations of this pedestrian as the experience of the 
storm quickly shifted from novelty to hazard. 
 
Making landfall 
The storm tracked over the Halifax Regional Municipality on the eastern edge of Nova 
Scotia, traveled through the centre of the province and continued to Prince Edward Island 
(Figure 4.5). A transport manger recalls: 
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It hit Halifax, … it took most of the trees down in Point Pleasant Park, and then 
it went right straight through the peninsula, knocking down several trees…, 
and then over to Dartmouth causing crazy havoc along Dartmouth area, which 
is across the Harbour from Halifax, and then out through some of the suburban 
areas. (NS Transport 128) 
 
The storm ranked a Category 2 on the Saffir-Simpson Hurricane Wind Scale with 
sustained wind speeds of 151 kilometres per hour and wind gusts reaching 176 
kilometres per hour.  
A meteorologist recounts the storm forecast, indicating friction between 
experience and expectations of the storm: 
 
Neither me, nor my colleagues, envisioned the full-strength Category 2 at 
landfall. We were thinking a pretty well intact hurricane at landfall with trees 
coming down (we mentioned the trees in our bulletins, power outages pretty 
much guaranteed). So we predicted things quite definitively and were confident 
with that. Definitely some impacts, but we certainly [weren’t] expecting the 
massive tree blow-down that occurred. There was just – the extent of the tree 
damage, right? We didn’t expect [that]. (Regional Government 108) 
 
Many research participants shared this observation. One representative of the provincial 
government states: 
 
Oh, it was by far worse than we ever imagined. I mean, I don’t think anybody 
had planned for – we get a lot of heavy wind and everything here in Halifax 
and throughout Nova Scotia. But no one planned for that. No one knew that 
was coming. And it was absolutely astounding what damage it caused. (NS 
Government 122) 
  
It is estimated that 100 million trees were felled across the province (Canadian Hurricane 
Centre no date). The electricity system was severely damaged: “devastating winds 
brought down 27 main transmission lines, several 120-foot transmission towers, 117 
distribution feeders, and 31 major… substations” (Government of Nova Scotia 2003: 1). 
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As one utility official states: “The hurricane tracked along the “backbone of the… 
transmission system from Halifax to Truro,” a distance of 100 kilometres, disrupting 
service to 70 per cent of customers (Government of Nova Scotia 2003: 6). The president 
of  Nova Scotia Power reflected that it was like the storm “was designed to come straight 
up the harbour (and) attack the major populations and the transmission system in its 
entirety” (The Chronicle Herald 2003: 69). 
 Due to fallen trees and electrical poles, as well as a coastal storm surge, roads 
were severely impacted. More than one kilometre of rail tracks, another form of static 
infrastructure, were washed out in several locations along Halifax Harbour by a 1.5 
metre storm surge and a record-breaking total storm tide of 2.9 metres (Environment 
Canada 2003c, The Chronicle Herald 2003) (Photo 4.1).53 Ten train cars were derailed 
(The Chronicle Herald 2003). Ships were taken to sea to avoid the damage caused when 
vessels are buffeted against terminal infrastructure. However, one boat sunk, several 
yachts were swept onto land, and other vessels moored in harbour broke their lines 
damaging both the vessels and nearby infrastructure. While air travel was disrupted 
during the hurricane, the lack of infrastructure damage meant that service could resume 
quickly. However, given that marine and air services are integrated with the road 
network, the extent of road washouts meant that accessing the air and marine facilities 
was a challenge. 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53
 Hurricane Juan hit when these forces aligned to produce high water levels, though had the storm hit two 
hours earlier or ten hours later the storm surge could have been as much as one metre greater  (i.e. 3.9 
metres) (Environment Canada 2003c). 
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Figure 4.5: Hurricane Juan storm track (The Guardian 2013) 
 
 
Photo 4.1: Rail  cars and tracks washed out by Hurricane Juan storm surge   
(Environment Canada 2015b) 
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The impact on the road network in particular complicated all transportation, 
including, critically, health-related transport. The risks were tragically illustrated when a 
falling tree killed an ambulance driver. The provision of care to home-based patients, as 
well as access to hospital-based care, was disrupted, exacerbated by damage to the roof 
of the Victoria General Hospital, which was partially evacuated during the storm (see 
Fink (2013) for an account of a hospital evacuation during Hurricane Katrina).  
As a result, “Hurricane Juan left the entire health care system, in affected areas, 
with a backlog of hundreds of surgeries and clinic appointments,” exacerbating a system 
already grappling with long wait times (Government of Nova Scotia 2003: 5) (see 
Fulmore and Russell (2005) on how Halifax hospitals coped in the storm’s aftermath). 
The impact of the hurricane on health services was a theme in legislative discussions 
related to Hurricane Juan. Minister of Health, Angus MacIssac, conceded:  
 
We know that weeks and months after the trees and bushes are picked off the 
streets, and after windows and roofs are fixed, the effect of Juan will still be felt 
on the health care system. This impact reminds us just how much our health care 
workers do every day. Yet, while their extraordinary efforts continue, for those 
patients and their families who are waiting, I know that this is not an easy time 
for them. (NS Hansard Oct 3 2003) 
 
 
Further, loss of power hindered the safe storage of vaccines and other medical supplies 
that require refrigeration (Government of Nova Scotia 2003: 5).  
The immobility of electrical currents also affected food storage. As social support 
cheques were issued just before the hurricane, many households lost recently purchased 
groceries when the power went out. Approximately $780,000 in food vouchers was 
distributed to low-income households. The Red Cross, in coordination with Community 
  146 
Services Nova Scotia, managed shelters and assisted 30,000 people by providing water 
and meals (Government of Nova Scotia 2003).  
 
Charismatic immobility  
 
Just as I describe the movement of water, wind and waves ‘charismatic mobility,’ an 
adaptation of the ecological term charismatic megafauna which refers to species such as 
polar bears, moose, whales that humans find compelling, I use the term ‘charismatic 
immobility’ to refer to blockages of flows caused by tree falls and flooded rivers. These 
blockages of flows work in an analogous way to attract spectators. Just as emergency 
managers, transport officials and politicians focused on surveying the damage, referred 
to in disaster management as situational awareness, so too did community members for 
both practical and inquisitive purposes.  
A Chronicle Herald reporter observed:   
 
Halifax was made up of two main groups Monday: those who walked the 
streets to see what they could see, and those who stayed at home to see what 
they could saw. In the heavily treed west and south ends, camera-toting 
gawkers exchanged tips on where to take in the most spectacular damage. 
“Have you seen Vernon Street?” asked one. “You've got to go over there.” 
(Spurr 2003a) 
 
 
Residents travelled by foot and by car to observe and assess the damage in their 
neighbourhoods and local parks and, where possible, travelled to other hard hit 
neighbourhoods with activities that ranged, according to media accounts, from mourning 
to offering assistance to a form of sightseeing, not unlike disaster tourists who travelled to 
New Orleans to view the damage after Hurricane Katrina (see Pezzullo 2009).  In one 
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Chronicle Herald article a police officer expresses frustration at having not only to 
manage the impacts of the storm, but having to assist people who put themselves at risk by 
venturing into unsafe conditions:  
“Traffic was a major issue after people started going out . . . especially after they 
started to go sightseeing.” … The problem of people ignoring the entreaties of 
law enforcement agencies to stay home and stay out of the way was an issue for 
police in both urban and rural areas. “That was the case despite the many 
warnings we put out through the media to stay home, stay off the streets unless 
absolutely necessary,” Fraser said. “You're still going to get those that are going 
to challenge that and come out.” (Spurr 2003b) 
 
The management of mobility, whether of the storm or of people motivated to observe the 
storm and storm damage, materialized as a source of friction.  
A confounding issue was that with the fallen trees came fallen power lines and 
concerns about electrocution. A non-governmental representative recalls the tension 
between the messages conveyed by emergency officials to stay off the roads to permit 
clearing, and the real life reaction, which was to assess, explore, connect, access goods 
and services as well as offer assistance: 
 
… there were so many downed trees, and there were so many downed power 
wires. Whether or not the streets were passable or not, definitely the message 
from the provincial authorities and EMO was “people stay home so we can 
clear this,” and urging people not to walk around and not to bike around, so as 
not to run into live wires. No one really listened to that. … And then there were 
places, even in HRM, where because of downed trees and power wires, 
sections were impassable. ... It’s the messages you get about where you can go, 
what’s open, what you should be doing and not doing. And so there were 
definitely people rushing out to try to look at damage…. And other people that 
were told to stay home (don’t clog the system). I think there certainly was a 
perception that transportation was undesirable, whether or not that was actually 
true or not. (emphasis added) (NS Non-governmental organization 112) 
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A reporter further describes with pride how community members governed their own 
mobility:  
 
At times like this, we find what we are made of. … We find that people will 
drive carefully and patiently through intersections that don’t have [functioning] 
traffic lights. We find that young men will clear tangled brush in the rain 
without being asked. … We find that people will put up warning signs and 
hang reflector tape from dangerous wires.  …  We find that we are made of 
something good.  (The Chronicle Herald 2003) 
 
 
Official calls for immobility or limited mobility appeared not to reflect the needs and 
instincts of the population, though they perhaps set an appropriate tenor of caution. 
Further, a successful governmobility comes to light. 
There were, of course, exceptions. The owner of a taxi company reflects on the 
distinction between the essential mobility of health care workers and the compulsion for 
nonessential mobility: 
 
We’ve started catering mostly to the health care nurses that go to the home and 
hospital employees that are trying to get to work, or someone that just got stuck 
somewhere and has to get home. … You would be amazed when you have a 
disaster or a really bad storm how many people all of a sudden decide they 
want to go out shopping. [chuckles] … It’s unbelievable. … Yeah, they figure 
[places like the mall] won’t be very busy and they want to go out. But a lot of 
people that take cabs, they don’t own their own vehicles because they don’t 
know what it’s like to be out there driving during that kind of stuff. (NS 
Transport 126) 
 
 
This example indicates a disjuncture between strategic mobility, that is, taking advantage 
of quiet periods to undertake travel and an awareness or appreciation of the impact of 
environmental conditions of mobility webs. The impacts of Hurricane Juan repressed 
circulation, in the form of streets blocked by fallen trees and power poles, as well as 
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produced it, by prompting an instinct to explore the changed landscape and access goods 
and services.   
 
 
Declaring a state of emergency 
 
Preceding the storm, at 9:25pm the Mayor of the Halifax Regional Municipality declared 
a State of Emergency (Jeffrey and Pugsley Fraser 2003). A state of emergency has 
several practical implications related to mobility including imposing curfews and travel 
bans. As one provincial risk manager details: 
 
The powers that the declaration gives you are fairly extensive. … You don’t 
enter into it lightly…. For starters, we can order an evacuation of an area, 
which we may not be able to without the declaration. Now, the fire department, 
in the [Municipal] Government Act, can order an evacuation (because of a fire 
or explosion or an emergency) of an area, but they’re the only agency within 
Nova Scotia that can do that. But if you’ve declared a state of local emergency 
then you can, through your control group or through your mayor, you can order 
an area evacuated. … you can [also] control or prohibit travel to an area. So we 
can say, for instance, you can’t go there. Or you can’t go there in certain hours 
of the day or night. So similar to what you would consider a curfew. (NS 
Government 118) 
 
Such ‘voluntary immobility’ contrasts with the ‘charismatic mobility’ of the approaching 
storm or the ‘charismatic immobility’ of the storm impacts. A mass evacuation was not 
considered in the case of Halifax, as it was briefly in the case of Montreal during the ice 
storm (Murphy 2009). However, given its peninsular geography a large-scale evacuation 
poses a logistical challenge with the natural characteristics of the landscapes creating 
bottlenecks (Grieve and Turnbull 2013). As well, declaring a state of emergency allows 
the municipality or province, as the case may be, to go on land without a warrant, recruit 
qualified workers and implement pricing controls to prevent gouging. Financially, 
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declaring a state of emergency is a necessary step in the process of claiming federal 
disaster relief funds through the Disaster Financial Assistance Agreement (DFAA) 
(Grieve and Turnbull 2013).  
From a Foucauldian perspective, declaring a state of emergency is a direct 
disciplinary technique focused on ensuring the safety of citizens by expediently 
reconnecting transport and electrical networks. In contrast to the art of governmentality, 
which aims to conduct the conduct of citizens from afar, declaring a state of emergency 
positions the government centrally and authoritatively. Officials however opted to issue 
voluntary warnings, rather than compulsory curfews and mobility restrictions. Though in 
advance of the storm, targeted evacuations were ordered for residents living in coastal 
areas from urban Halifax Harbour to rural Sambro and Clam Harbour (Jeffrey and 
Pugsley Fraser 2003). As well, residents of an apartment building damaged during the 
storm were evacuated.  
Evacuation is an extreme measure that is used sparingly by officials, because 
while voluntary movement motivated by a desire to observe the storm and its damage is 
charismatic, forced mobility or immobility spurred by necessity is stressful and undesired 
(Birtchnell and Büscher 2011). Motive force matters. However, in the absence of 
permanent retreat from coastal and other flood prone areas, skill in organizing temporary 
retreats in the form of evacuations will likely become more necessary as extreme weather 
events increase in frequency. For example, a non-governmental organization 
representative reflects on the need for adequate shelters: 
 
One of the learned lessons around that was to ensure that in the future the pre-
positioned, pre-designated shelters would be on generated power. Because how 
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can you even feed people if they’re in the dark, and you’ve got … volunteers 
with flashlights? So then now you’re creating more crisis for the people that 
were in the shelter, which puts more stress on the … volunteers that were 
managing the shelter with these people. (NS Non-governmental organization 
117) 
 
Managing charismatic movement, restrictions on travel (i.e. ranging from voluntary to 
compulsory) and mandatory evacuations promises to be features of increasingly frequent 
storm events. Official attempts to repress circulation were countered by governmobility 
on the part of the population, where residents appeared to assess – largely successfully 
according to injury and mortality rates – the appropriate level and type of mobility based 
on their direct experiences of friction, route, motive force – that is, overall experience of 
turbulence.  
   
Electrical and boreal entanglements  
The storm hit early enough in the fall that trees still had leaves – in effect, millions of 
sails – that were buffeted by the gale force winds. One citizen states: 
“We've had some great storms in the past, but the trees were full of leaves and 
were like big sails," said Darin Sweet, a landlord who spent the day hacking 
away at a huge elm that fell on one of his buildings. “The gusts did the damage. 
The devastation is incredible.” (McLeod 2003) 
 
A municipal planner observes that if the storm had occurred later in the fall when there 
were fewer leaves “there wouldn’t have been near that amount of damage” (NS 
Government 114). The damage to the urban forest canopy and provincial forestlands was 
extensive. Trees were mobile, uprooted and blown down; torn branches were projectiles. 
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Mobile trees rendered transport immobile. Trees fell on vehicles – causing two fatalities – 
and across roads (Photos 4.2 and 4.3). One emergency manager states:  
 
The number of trees that were pulled down was almost unimaginable. We had 
lost most of the power to the central part of the province. I think there was 
220,000 user accounts in HRM [Halifax Regional Municipality] alone that 
were without power for various periods. So we’re dealing with lost power. 
We’re dealing with loss of critical infrastructure in this sense, because the trees 
were down you couldn’t get fire trucks or police cars or ambulances down 
certain streets. This is during the night itself. We had a death of a paramedic, 
unfortunately. A tree fell on his ambulance. We were dealing with all those 
things. (NS Government 118) 
 
The hurricane force winds brought down trees and electrical poles, creating a fibrous and 
electrified entanglement blocking routes. The orderly assemblage of the everyday was 
rendered chaotic.  
Following Murphy’s (2004) work on socially-constructed disaster, what comes to 
light is not isolated technical systems (e.g. transport networks, electrical grids) that raise 
humans above ecological concerns, but rather an intensification and interweaving of 
technological and ecological systems. Technological systems literally wend among 
ecological systems (e.g. roads shaded by the urban tree canopy, rail infrastructure built 
along coastal zones), illustrated by the toppling of trees and power poles on roads (Photo 
4.2). The case of Juan, as well as Igor (Chapter 5: Port of Call II: Results - Hurricane 
Igor), allow me to bring to the fore how mobility webs are implicated in the social 
construction of disaster, a focus that is often backgrounded in disaster sociology (e.g. 
Freudenburg (2012, 2009) on economic development, Klinenberg (2002) on community 
health, Murphy (2004) on electrical infrastructure).  
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Photo 4.2: Fallen trees and power l ines block a residential Halifax street  
(Halifax Regional School Board 2003) 
 
 
Photo 4.3: Fallen tree on truck on a residential Halifax street  
(Halifax Regional Municipality 2015) 
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The frame ‘big mess’ was used to describe the resulting mix of leaves, branches, tree 
trunks, electrical wires and poles. A transit manager recalls the sight of: 
 
power lines, fallen trees, cables, I mean it was just a mess. … I was in EOC 
[Emergency Operations Centre], but we were looking at video and pictures … 
that were going around and transmitting photos back to us, so we knew where 
to focus our attention. It was just chaos all over the place. There’s trees 
uprooted. … So it left quite a trail of mess all through the area. And that 
impacted a lot of the infrastructure that we would travel on the streets and 
roads. (NS Transport 128) 
 
Likewise, a meteorologist states: “If you’ve got trees and power lines together, that’s a 
hell of a mess [and that’s] what happened with Hurricane Juan here. A big, big mess” 
(Regional Government 108). What materializes is the intersection of static human 
infrastructure (e.g. roads and power poles) and with both dynamic and compromised 
ecological processes. For example, forests naturally regenerate over time, with storms and 
fires creating space for new growth (i.e. disturbance ecology). The urban forest canopy is 
particularly susceptible to blow downs, as confounding issues such as shallow root 
systems, even age and non-native species increase vulnerability.  
The scale of the damage was starkly apparent in Point Pleasant Park, a popular 
recreational space for walking, jogging and biking (Photo 4.4). A local author describes 
the scale of the damage: 
 
Point Pleasant Park, a heavily wooded area on the city's southern tip, looks 
tattered and torn as if picked up by a giant and vigorously shaken. Throughout 
the city Tuesday, the sputter of chainsaws rang over streets choked with fallen 
trees and tangles of dead power lines as people continued to marvel at the 
hurricane's ferocity. (McLeod 2003) 
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The Park was vulnerable not only because of its location in relation to the storm, but due 
to other human and natural factors. A park since 1866, the urban forest has been protected 
from natural regenerative processes. A municipal planner notes that: 
 
I had worked on the Point Pleasant Park plan peripherally, and I think if you 
look at resilience, if you look at the urban forest and susceptibility – certainly 
what you don’t want is an even-aged stand with low biodiversity. What you 
want is something with a range of ages of trees, and also trees that are 
structurally sound. Most – well, I would say most, but a lot of the failures that 
we saw (especially on the peninsula) were the result of poor pruning practices, 
or lack of pruning over the years. (NS Government 114)54 
 
Further, a brown spruce longhorn beetle epidemic that began in 2000 was a source of 
contention over management practices. The beetle epidemic is attributed to the 
importation of wood through the Halifax Port Authority that neighbours the Park (Photo 
4.4).  
What was viewed as a ‘big mess’ from an emergency management and operational 
standpoint, was viewed with grief by community members. A strong sense of a loss 
surfaced as residents observed the damage to trees on their properties and in public green 
spaces. In a Chronicle Herald article, a city councillor shares her reaction to the damage 
to the Public Gardens, a popular Victorian style park in the city centre: 
 
The sight of the Gardens' uprooted century-old trees was hard to take, Coun. 
Dawn Sloane (Halifax Downtown) said. “I was saddened when I saw the park 
gates and then those large trees downed inside them,” she said. “It just seemed 
like all the greenery was gone.” Apparently, many passersby felt the same way. 
By late Monday afternoon, hundreds of people stood gazing in at the 
destruction from outside the historic park gates. … “It's a traumatic experience 
we went through,” Coun. Sloane said of the damage. (Pugsley Fraser 2003) 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54
 In contrast, Wiersma et al. (2012) found that after no particular tree type was more susceptible to 
Hurricane Igor. 
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One transport manager reflects: “if you look at the scarring left from Hurricane Juan on 
things like Point Pleasant Park, that was so sad” (NS Transport 115). A citizen who lives 
close to Point Pleasant Park recalled the sound of the storm: "It sounded terrible…. It 
sounded like lumber cracking" (Pugsley Fraser 2003). 
 
Photo 4.4: Damage to Point Pleasant Park post-Hurricane Juan, with Halifax Port 
Authority in background (Guscott 2003) 
 
 
Trees, like power poles and roads are static, unable to skirt direct hits. Another 
transport manager recalls the changed landscape:  
 
And it just looked like a bomb hit down there off of the harbour. It was 
unbelievable. All those big old trees down covering the whole road and stuff, 
and we had to detour around another way. Some places there was just no way 
you were getting through. The whole scape looks different now because that 
whole street used to be covered in trees. (NS Transport 126) 
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The response to the loss of trees reveals the emotional connection between humans and 
the environment, just as does the charismatic mobility of storms. Normal relations 
between the social and the environmental are disrupted, with the active social sphere 
suddenly rendered vulnerable to environmental factors. The metaphors used are 
illustrative, from a giant shaking the city as if it were a snow globe to war imagery such as 
the destruction wrought by a bomb, scarring the landscape and traumatizing community 
members.   
Power lines fell due to the force of winds and falling trees. The result was the 
blockage of streets with entangled masses of fallen trees and power lines (Photos 4.1 and 
4.2). Simultaneously, the tightly-coupled road and electrical networks were compromised. 
In the media archive, the focus on restoring electrical service was framed as the primary 
goal, with clearing roads as a secondary measure to support that goal. Three hundred 
power crews from Nova Scotia, New Brunswick and Maine worked to reconnect the 
electrical grid. They were supported by 2,000 members of the Canadian Forces tasked 
with clearing roads (Government of Nova Scotia 2003). One line worker compared his 
experience of Hurricane Juan to that of 1998 ice storm: “The weather has been good – at 
least it's not 45 below and people dying” (Cox 2003). 
However, through interviews, details of road network restoration efforts surfaced:   
 
We were dealing with, like I said, downed power lines, downed trees. There 
was a lot of clean-up that we had to do. … But I know the clean-up went on, 
and, like I said, we had representatives from Nova Scotia Power, the 
Emergency Operations Centre, … we had police, we had RCMP [Royal 
Canadian Mounted Police], we had military, conventional emergency 
operations, federal emergency operations. So we’re all working together from 
one room down there [in the Emergency Operations Centre located in nearby 
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Dartmouth] and trying to pull together to clean it up as quickly as possible. (NS 
Transport 128) 
 
 
Likewise, a transport manager likens the recovery process to triage, a metaphor that is a 
natural extension of an encounter with storm likened to a giant or war:  
 
…the first thing that we would look at is obviously the public safety issues. 
And attached to that would be the requirement to, attempts to keep as many or 
all the main roads or the main arterial routes from police stations, fire stations, 
hospitals, those types of things. We would have to, I guess, ultimately triage 
those things from more of the non-essential type services (i.e., a school or a 
shopping centre). So we would look at maintaining those networks, just so that 
we can keep ambulances rolling around and fire trucks going and police, and of 
course our crews as well. (NS Transport 130) 
 
Murphy (2004) describes humans dancing, either adroitly or ineptly, with the moves of 
nature’s actants to create hybrid social-material assemblages. What transpires in the 
aftermath of Juan is a painstaking disentanglement of the ecological and technical, tree-
by-tree, line-by-line (see Kochanoff 2004 on tree/line tensions that emerged between 
utility providers and home owners following Hurricane Juan).55   
While damage to the Park was severe, damage to the neighbouring Port’s hard  
infrastructure was relatively minimal:  
 
There was damage to the shed roofs, for example, with the velocity of the 
winds that had to be secured and repaired, and cargo that was weather sensitive 
and those had to be shifted around so it wasn’t damaged. The seawall at Pier C, 
the south end of the Halterm container terminal, was badly damaged. … There 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55
 Given the damage to the electrical grid during Hurricane Juan, it is notable that discussion of burying 
power lines was not prevalent in the dataset. Nova Scotia Power (2015) notes that burying power lines costs 
ten times more than above ground infrastructure and requires disruption to streets for installation. However, 
with more frequent severe weather events the economics may change. Further, safety concerns surrounding 
service provision following severe weather may instigate regulatory requirements for underground power 
lines. 
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was a lot of water surge on top of this terminal during the storm, but that 
drained off properly in the storm sewer systems…. We did have one ship 
departed its lines and pilots responded in a very timely fashion to re-secure that 
vessel. Some containers were lost overboard on the ship when it surged off the 
dock. Those were recovered. And any other structural damage around the port 
was rectified in a good, orderly process. (NS Transport 115) 
 
 
The Port was functional within 24 hours of Hurricane Juan hitting, though blockage of 
roads caused disruptions in terms of intermodal connectivity. By contrast, Point Pleasant 
Park remained closed to the public for eight months. The juxtaposition of the damage to 
the treed Park and relative lack of impact to the hardened coastal port infrastructure is 
notable. The experience of damage was highly variable and not proportionate to the 
contribution of a sector or space to climate change.  
Influenced in part by the experience of Hurricane Juan, the Halifax Regional 
Municipality (2013) developed an Urban Forest Master Plan to manage the 709,000 
trees on public property and fill 94,000 vacant spots to achieve an average 40 per cent 
forest canopy across the city. The Plan takes a green infrastructure approach, including 
measures such as using trees to decrease stormwater in highly impervious areas, with 
priority given to conifers where conditions permit. 
 
Transit as essential 
As the mobility web was gradually disentangled from the electrical grid, there was a 
focus on restoring public transit as an essential service. Transit service emerged as both a 
source of innovation and adaptability, as well as a symbol of a ‘return to normal’ 
functioning that characterizes passive engineering resilience – the tendency for a system 
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to retain the status quo. Critically, transitioning from the status quo into an alternate state 
and back again, is frictious.  
At full functioning Halifax Transit has, according to Chad a transit manager, a 
service area of  “about 263 square kilometres. We have about 340 buses and three ferries. 
We operate about 22 hours a day” (NS Transport 128).56 The impacts on public transit, 
given its reliance on a functioning road network, were notable: 
 
And of course the priority was to try to get things rolling, get the city operational. 
And so we were trying to open up all the priority routes: priority 1 infrastructure, 
repair what damages we could. I mean you’re making remedial, just basic repairs 
to what you need to get you going again. And of course one of the main focuses 
was getting transit re-established, so that we could actually have people start 
moving around again. … But we were dealing with power outages. (NS Transport 
128) 
 
There was relatively little physical damage to buses and ferries, however, one of the 
terminals was damaged: “we sustained a lot of damage to our Halifax Ferry Terminal, 
which kind of took the brunt of it. The [ramp] to the ferry was smashed up quite badly, so 
we had a lot of repairs there” (NS Transport 128).  
However, while Juan did not damage buses, problems arose because a lack of 
electricity, which meant that the gas pumps located in the main bus terminal, were not 
functioning. Chad recalls:  
 
At the garage, we didn’t have a backup generator. … the fuel pumps that pump 
the diesel into the buses, they weren’t pumping at the time… At the same time 
we were looking at if the power was down, if we didn’t have the ability to 
refuel our buses, we wouldn’t be able to put our service out and get the city 
moving again. … I was being pushed to find areas to fuel the buses, because 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56
 Formerly called Metro Transit, the name Halifax Transit was adopted in 2014. 
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our fuelling stations weren’t working. So I had some contingency set up for 
that. But ... the power was restored quite quickly. (NS Transport 128). 
 
The failure of the electrical grid and lack of generator power was a barrier to transit 
service delivery, just as it complicated the operation of evacuation shelters.57,58 
During, and immediately after, the storm, transit buses were themselves used for 
evacuation and temporary shelters. For example, 251 residents of one apartment building 
found themselves homeless the night of the storm and buses were used as temporary 
shelter (Government of Nova Scotia 2003).  One emergency manager recalls: 
 
We actually used buses that night to evacuate the people up in the apartment 
building that had the roof blown off. ... Went out in the storm to evacuate these 
people – in a windstorm, in a hurricane – because these people were hiding 
behind fire trucks because there was no safe place to be because the wind was 
that strong. It was blowing leaves off the trees, and the leaves they were 
actually wadding up like little mini bullets. There were garbage cans flying 
everywhere. People were huddled behind fire trucks for protection. Bus drivers 
came out and put them in buses, and … the buses backed up the road because 
there was no place to turn around. (NS Government 118) 
 
 
War zone imagery is used: leaves like bullets, residents taking shelter and buses 
retreating as if from a front line.  
Buses were also used to transport clean-up crews: 
 
We were moving some folks around to various areas to assist with the clean-up. 
We couldn’t put our service out, but we got a few buses on the road, just to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57
 In the city at large, access to gas was also an issue due to power outages. At one point only one gas 
station was open; the Lower Sackville station was inundated. Sales tripled and police resources were needed 
to manage extensive traffic backups (Mcleod 2004) 
58
 In late summer 2015, Nova Scotia was impacted by a ‘fuel drought’ that lasted for five days due to 
supply chain issues, additive requirements and panic buying. This raises fuel resilience as a component of 
transport resilience. Fuel resilience could include both transport fuels, as well as cooking fuel (i.e. propane) 
(Canadian Broadcasting Corporation 2015e). See MacNeil and Keefe (2015) for an independent review of 
the fuel shortage. 
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move some people around to areas where – like we could be moving a crew at 
one point to another ... And for the most part the main component was to clear 
the roads and try to restore power at the same time. So we had crews that were 
going around with [Nova Scotia] Power [boom trucks] to try to get the trees 
and branches off the road. We would be focused on trying to move those folks 
around. We did that quite effectively. (NS Transport 128) 
 
 
Transit materialized as a versatile and central component of the hurricane response and 
recovery efforts.59 The motive force of public transit shifted from moving the public to 
sheltering the public and transporting workers, to once again moving the public. 
In the aftermath of the storm, the focus was on clearing main arterial routes and 
major transit routes so as to resume transit service as quickly as possible.  
 
Of course, the transit component is one of the key components to making the 
city move again. And after any storm like that there’s some trauma. We had 
established, through some of our situation reports, that getting transit on the 
road was a priority because people would have some feeling of normalcy. So 
we were quite focused on getting some of these areas cleaned up, where we 
could get some degree of the operation back on the road again. And that way 
people would be a little bit more relieved to the fact that, “Oh, well transit is 
running again, we’re good. We’re going to start coming back, right?” … And 
most people, I think, in an urban area, once the buses start coming back out 
again, people start saying, ‘Ah, well, gee we can get out and around.’ And I 
think that’s something we were quite focused on at the time. (NS Transport 
128) 
 
 
Restoration of transit routes is symbolic of the city being on the ‘move again’ and ‘getting 
things rolling’ was a core consideration. The provision of transit is considered an essential 
service, as well as a symbol of normalcy. The movement and circulation of buses and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59
 See the New York Transit Museum’s (2016) online exhibit, Bringing Back the City: Mass Transit 
Responds to Crisis, for accounts of how mass transit providers prepare for and respond to extreme events 
including 9/11, the 2003 Blackout and Hurricane Sandy. See Douglas, Koslov and Klinenberg (2015) for a 
discussion of the impacts of Hurricane Sandy on New York’s transit system. 
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ferries are part of the visual and practical rhythm of city life (see Lefebrve (2004) on 
interval rhythms): 
 
It was high priority because getting people to be able to move around again is 
one of the things we need – to both bring commerce back, to bring people 
back to their sense of comfort, and also be an indication that if transit is 
running, then the primary roads are clear, which means public safety vehicles 
can get down them as well, and they’re working from there on to your 
secondary roads. (NS Government 118) 
 
First, a limited schedule holiday service was restored on main routes within approximately 
24 hours. Demonstrating passive resilience, full transit service was restored about four 
days later. Provincially, all major roads were cleared and passable by October 3, with a 
goal set of clearing minor roads by October 31 (Government of Nova Scotia 2003: 6). The 
clearing of roads and the restoring of electricity occurred in tandem, with 95 per cent of 
utility customers reconnected by October 3 and the remaining five per cent restored by 
October 12 (Government of Nova Scotia 2003: 7).  
 
Inundating events 
 
In the years leading up to and following Hurricane Juan, Nova Scotia experienced a 
diverse range of extreme events, from natural to technical to intentional (Table 4.1).60 The 
experiences highlighted Nova Scotia’s exposure to a range of risks, as well as aspects of 
resilience and vulnerability when facing such risks, particularly in terms of mobility. 
Many of the risks are in line with the risks associated with reflexive modernization in that 
they are transboundary and insidious, and most of which are facilitated in some capacity 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60
 Most recently, Nova Scotia experienced a record-breaking series of winter storms that resulted in 
significant damage and disruption (see MacIntyre 2015 for an account). 
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by global mobility webs. Budd et al. speak to the increasing “awareness of the inherent 
‘riskiness’ of air travel…identifying the threat posed by terrorism, human failings and 
emerging infectious diseases” (2011: 38). However, in the case of Hurricane Juan, as well 
as other extreme events, the risk and vulnerability of a range of transport modes came to 
light. In the case of Juan, the static infrastructure of roads and rail in particular is 
vulnerable to mobilities of wind and storm surges.  
The experience of Hurricane Juan lent further weight to The Globe and Mail’s 
framing of 2003 as Canada’s “year of affliction,” citing events such as the British 
Columbia forest fires, the North American black out, the Iraq War, BSE and SARS (Little 
2003). Likewise, The Chronicle Herald remarks on the number of severe events that 
Nova Scotians managed between 1998 and 2003 and the competency they are developing 
for “coolly coping in the face of adversity” (Spurr 2003b).  
A provincial risk manager comments on the frequency of events and Nova 
Scotia’s relative success in managing the unexpected:  
 
It’s not just Hurricane Juan. We were involved in Swissair [1998 plane crash] 
for months. We were involved in Hurricane Juan. We were involved in White 
Juan. We have one, I always say, every 18 months. … I would go out on a limb 
and say that one of the things that makes us a success in Nova Scotia is that we 
have full empowerment to make decisions and create activities to move a 
disaster, a remediation of a disaster, forward. That’s really the big thing that we 
have. (NS Government 122) 
 The overall effect was both a heightened awareness of Nova Scotia’s vulnerability to a 
range of disasters, as well as an increased familiarity in, and competence with, dealing 
with disaster:  
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“If you think back, Nova Scotia for the last - well, certainly since Swissair - 
we've dealt with multiple tragedies, so it's fortunate and unfortunate that it's 
second nature now to kick into emergency mode,” said Supt. Vern Fraser of 
Halifax RCMP. “It's fortunate that we have that ability, it's unfortunate the way 
we acquired it.” (Spurr 2003a) 
 
Nova Scotians are developing a necessary, albeit undesired, skill set. The need for such 
disaster preparedness skill sets will only increase as the climate changes and will be 
exacerbated by interrelated issues of conflict, terrorism and disease amplified by intensive 
global mobility webs. Hage reflects that, “Crisis today is no longer felt as an unusual state 
of affairs which invites citizens to question the given order. Rather, it is perceived more 
as a normalcy… a permanent state of exception” (2009: 8). What transpires is a new 
normal, both in terms of climate and of expectations of mobility disruption. 
The cumulative impact of such diverse disasters was a major theme within the 
Legislative Assembly in the year following Juan. The Conservatives were in power, with 
the New Democratic Party (NDP) in Official Opposition. John MacDonell, NDP Member 
of the Legislative Assembly for Hants East, spoke to the cumulative effects of extreme 
events in the agricultural sector: 
 
Whereas the farmers in Nova Scotia are struggling to survive in the wake of 
spring floods and the BSE crisis; and Whereas damage by Hurricane Juan is 
yet another blow to Nova Scotia's agricultural sector; and Whereas farmers in 
Nova Scotia simply cannot handle any more financial challenges this year; 
Therefore be it resolved that this government commit to including the 
agricultural sector in any plans for disaster relief related to Hurricane Juan. (NS 
Hansard September 30 2003) 
 
 
Likewise, Member of the Opposition, Howard Epstein, speaks to novel risks identified by 
the Emergency Management Organization: 
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The EMO identified new risks and challenges in this year's business plan. What 
EMO is expecting is more forest fires, more flooding, more tidal surges and 
severe winter weather thanks to climate change. EMO has also predicted that 
Nova Scotia will experience a flu pandemic in the next few years. The agency 
is also concerned over security issues. (NS Hansard May 4 2004) 
 
 
From a Foucauldian perspective, physical security of the population arose as a 
governance concern.  
There is a historical dimension to Nova Scotia’s experience. In 1917, Halifax was 
the site of the largest human-made explosion prior to Hiroshima and Nagasaki when two 
ships, a French ammunition ship (Mont-Blanc) and a Norwegian relief ship (Imo) collided 
in Halifax Harbour. Approximately 2,000 people died and 9,000 were injured, and much 
of the city destroyed (Photo 4.5). A municipal staff person likens the damage caused to 
trees to that experienced a century earlier: “This is quite possibly the worst damage to our 
urban canopy since the Halifax Explosion. It's that significant and that order of magnitude” 
(Pugsley Fraser 2003).61  Similarly, a report on the provincial government’s response to 
Juan states that the “Joint Emergency Operations Centre (EOC) group – in coordination 
with the Halifax Regional Municipality (HRM) EOC – mounted the greatest emergency 
response effort in Nova Scotia since the Halifax Explosion of 1917” (Government of 
Nova Scotia: 2003: 2). Grieve and Turnbull note: “officials continue to look back [on the 
Halifax Explosion] for lessons in the challenges of sound emergency preparation. In 
particular, the city must prepare for the hazards associated with port, rail and road 
transport” (2013: 77) (see Remes (2016) for an account the Halifax Explosion through the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61
 The Halifax Explosion was an ‘emancipatory’ catastrophe in two ways. First, it led to transformations in 
disaster preparedness, response and recovery efforts. Second, due to the death of numerous tramline 
operators, women were hired as operators for the first time (Remes 2016). 
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lens of disaster citizenship). Knowledge and memory of disaster, even in the absence of 
direct experience, leave an impression.62 
 
Photo 4.5: Damage caused by Halifax Explosion ( Imo  on far side of Harbour) 
(Wikipedia 2015) 
 
 
 Relative to Juan, the series of extreme events began five years prior. All of the 
events have a mobility linkage, whether direct or indirect. On September 2, 1998, 
Swissair Flight 111, out of New York crashed eight kilometres off the coast of Nova 
Scotia near the village of Peggy’s Cove, with a loss of 229 passengers and crew. The 
crash was ultimately attributed to a technical failure – fire causing the malfunction of the 
electrical system and consequently spatial disorientation. Just four years later, planes 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62
 Notably, some senior citizens experienced both events (see The Chronicle Herald 2003 for one such  
profile).  
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emerged again at the centre of disaster. On September 11, 2001, passenger planes were 
hijacked and employed as weapons. North American airspace was closed and 225 planes 
bound for the United States were diverted to Canadian airports, including Halifax 
International Airport. A large-scale response was mobilized to provide food and shelter 
for passengers. In 1999, another form of movement under duress, facilitated by planes, 
occurred as refugees fleeing war-torn Kosovo landed in Canada, including Nova Scotia. 
As one non-governmental organization representative states: 
 
Who would think 8,000 people [from] 44 planes [would arrive] in Halifax 
because of 9/11? Who would think that would even affect us, you know? Who 
would even think that Canada would say we would agree to receive 5,000 
[Kosovo] refugees, and that Nova Scotia would take 2,500? And then after 
these events saying, “Well, that’s once in a lifetime. That’s never going to 
happen again.” And then you see events like the Superstorm Sandy and then 
you see events like the tsunami in Japan. ... So what it says is this is more and 
more possible, and that Superstorm Sandy could have been easily Halifax 
instead of New York and New Jersey. (NS Non-governmental organization 
117) 63 
 
 
Due to the succession of diverse extreme events, the sense of such events being unique or 
‘one-offs’ quickly eroded, discernably changing the disaster response culture in Nova 
Scotia. 
During the same time period as these transport-related disasters, the transmission 
of disease was also a pressing concern. In 2003 an outbreak of BSE threatened human 
health and the beef industry (see Davidson and Bogdan 2010). While the Canadian 
epicentre of the crisis was Alberta, the ramifications were felt across the country, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63The Halifax International Airport Authority (2015b) states that approximately 7,000 passengers on 40 to 
50 planes landed in Halifax. In Newfoundland, 78 planes carrying 13,000 passengers landed at five airports 
(Morrison 2003) (see DeFede (2003) for an account of impact of 9/11 flight diversions on Gander, 
Newfoundland and Labrador). 
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including Nova Scotia, as beef exports declined. In 2000, there was an outbreak of the 
brown spruce longhorn beetle, an insect that attacks healthy trees by preventing the 
transport of food to tree roots. The invasive species was likely introduced to the province 
though wooden packing crates offloaded at the Halifax Port Authority. As a result, Point 
Pleasant Park which is adjacent to the Port, as well as forestry lands were quarantined 
with ecological and economic impacts further exacerbated by Hurricane Juan. Just as 
curfews are used to limit mobility of humans, quarantines are used to limit the movement 
of insects and viruses. Among humans, there was an outbreak of SARS in 2002/03. The 
outbreak originated in China, spreading to 37 countries. In Canada, there were 231 cases 
and 44 deaths (18 per cent fatality rate). The outbreak was a source of concern for the 
general population, as well as for frontline health care workers.  
In addition to transport, refugee and disease-related events, natural events posed 
challenges. Hurricane Hortense hit in 1996 incurring $3 million in damage. Significant 
flooding occurred in the spring of 2003. The Town of Truro declared a state of emergency, 
closing roads, schools and businesses (Grieve and Turnbull 2003). The flooding resulted 
in two fatalities and damaged 47 bridges and 200 roads. Approximately $10 million in 
damage was incurred (Dunn 2003).64 In winter 2004, just six months after Hurricane Juan, 
a record-breaking blizzard dubbed White Juan hit causing the province (as compared to 
municipalities in the case of Hurricane Juan) to declare its first ever state of emergency 
(Grieve and Turnbull 2013). Following the impacts of Hurricane Juan and White Juan 
two citizen coalitions focused on the special needs, particularly related to mobility, of 	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 At the same time, flooding isolated Corner Brook, Newfoundland and Labrador for four days. 
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community members who are elderly and/or who have physical challenges (Grieve and 
Turnbull 2013). For example, McLeod (2004) writes of how one woman who used a 
wheelchair required the assistance of two strangers to carry her six floors to her apartment 
as the elevator was not functioning. In response to such cases, the Special Care 
Emergency Preparedness Association of Nova Scotia collaborated with Nova Scotia 
Community Services to create an educational brochure on how individuals with limited 
mobility can prepare for, and be supported during, extreme events. While such cases of 
individual mobility are beyond the scope of this project, it is a valuable area for future 
research. 
Mobility figures differently in each of these events. The Swissair crash relates 
most directly to conventional notions of mobility as human transport, while in the case of 
9/11 airplanes were a tool of terrorism. For refugees from Kosovo, it is easy to imagine 
that movement was a welcome escape from adversity combined with the stress of 
migration. In terms of BSE and SARS, spread of disease from animal to animal, human to 
human or from animal to human, arose as matter of concern. In the case of the beetle 
epidemic, the focus was on containing the spread through quarantines, while in the case 
of the spring floods water was the focus of discipline (i.e. containment). During Hurricane 
Juan, restricting the movement of humans was the focus of a strongly advised albeit 
voluntary immobility.  
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Table 4.1: Natural, technical and intentional extreme events impacting Nova 
Scotia, 1996-2004  
YEAR EVENT 
1996 Hurricane Hortense 
1998 Swissair crash 
1999 Kosovo refugee arrival 
2000 Brown spruce longhorn beetle 
2001 9/11 flight diversions  
2002 Severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) 
2003 Spring floods 
2003 Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE or Mad Cow Disease) 
2003 Hurricane Juan 
2004 White Juan (blizzard) 
 
It is worth noting the disasters that were averted either by human or ecological 
forces. For example, with the extensive and prolonged loss of power following Hurricane 
Juan, officials “anticipated an increase in food-borne illness… that did not occur” in part 
because of the proactive measures such as setting up a food safety hotline and providing 
food vouchers (Government of Nova Scotia 2003: 4). The movement of harmful bacteria 
through humans was successfully prevented. At the same time as officials were managing 
the response to Juan another hurricane was being tracked (Government of Nova Scotia 
2003). Fortunately, the hurricane did not make landfall but the quick succession of 
extreme events is not unheard of. For example, the day after the 1917 explosion, Halifax 
was hit by a blizzard compounding the disaster and hindering relief and recovery efforts. 
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Long-term planning 
Longer term planning was also influenced by these events. Given the diversity of events, 
an adaptable all-hazards approach is employed by emergency management officials. An 
all-hazards approach means that the same protocols are used regardless of the nature of 
the incident. For example, “emergency managers regard terrorist emergencies as they do 
any other hazard, yielding the same demands for shelter, food, and communications as 
weather or accident-related emergencies” (Grieve and Turnbull 2013: 69). Reflecting on 
Hurricane Juan, an emergency manager states: 
 
It reinforced how we do things. … the process hasn’t changed. The actual how 
we get information, how we make decisions, and how we catalogue that – that 
hasn’t changed because it was sound to begin with. I started using that back in 
Swissair days. (NS Government 118) 
 
 
The management process remains the same regardless of the type of event, and both 
interview participants and policy documents convey a sense that the approach is effective. 
Through iterative learning, the process is fine-tuned with each event (Grieve and Turnbull 
2013). In their study of emergency planning in Nova Scotia, Grieve and Turnbull find that 
stakeholders deem the process “adequate and moving forward” (2013: 62). One aspect of 
the emergency planning system in Nova Scotia that is credited with its efficacy is the 
location of federal, provincial and municipal (i.e. Halifax Regional Municipality) 
emergency officials in one building, facilitating informal connections and quick 
consultations (Grieve and Turnbull 2013). The physical co-presence, to use Urry’s term, 
reduces friction in, and increases speed of, decision-making.  
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 A review of EMO responses conducted after Juan identified three broad lessons: 
improving the use of resources and people (e.g. leverage skills of Department of Justice 
staff who have experience transporting people), improving operational protocols (e.g. 
identify back-up sites for emergency operations centres) and improving communications 
(e.g. provide callers to emergency hotlines with hold time estimates) (Government of 
Nova Scotia 2003). However, Grieve and Turnbull find that the “sporadic and event-
driven nature” of these events results in a focus on refining the emergency response 
process, rather than a focus on disaster prevention – demonstrating passive rather than 
transformative resilience (2013: 64). Likewise, the framing of the impact of the Icelandic 
ash cloud event on the aviation sector as a political and administrative “fiasco” diverted 
attention away from “safety, our over-dependency on aviation and mobility, [and] the 
impact of aviation on climate change” (Budd et al. 2011: 39). Additionally, in Canada 
since 2001, the federal government has directed its attention towards border and 
international security issues, downloading responsibility for extreme weather-related 
events to provinces and municipalities (Grieve and Turnbull 2013).  
 
Social-ecological mobility webs 
From an ecosystem perspective, and consequently from social, health and economic 
perspectives, global and local space are biophysically enmeshed. Giddens observes “very 
few new-style risks have anything to do with the borders of nations” (2003: 34), a trait 
held in common with mobility webs. What emerges are multiple complex and intersecting 
mobilities (i.e. natural, technical, political) that continually shape each other. Humans do 
not exist in isolation but are enrolled in materialist assemblages, “imbroglios of people 
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and things,” that result in the co-construction of humans and non-humans (Latour 2011: 
4). This is particularly the case with the natural environment on which humanity depends. 
“Nature, contrary to appearances,” Latour argues, “is a political animal. It is what is used 
to define the world we have in common, the obvious existence we share, the sphere to 
which we all pertain equally; it is what connects us” (2011: 8). Disciplining or 
securitizing such diverse, complex and multiscalar mobilities appears challenging at best, 
highlighting a more diffuse distribution of power between the social, ecological and 
technical, contrasting with modernistic images of humans conquering time and space.  
The swaths of felled trees can arguably be construed as an ecological vernacular, a 
legibility imposed by the non-human environment on humans. Nova Scotia’s landscape, 
was rewritten by Hurricane Juan (Sodero 2014c). Hurricanes leave a temporary 
geomorphic signature characterized by slope erosion, fluvial outwash deposits and stream 
bank erosion (see, for example, Catto and Tomblin 2013). Such an extreme event lays 
bare not only the tenacious and tenuous nature of the human relationship with the non-
human environment, but reveals the artificiality of the human/non-human dichotomy. Just 
as bacteria populate an elbow crook, humans populate ecosystems (Bennett 2010). 
Notions of scale and hierarchy are easily disrupted. The events experienced by Nova 
Scotia over the course of a decade illustrate the inseparability of humans and non-humans, 
that is, the indivisibility of the planetary ecosystem. With climate change, the co-
constructed networks of human and non-humans “come out of hiding” (Latour 1996: 139). 
Greenhouse gases, hurricanes and humans are engaged in a real-time climate experiment 
where ecological and policy responses are entwined (Latour 2011). 
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It is valuable to consider a nexus of climate change interactions made up of both 
climate change causation and human and ecological impacts. Whereas government, 
industry and community members may be seen to exert power and adversely affect the 
climate through a fossil-fuelled mobile society, severe weather events such as Hurricane 
Juan, turn the table. Climate change-related events are disrupting mobility, intersecting 
with other natural, technical and intentional disruptions. Deep structural shifts in the 
global carbon cycle are disturbing surface continuities in the mobility complex. The 
aspiration of ‘seamless’ connectivity needs to be reconsidered (Cowen 2013). 
 
Climate change 
In policy documents, legislative transcripts and interviews, links are made between 
Hurricane Juan and climate change. A report summarizing a provincial emergency 
response debriefing session on Hurricane Juan states: 
 
Many people [in attendance at the debriefing] suggested Hurricane Juan was a 
“hundred-year storm” in name only – that with a changing global climate and 
warming ocean currents, a repeat was possible, if not likely. An official from the 
Department of National Defences put it most directly: “…Only a fool would act 
on the supposition that it would not happen again.” (Government of Nova Scotia 
2003: 8) 
 
Likewise, one environmental manager states: 
 
Professionally, I think it was an opportunity for reflection on the impacts of the 
severe weather. It was on the radar already. It was already something that we 
were looking at in terms of the goals and objectives of the [Climate Change 
Action] Plan. It was fairly clear, even at that point, that we would look at the 
climate change, but also look at emergency events, sort of unexpected in terms 
of the weather, as part of our planning. (NS Government 114) 
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The influence of Hurricane Juan on future policies and responses was immediately 
apparent. 
In the Legislature, Member of the Opposition Joan Massey drew links between 
Hurricane Juan and climate change, challenging the government’s response: 
 
Mr. Speaker, we have been told that climate change could lead to an increasing 
severity in these storms. In expectation, we should be working with Nova Scotia 
Power to safeguard our infrastructure. In response to 1998's massive ice storm, 
both Quebec and Manitoba developed environmental targets. Manitoba took 
steps to upgrade its transmission systems. Mr. Minister, has your department 
assessed how we can be better environmentally protected in case of another 
storm? (NS Hansard October 7 2003) 
 
 
The Minster of Environment responded by stating the government’s intentions to work 
with Nova Scotia Power. However, while improvements may have been made, ongoing 
issues persist (Grieve and Turnbull 2013).65 Links between Hurricane Juan and climate 
change were less common in the media coverage, perhaps due to a focus on more 
immediate issues of recovery.  
 Hurricane Juan is referenced on the first page of the provincial Climate Change 
Action Plan (CCAP), released six years after the event:  
 
When it comes to climate change, Nova Scotia faces a triple threat: 
• Because most of the energy we use comes from fossil fuels, we have an 
unusually long way to go in curbing the emissions that cause climate change. 
• We’re at the northern end of the Atlantic hurricane track, where more storms 
similar to Hurricane Juan could hit us as the planet warms.  
• With 7600 km of coastline, we are exceptionally vulnerable to rising sea 
levels caused by climate change. (Government of Nova Scotia 2009: 3) 
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 Notably, however, power failures are a regular feature of severe weather events in Nova Scotia, such as 
occurred during post-tropical storm Noel (2007) (Grieve and Turnbull 2013). 
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The CCAP addresses the transport sector, focusing on increasing vehicle efficiency, 
promoting sustainable modes of transport and designing communities to reduce the need 
for transport. The report asks fundamental questions that strike at the heart of transport by 
probing societal reliance on mobility: “Are Nova Scotians willing to move closer to work 
or public transportation? … How can we redesign communities to minimize the need for 
transportation? Can more efficient urban layouts for our towns and cities be encouraged 
by rezoning?” (2009: 20). These are bold questions given the reliance on fossil-fuelled 
automobility in Nova Scotia. However, such transformative questions are not reflected in 
the nine action items listed in the CCAP. Six actions pertain to vehicle efficiency (e.g. 
maximum speeds for semi-trailers) and three to sustainable transportation (e.g. expand 
innovative sustainable transportation projects), with none focusing on land-use planning. 
Translating intention to practice is challenging, especially in the context of goals that 
involve several provincial departments, as well as municipalities. 
One of the actions included in the CCAP was developing a Sustainable 
Transportation Strategy, released in 2013. The Strategy does not reference Hurricane 
Juan specifically, but takes an integrated approach that addresses climate change, energy 
costs and health. In terms of climate change, the strategy states: 
the impacts of climate change will affect Nova Scotians in a number of different 
ways that include more frequent extreme weather events, rising sea levels, and 
warmer average temperatures (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 2007; 
Climate Change Action Plan 2009). This will put further strain on our current 
transportation system as more roads and other infrastructure are washed out by 
storms and floods. We are already starting to see the impacts of climate change in 
Nova Scotia. Adaptation to climate change will be an important component of the 
provincial government’s approach to all activities. Our transportation system will 
also have to be resilient to the impacts of climate change, which should be part of 
all our transportation-related decisions. (Government of Nova Scotia 2013b: 9) 
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The Strategy focuses on passenger transport and forwards 28 actions pertaining to 
leadership, collaboration, community engagement, transport networks (i.e. active 
transportation, public and community transit), urban and rural planning, vehicles and 
fuels, and monitoring and evaluation. The guiding principles of the Strategy include 
increasing vehicle efficiency, but also to “drive less distance” and “provide access to 
employment and essential services” and to “engage with our communities to create 
locally designed, regionally integrated solutions” (2009: 17-18). The report focuses on 
personal journeys, such as commuting, while the modal distribution of freight and the role 
of air and rail travel are not addressed in the Strategy, signalling significant gaps in terms 
of decarbonizing transport and promoting transport resilience in the context of disaster.  
 
Towards an ecopolitics of mobility 
Hurricane Juan brought mobility to the fore in multiple ways, from the charismatic 
mobility of the storm itself to the immobilities caused by entanglements of trees and 
power lines and the immobilities promoted by a state of emergency. At the local scale, 
public transit service, both pragmatically and symbolically, was an important means and 
measure of mobility. At the regional scale and beyond, the inundation of multiple, 
diverse and complex events, from the terrestrial movements of beetles to the atmospheric 
movement of planes, created challenges for Nova Scotia, rapidly developing capacity in 
an undesired ‘all-hazards’ skill set.   
The six elements of an ecopolitics of mobility – motive force, speed, rhythm, 
route, experience and friction within Nova Scotia’s mobility web – prove adept at 
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describing flows related to Hurricane Juan. The charismatic mobility of the hurricane 
motivates people to takes risks to experience the force of the environment. Managing both 
charismatic movement and mandatory evacuations promise to be a feature of increasingly 
frequent storm events throughout Atlantic Canada and beyond. While just a slice of what 
can be included under ‘experience’ of the ecopolitics of mobility, it indicates one concrete 
dimension of issues that arise when communities are impacted by severe weather. The 
hurricane’s speed is notable, as is the speed with which it caused a fully functioning 
mobility web to contract and immobilize. In terms of rhythm, the contracting mobility 
web disrupted daily transport rhythms and replaced them on the one hand with 
immobility by the many, as communicated by messages to stay off the roads both for 
safety purposes and to allow clean-up to occur, and on the other hand, the urgent 
mobilities of a relatively small group of skilled workers, such as emergency management 
officials, line crews and tree clearing crews. Route pertains to the uncertainty related to 
the storm path, which made landfall in the most densely populated region of Atlantic 
Canada. As one non-governmental representative noted the path of Hurricane Sandy 
could easily have reached Nova Scotia. Route also pertains to the disrupted roads in 
Halifax and the friction caused by fallen trees and power poles, and the concomitant 
adaptations. Friction also occurs in the dissonance between the expectation of the 
hurricane force and the actual experience of the event, illustrating the tensions that appear 
as human grapple with a changing climate and new parameters for what constitutes 
normality. Finally, experience varies from the thrill and fear associated with watching and 
hearing the storm, to the social connections facilitated by upheaval to grief for a 
transformed treescape, and in worst cases, mourning for community members.  
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Key sources of resilience include maritime cultural knowledge of the need to 
prepare for severe weather events (i.e. batten down the hatches), the creative use of public 
transit as both emergency transport and shelter as well as a symbol of a reinstatement of 
the mobility web, and the coordinated and collaborative all-hazards approach to disaster 
management in Nova Scotia facilitated by both formal as well as informal relationships 
and physical co-presence in the same facility. Key sources of vulnerability include the 
precarious co-presence of the urban forest canopy and the electrical grid, susceptibility of 
hard static infrastructure (i.e. roads, rail) to storm impacts, reliance on electricity to access 
fossil fuels (i.e. gas pumps) and the lack of generators given this reliance, as well as the 
reliance on finite and carbon intensive energy sources for fuel. Further, disruptions to 
mobility exacerbate pre-existing vulnerabilities such as the (im)mobility of physically 
challenged community members and flows of patients through hospitals as measured by 
wait times. 
In the face of multiple extreme events that relate directly to and impact mobility, 
governance morphs from art to triage. Community members actively negotiate their own 
mobility. The governmobility of citizens and the mobility limitations imposed by a state 
of emergency are both a source of resilience and vulnerability. Residents, while enticed 
by the charismatic mobility of the storm and charismatic immobility of the storm’s 
impacts, as well as motivated to meet basic daily needs and assist with recovery, appeared 
to successfully navigate the disrupted mobility landscape as measured by the lack of 
fatalities (by contrast, see Murphy (2009) for a discussion of the fatality and injury rates 
that resulted from the North American ice storm). Simultaneously, municipalities and the 
provincial government can, and in the case of the former, did enact states of emergency 
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that permit limitations on mobility. One vulnerability lie in selecting the appropriate mix 
of persuasive and coercive measures within a state of emergency, permitting 
governmobility where possible while also ensuring the protection of citizens. Another 
vulnerability for officials and citizens alike, is the level of discretion used by officials in 
enforcing voluntary immobility (i.e. might a group of white teenagers exploring damage 
after the storm in the south end receive differential treatment than a group of black 
teenagers in the north end?). Numerous complaints were received about youth  
“smashing windows, harassing outside workers and setting brush fires” (The Chronicle 
Herald 2003” 73). Though no incidents of discrimination emerged in the dataset in the 
contexts of Hurricanes Juan (nor Igor), given the racialized dimensions of both crisis 
mobilities (e.g. Hurricane Katrina) and the non-crisis mobilities (e.g. New York’s stop-
and-frisk policy), it bears flagging as a potential issue. 
The development of a Climate Change Action Plan and a Sustainable 
Transportation Strategy are efforts to secure the population from the effects of climate 
change and the adverse impacts of fuel price volatility and sedentary lifestyles associated 
with automobility, as well as to discipline anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions. An 
unfortunate source of resilience is the lack of change in the provincial and municipal 
modal split profile. The experience of Hurricane Juan combined with other extreme and 
ongoing events (e.g. decreasing health, increasing fuel prices) has led the province to 
consider the need for transformative resilience characterized by questioning societal 
reliance on both fossil fuels and automobility, as well as taking steps to discipline, 
restrain and redirect the ecopolitics of mobility. While these steps are incremental (i.e. by 
focusing on increasing the energy efficiency of automobility and trucking), given the 
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scale of change required, they in a modest way recognize the need for change and resist a 
wholly passive resilience. The fact that these documents, particularly the Sustainable 
Transportation Strategy, question the status quo of mobility is notable and a valuable area 
to build upon, for example through the development of a resilience strategy that brings 
together the field of transport, disaster management and climate change mitigation and 
adaptation, as well by drawing questions of transport resilience writ broadly into 
discussions of economic development such as raised in the Ivany Commission report (See 
Chapter 7: Navigating Transition). Nova Scotia has started the wheels moving on an 
important policy conversation. The next step is to gain traction. 
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5  PORT OF CALL II: RESULTS 
HURRICANE IGOR: THE (PASSIVELY) RESILIENT NEWFOUNDLANDER  
 
We had only just begun 
 
to put leashes on things that had resisted 
being caught. In this way, we muzzled 
 
our concerns and decided to turn on lights 
before it got dark.   
  
Sue Goyette 
Six 
2013 
 
 
Alex Colville 
Truck Stop 
1966 
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A man blends into the background amidst the transport truck and gas pump. His broken 
arm hints at the vulnerability of humans in tightly coupled social-technical assemblages. 
His other hand rests on the pump, as if tethered: “leashes on things that had resisted 
being caught.” 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Chronologically, our second port of call is Hurricane Igor. Two key examples of 
resilience were lauded during Igor, that of individual through the frame the ‘resilient 
Newfoundlander’ and that of community coming together: ‘getting things back to normal 
as quickly as possible.’ In terms of responses, a variety of resiliencies and vulnerabilities 
related to social-ecological interactions materialized. A robust form of passive resilience 
characterized the response of both communities and the government, where the priority 
was returning things to normal with limited reflection on how to proceed given past and 
prospective severe weather events.  
In terms of frames, there is emphasis on a ‘ten-day recovery’ narrative, referring 
to the time it took to reconnect the road network, albeit partially and with temporary 
repairs. There is a parallel frame praising the resilience of residents and expressing pride 
in the community in both grappling with the impacts and affecting a prompt return to 
normal, but a notable absence of a transformative frame proposing a new social-
ecological relationship with limited references to climate change in all data sources. 
Throughout this Port of Call I highlight how an ecopolitics of mobility – drawing on 
Cresswell’s six elements of motive force, velocity, rhythm, routes, experience and friction 
– and Foucault’s theorization of circulation are well suited to detailing the interface and 
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power dynamics inherent between the environment and contemporary social-technical 
mobility assemblages.  
 
Newfoundland’s mobility web 
 
Since the 1992 cod fishing moratorium, two prominent strategies were pursued to 
diversify Newfoundland’s economy: attractive development in the form of tourism and 
extractive development in the form of the oil (Luke 2002).66 Newfoundland aims to 
double its tourism revenue by 2020 and maximize oil revenue (Government of 
Newfoundland Labrador 2009a). Both sectors are central to the provincial economy and 
both are embedded in a petrocapitalist mobility complex that centres on the ‘production, 
exchange, and consumption’ of fossil fuels (Valdivia 2001: 312; also see Altvater 2007, 
Urry 2013). The tourism sector is linked to petrocapitalism via a global, fossil-fuel 
dependent mobility network that includes airplane, cruise ship, ferry and car travel, while 
the oil sector is bound to petrocapitalism through fossil fuel extraction, employment and 
royalties (Urry 2013). 
The petrocapitalist profile of Newfoundland’s economy is apparent when 
analyzing Gross Domestic Product (GDP), employment and greenhouse gas emission 
statistics. The oil sector contributes significantly to the provincial GDP, 31 per cent, 
compared to less than five per cent for the tourism sector.67 However, the tourism 	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 The province of Newfoundland and Labrador consists of an island in the North Atlantic (Newfoundland) 
and a portion of the continent land that borders the province of Quebec (Labrador). Both have limited 
transport options due to their remoteness. However, I focus on the island portion, Newfoundland, as this 
received the brunt of Hurricane Igor’s impact. 
67
 With the fall of oil prices in 2014/15, the contribution of the oil sector to provincial GDP is on a 
downward trend (Canadian Broadcasting Corporation 2015b). 
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industry is an employment engine, engaging 13,000 people, compared to approximately 
3,000 in the oil sector (Government of Newfoundland and Labrador 2014a; Higgins 
2011).68 The fossil fuel intensive transport and oil sectors account for approximately 
seventy per cent of provincial greenhouse gas emissions (Government of Newfoundland 
and Labrador 2011a).69 Such carbon intensive development is at odds with the provincial 
emission reduction target of ten percent below 1990 levels by 2020 (Government of 
Newfoundland and Labrador 2011).70 
I use the term mobility webs to refer to the environmentally exposed, but also 
diverse and adaptable dimensions of contemporary mobility systems. Newfoundland’s 
mobility web lacks redundancy, defined by vast spaces and limited transport options and 
routes. A road manager, Phil, observes: “one of the problems we faced was the fact that 
some places there was no other route: the Trans Canada, for instance. There’s ways that 
you just can’t get around the Burin Peninsula Highway” (NL Government 106). In terms 
of mobility, redundancy can be defined as having more than one way to get to a 
destination, or being able to meet needs independent of mobility (e.g. local provisions of 
food, medicine, fuel). Limited routes render Newfoundland more vulnerable to severe 
weather impacts. A reliance on ferries and one highway means that disruptions are 
“reflected almost instantly in empty shelves” as the average five-day food supply 
dwindles (Catto and Tomblin 2013: 96). Further, a declining and ageing population has 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68
 Employment figures in the tourism sector include seasonal and part-time employment; employment 
figures in the oil sector increase temporarily during the construction phase of a given project. 
69
 Based on greenhouse gas inventory data, this calculation includes oil production (e.g. oil and gas 
extraction and related fugitive sources, as well as mining) and transport (e.g. gas- and diesel-powered road, 
off road, marine and domestic air travel). The calculation is approximate as oil and gas data includes mining, 
and transport data excludes international aviation and marine transport. 
70
 For anticipated regional climate impacts see Catto (2010) and Finnis (2013).   
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led to the centralization of provincial services such as hospitals and schools (Catto and 
Tomblin 2013). 
Travellers access the island by air or ferry. There are three hub airports, including 
the St. John’s International Airport in the capital city on the east, Gander airport, a 
formerly significant hub in transatlantic passenger travel and military transport in central 
Newfoundland, and Deer Lake on the west coast (Figure 5.1). Two ferries are operated by 
the Crown corporation Marine Atlantic, a year round ferry that travels between North 
Sydney, Nova Scotia and Port-aux-Basques on the western side of the island and a 
seasonal ferry that runs between North Sydney, Nova Scotia and Argentia on the 
southeastern side of the island. Marine Atlantic ferries also transport freight, as do private 
sector companies.  
The vast majority of goods – from food, to the refrigerators that hold food, to the 
materials needed to build homes that hold refrigerators – are shipped. A marine operator 
speaks to the lack of self-sufficiency: 
 
We’re not self-sufficient. So if it’s a trend that weather conditions are going to 
be more severe in the future, I guess – and I hate to say that we’ve just to live 
with it, but that’s probably-, we’ve done it for hundreds of years. We’ve made 
our life around the water all along the coast of Newfoundland. And we we’re so 
dependent on the ocean to maintain, I suppose, to develop the lifestyle that we 
have. But even now as things change, as the economy changes, look at the 
offshore oil, the oil industry. It’s huge, and it keeps growing. But we’ve got to be 
able to supply their needs. So there is a huge impact. (NL Transport 110) 
 
The marine operator continues, “If the trend is that there’s going to be more impact from 
weather or we’re going to see more severity in weather systems, I think as an island we 
have to expect that there’s going to be an impact to supplying the island” (NL Transport 
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110). On one hand, these statements indicate an appreciation for the environmental 
exposure of Newfoundland as a coastal region, with communities reliant upon the ocean, 
for transport. On the other hand, these statements reveal a disjuncture or, to adopt 
Cresswell’s term, friction, between the experience of climate change impacts in the form 
of severe weather and anthropogenic contributions to climate change in the form of 
shipping and the oil industry.  
Once on the island the dominant form of transport is by car and truck. The Trans-
Canada Highway reaches from Port-aux-Basques on the west coast to St. John’s on the 
east coast; it is the only highway that transects the province. There is a private bus service 
that offers a daily trip across the island – notably travelling across the island by bus takes 
approximately the same amount of time as it takes to cross Canada by air. St. John’s 
offers a modest public transit service, while taxis operate in both the capital and smaller 
communities. In addition, 14 provincially funded ferries operate, connecting communities 
within Newfoundland. 
The transport sector, including passenger and freight transport, accounts for 29 per 
cent of provincial emissions – the second largest emissions source after large industry (44 
per cent) which includes the oil sector (Figure 5.2).71 The volume of transport is on the 
rise. The St. John’s International Airport projects reaching two million passengers by 
2020 (compared to 1.6 million in 2014), and is in the process of installing technology that 
will allow flights to land even in foggy conditions (Broadcasting Corporation 2015c). 
One marine shipper comments on recently adding a new ship to his fleet, while another  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71
 This figure is on par with Nova Scotia where the transport sector also accounts for 26 per cent of 
emissions and is the second largest source of provincial emissions (Government of Nova Scotia 2013b). 
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Figure 5.1: Newfoundland and Labrador transport map (Nelleman 2016)  
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marine shipper projects an annual increase in commercial shipping of 1.5 per cent per 
year (NL Transport 110, 113). In terms of commuting, travelling by car or truck is the 
dominant mode, accounting for just under 90 per cent of the modal share between 2006 
and 2011 (Statistics Canada 2011). Within the transport sector, 64 per cent of energy is 
consumed by road transport, 23 per cent by the marine transport and 13 per cent by 
aviation (Government of Newfoundland and Labrador 2011a) (Figure 5.3). 
 
Figure 5.2: Greenhouse gas emissions by sector, Newfoundland and Labrador, 
2010 (Government of Newfoundland and Labrador 2015) 
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Figure 5.3: Energy consumption within the transport sector, Newfoundland and 
Labrador, 2010 (Government of Newfoundland and Labrador 2015) 
 
 
 
Hurricane Igor  
Hurricane Igor formed off the coast of Africa on September 8th, traveled across the 
Atlantic Ocean reaching Bermuda on September 20th and intensified as it tracked up the 
Eastern seaboard. As it approached Newfoundland, it combined with a moving storm 
front, Hurricane Julia and a trough of low pressure making landfall in Newfoundland on 
September 21st (Environment Canada 2011). Fire and Emergency Services Newfoundland 
and Labrador, the provincial body responsible for emergency response, monitored the 
storm a week in advance of its arrival (Courage 2013). With contemporary storm tracking 
technology, the track or route of hurricanes is closely monitored – or from a Foucauldian 
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perspective, surveilled – as minor shifts in the storms trajectory can mean the difference 
between making landfall or heading into open ocean.  
Preliminary data indicated the storm would track over the ocean, however the day 
before the hurricane hit the Canadian Hurricane Centre issued warnings that the storm 
could track over land: “even during the day of the event, the position and track forecast 
had to be continually adjusted closer to land as the details of the upper-level trough 
influence were evolving” (Environment Canada 2011). Likewise, hurricane speed is a 
matter of concern. As Igor passed over Newfoundland it was in the process of 
transitioning to an extratropical hurricane. Such transitions are typical in the North 
Atlantic and characterized by a “larger rain and wind field” (Masson 2014: 631). Though 
Igor was large, it was not fast. While hurricanes distinguished by stronger winds rank 
higher on the Saffir-Simpson Wind Scale, slower moving storms can yield greater 
damage from precipitation, as there is more time for the rainfall to inundate a given 
region (Masson 2014). This was the case with Igor. 
In early September, storm warnings were issued for Hurricane Earl, which was 
forecast to track over land. The anticipated storm received media coverage, but the 
impacts were mild compared to Hurricane Igor. By contrast, Hurricane Igor, which was 
projected to track offshore received less media attention prior to landfall. Igor’s change in 
direction caught the region off guard. Acting pre-emptively, the Eastern District School 
Board closed schools preventing the movement of dozens of schools buses (Courage 
2013) (see Fothergill and Peek (2015) for a discussion of the impacts of disaster on 
children, including long-term absence from school). Oil companies evacuated 
approximately 200 workers from offshore oilrigs (Canadian Broadcasting Corporation 
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2010a). Eastern Health set up shelters, however no evacuations were ordered (Masson 
2014). Proactive measures were also taken by a non-governmental organization: “we 
preposition supplies on the island and in Labrador, because if it’s foggy we don’t get 
flights in. If it’s windy we don’t get flights or boats in” reflecting familiarity with the 
difficulties that develop when mobility webs are disrupted by weather (NL Non-
governmental organization 116).  
Igor was a record breaker. Spanning 1,480 kilometres in diameter, it was the 
largest recorded storm in the Atlantic Basin until Hurricane Sandy (Government of 
Newfoundland and Labrador 2010a). 72 Sustained winds reached 130 kilometres per hour, 
with gusts of 170 kilometres per hour, ranking it a category one hurricane on the Saffir-
Simpson Wind Scale. It was the third wettest hurricane in Canadian history, deluging the 
Bonavista and Burin Peninsulas with up to 250 millimetres of rain, or approximately 20 
per cent of annual precipitation for the region (Current Results 2015; Environment 
Canada 2011) (see Figure 5.4).  
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 Hurricane Sandy (2012) had a diameter of 1,600 kilometres (National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration 2013). 
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Figure 5.4: Hurricane Igor rainfal l  total (Canadian Broadcasting Corporation 2010b) 
  
 
Newfoundland is colloquially known as The Rock due to its geologic makeup – 
when such intense precipitation hits the province’s thin soil it was quickly saturated 
(Catto and Tomblin 2013). Stream flow increased from a mean of 10 cubic metres per 
second to 600 cubic metres per second (Masson 2014). One community member draws on 
a transport metaphor to describe the scale of impact: “It sounded like a roar, like an 
airplane was going to land in the backyard, but it was the brook” (The Telegram 2010). 
Floyd Prince recounts the inundation of his store and post office: 
 
… In a matter of minutes the store faced destruction as the waters rose in a nearby 
pond, overflowing its banks. “I went to secure the gasoline storage facility (in the 
parking lot),” Prince says, “and by the time I got back to the store, I had to fight 
the current to get back inside.”… Water surged from the back of the building 
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through the loading door. Deep freezers floated. The community’s mailboxes and 
Prince’s office became saturated beyond salvation. Fearing his store would fill to 
the ceiling, Prince left the front door open to let the water “pour out like a 
waterfall.” …“You can’t stop nature at that point,” says Prince. (Borja 2010) 
 
Prince concludes that the experience left him “heartsick” (Borja 2010). 
States of emergency were declared in 30 communities (CTV News 2010a). The 
storm caused dramatic upheaval to Newfoundland’s mobility web, particularly the road 
network, resulting in extensive and prolonged road and bridge washouts that isolated 
more than 100 communities. In a photo book commemorating the event, journalist 
Barbara Dean-Simmons reflects: 
 
I never imagined life without a highway, no connection between communities. … 
Huge chunks of pavement had disintegrated, leaving gaping holes and sheer drops. 
Streams and rivers had changed their courses; water flowed in areas where water 
had never flowed before…. The 35-km route that I took everyday to get to work 
was practically obliterated. Guardrails hung like slack clotheslines across huge 
gaps. Asphalt was ripped apart like paper. (The Telegram 2010) 
 
In addition, vehicles were damaged and air and marine transport were interrupted.  
The failure of the road system resulted in the blockage of diverse flows of people 
and goods, from the utility crews required to reconnect electrical services to the flows of 
oxygen to people with home ventilation systems. Transport to work and school, and the 
movement of goods such as food, water and fuel, as well as access to medications and 
treatments such as insulin, dialysis and methadone was challenging. In addition, 
approximately 70,000 households lost power. The Canadian Forces were brought in to 
assist with recovery. Costs estimates for infrastructure and property damage range 
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between $100 to 200 million.73 As with Hurricane Juan, Hurricane Igor’s arrival at night 
was attributed with lower rates of injury and mortality. However, one life was lost when 
the driveway upon which a man was standing washed out. 
 
Photo 5.1: Typical example of type of damage to roadway caused by 
Hurricane Igor - Litt le Barasway, Avalon Peninsula (Rose 2010) 
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 Costs for Hurricanes Juan and Igor are estimates that include insurable costs and costs recovered under 
the Federal Disaster Financial Assistance Arrangement (DFAA). They do not include uninsured costs, 
indirect costs, nor ecological and social costs not reflected in the market. Critically, overland flooding was 
not an insurable cost. At the time an Insurance Bureau of Canada representative stated: “There’s no policy 
available to homeowners in Canada that would cover that kind of damage,” though recently overland 
insurance is available on the market (Aviva 2015; The Telegram 2010 np). 
  198 
Mobile roads 
Once the storm passed, the first step was assessing damage: determining what routes were 
intact and what routes had structural failures (Figure 5.5). Roads transmuted from the 
realm of fixity to the world of fluidity. A politician recalls: “We went down to Random 
Island and it hit us. Total destruction over there. … [It] wasn’t gaps – there were just 
roads just sort of gone, right?  My thoughts were, “My god, we’re going to be years 
putting this place back together”” (NL Government 107). The order of the road network 
was supplanted by hydrological mobility: “The turbulent movement of a fast-flowing 
river for example, may be formed of intricate orders, when the liquid reaches a certain 
speed or ‘critical point’ the random flow of a moving liquid gives way to the intricately 
ordered patterns of turbulence” (Bryant 2007; Cresswell and Martin 2012: 519). To use a 
driving analogy, human mobility yielded as water took the right of way.  
Society had to reorient itself and navigate a dramatically changed mobility 
landscape. Road manager, Phil, recalls gathering information from the ground and via 
word of mouth: “we were getting calls coming in from everywhere, and our staff couldn’t 
get out to check on a lot of it because the roads were–. Once they got to the first washout, 
that’s as far as they got” (NL Government 106). Phil describes the process of piecing 
together the impacts of Hurricane Igor on the mobility web: 
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Figure 5.5: Map of Bonavista Peninsula road closures (red indicates road closure)   
(CTV News 2010b) 
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[Fire and Emergency Services] set up a command centre and they had different 
government agencies at that centre, and we would feed that centre with 
information. … The first day, none of that was in place. It got better as a couple 
days went ahead. But the first day … you couldn’t get a chopper or fly because 
the winds were too high. And it was still raining, so you couldn’t get out and 
really assess the damages. … [But after] that first day we had a pretty good idea. 
We might have missed some smaller ones, like a side road in a community, that  
kind of thing, but we had a pretty good idea that all our major routes were 
compromised. (NL Government 106) 
 
The first step of navigating disruption, that is, identifying the scale and range of impacts 
on routes, is fraught with difficulty. Given the weather conditions and infrastructure 
damage, even conducting a basic impact assessment of the damage to the road network 
proved challenging. While some officials had access to helicopters and were able to get a 
bird’s eye view of the situation, most transport managers relied on first-hand experience 
and second-hand accounts. Looking forward, one town manager imagines that in future 
events, drones will be an important tool for mobile disaster surveillance, permitting aerial 
mobility without risk to human life (NL Government 104).74 
 Of the damage, one road manager describes the stretch of highway for which he is 
responsible “it runs … pretty much the path that Igor took” (NL Transport 106). In terms 
of the impact on the mobility web the road manger draws on a war metaphor “It looked 
like a war zone. It looked like strategically dropped bombs on bridges and crossings” (NL 
Transport 106). Likewise, an editorialist for the provincial newspaper The Telegram 
recalls, “It’s the closest I’ve ever felt to being involved in a battle, except the enemy was 
the weather and it had far more in its arsenal than we did” (Frampton 2010). The 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74
 This interview was conducted in 2013. In 2016, the use of drones in disaster contexts is commonplace 
illustrating the speed of technological uptake. 
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hurricane’s track traced the path of the road network, an unfortunate alignment of 
ecological and human transport routes (Photo 5.1).  
Given that many regions in Newfoundland only have one primary road, Igor hit 
where it hurt, exacerbating a pre-existing vulnerability of a fragile mobility web that lacks 
redundancy. Fire and Emergency Services lamented the lack of  “overland re-routing 
options” (Masson 2014: 63). A fuel provider comments on the variable state of road 
maintenance across the province where sparsely populated areas may be less likely to 
attract provincial investment in maintenance but may still experience relatively high 
drive-through traffic volumes. He observes that “there’s a lot of roads that were in a lot 
worse shape than those areas that got washed out, that probably didn’t get as much wind 
and rain, so they were lucky” (NL Transport 123). The prospect that the damage to 
Newfoundland’s road system could have been even worse if the storm track shifted 
slightly raises a new specter for both climate and disaster mitigation. Road infrastructure 
is particularly vulnerable precisely because it is intended to be immobile.  
This contrasts with marine and air routes, which are malleable. A marine operator 
speaking to the flexibility of shipping, observing the intimate relationship between 
routing and motive force, that is, fossil fuel: 
 
… we always listen to the forecast, take advantage of the weather. We’re 
paying for our own fuel. …We have all the right incentives in place, if you 
will. We can be stupid, but it’ll cost us. … So every time we’d … take 
advantage of the currents that were predictable and the weather. So we’ll 
weather route to allow us to maintain the maximum speed with the 
minimum amount of energy. (NL Transport 113) 
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Weather routing refers to altering a ship’s course to take maximum advantage of tidal, 
current and wind conditions to reduce physical resistance, that is friction, of the ship 
moving through water. He expands, describing the inextricable relationship between the 
socio-technical assemblage of shipping and the marine environment: “So we have to do 
work-arounds and work with the environment that we live in. If you’re at that all the time, 
you’re naturally doing a lot of stuff without realizing it. … It’s something that we do all 
the time. It’s not an exception” (NL Transport 113). Through the optimization of weather 
and technology, speed is a central consideration in the “distributive space of capitalism” 
(Cresswell and Martin 2012: 254). Drawing on the example of the MSC Napoli, 
Cresswell and Martin (2012) detail how, taken to an extreme, a focus on profit resulted in 
overloading vessels and traveling too fast, overwhelming the capacity of the vessel to 
navigate. The result was a turbulent and ultimately failed mobility.  
In the context of Hurricane Igor, while the roads were in shambles, airports and 
marine services (i.e. shipping, ferries) were relatively unharmed. Ferries were taken to sea 
to avoid damage to terminal infrastructure. As with Halifax International Airport, air 
travel was disrupted during the hurricane, but a lack of infrastructure damage meant that 
service could quickly resume. 75  However, given that marine and air services are 
integrated with the road network, the extent of road washouts meant that accessing the air 
and marine facilities was a challenge.  
The road washouts caused by Igor were not disruptive to the Marine Atlantic ferry 
service as the seasonal ferry that operates on the southeastern side of the island was no 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
75
 Blizzards are far more disruptive to airports than hurricanes, given the time needed to remove snow and 
deice planes. 
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longer in operation. However, previous weather events, such as Tropical Storm Chantal 
(August 2007) were disruptive. A marine operator recalls: “we had to turn the vessel 
around – now, not because of the weather event. It was because of the damage to the road 
network that occurred overnight in Argentia. We wouldn’t be able to get the passengers 
out … because the roads were washed out” (NL Transport 110). Consequently, 600 
passengers were detoured.  
An airport manager states: “the airport being accessible by air, but probably not 
accessible by road, because the road infrastructure is at risk. So that’s something that I 
guess could be a potential weakness is that the road network, the access routes to the 
airport” (NL Transport 109). A transport manager states, “we would have got impacted a 
bit by [Igor] with the road washouts because we have a big trucking fleet as well. We’re 
just not a shipping company. We have about 500 trucks on the road everyday as well” 
(NL Transport 113). Passenger and freight transport is intermodally integrated, with one 
journey made up of multiple routes that are subject to differing environmental 
vulnerabilities (see Fleming 2014 for a discussion of the environmental adaptive capacity 
of truckers in Newfoundland). 
 
 
Fuel as fixity 
 
While roads became mobile, fuel morphed into fixity. Flows of fuels into the province, 
gas stations and vehicles were disrupted. Just as hurricane damage to roads was a primary 
source of mobility friction, the inaccessibility of fuel was a secondary or resultant source 
of friction. The mundane task of obtaining fuel, critical in the achievement or 
accomplishment of automobility, became a pressing matter of concern for both public and 
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private transport operators and community members (Normark 2006). One regional fuel 
provider, Stuart, recalls his interactions with gas retailers in the aftermath of Igor:  
 
[They were asking:] ‘When can you get us gas? When can you get us gas?’ 
And we’re like, ‘Guys, the road is washed out. It’s not like we can just go and 
drive down through that big hole and get a tractor-trailer over to the other 
side.’ So they understood, but everybody was kind of really anxious, I guess, 
to have that taken care of ASAP. (NL Transport 123) 
 
 
Stuart continues, “the road was cut off, the residents down there panicked and started 
buying gas like it was going to be made no more” (NL Transport 123). In Newfoundland, 
the average gas station carries about 15,000 litres of fuel with a turnover of two to three 
days.76 Stuart describes the aftermath of the storm: 
 
Well, they were selling everything they’ve got in one day. And then some of 
them even actually rationed gas. When they realized they were going to run 
out, they would stop letting people take whatever they wanted. Some sites 
actually stopped it and said, “If I sell out everything I’ve got, then how is the 
ambulance and the fire truck going to move if there’s an emergency? … 
They’re going to sell the litres anyway, so it’s just as well that they make sure 
a lot of people get some instead of only a few people getting that and 
everybody else doesn’t get any. (NL Transport 123) 
 
This raises valuable areas for future research, including the fuel procurement strategies of 
emergency services.77 
Due to the scarcity of fuel, both actual and technical, a number of research 
participants observed the tendency for community members to stock up. Even long after 
the storm, residents were sensitive – on “high alert” – to the possibility of fuel shortages 	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 In Atlantic Canada, oil is processed by North Atlantic Refining at Come-by-Chance, Newfoundland 
(115,000 barrel-per-day capacity) and by Irving in Saint John, New Brunswick (320,000 barrel-per-day 
capacity) (MacNeil and Keefe 2015). 
77
 This issue also emerged during the 2015 fuel shortage Nova Scotia experienced where, for example, 
ambulance drivers took measures to conserve fuel. 
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(Masson 2014: 629). Phil recalls a 2012 storm, “The eye went right through [town] and 
we didn’t have hardly any damage – 20 millimetres of rain, no high winds – but people 
were at the gas station, lined up at the gas station. Water was sold out” (NL Government 
106). The experience of scarcity made an impression on community members, modifying 
their storm preparation measures. Notably, the fuel shortages were not raised in the 
Legislative Assembly. By contrast, fuel shortages experienced in New York after 
Hurricane Sandy resulted in the imposition of short-term, government-imposed rationing 
reminiscent of the 1970s OPEC (Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries) oil 
crisis. In the longer term, legislation required key gas stations to install generators (New 
York State Energy Research and Development Authority 2015).  
While flows of fuel were blocked due to the failure of the road network, ferries 
were forwarded as a substitute transport mode, reconfiguring the mobility web 
spontaneously to deliver fuel. One ferry operator recounts loading fuel trucks and 
diverting ferries to the south coast (NL Transport 110). Movement of fuel, usually taken 
for granted – akin to our expectation that water will flow when we turn on a tap – 
surfaced as a pressing concern. Following Lin’s (2013) work on the reconfiguration of 
airspace during ash cloud events, Newfoundland worked quickly to adapt and respond, 
but at the same time reinforced fossil fuel dependence. From a social-ecological systems 
perspective, it was easier to retain the status quo (i.e. rigidity trap) than to transform to an 
alternate state.  
Access to fuel, however, was only one example of tightly-coupled systems 
(Brown 2014). With the failure of electricity system, even available fuel stores became 
stranded assets as gas pumps run on electricity. Stranded assets refer to geological stores 
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of oil and gas that, due to technological and/or financial barriers, cannot be extracted; 
they are observable but inaccessible. This parallels contemporary environmental 
campaigns that advocate for conscientiously refraining from resource extraction (i.e. 
keeping fossil fuels in the ground) (Canadian Broadcasting Corporation 2015a). Such 
campaigns argue that to avert disastrous climate change, two-thirds of known fossil fuel 
reserves must remain unused. Rather than mitigating emissions, the campaign argues for 
preventing emissions in the first place. While ideally such a transition would be phased in 
gradually, stranded or depleted gas stores give an abrupt sense of resource scarcity, 
evoking the strain anticipated by Urry (2011) under a regional warlordism scenario.  
Stuart notes that loss of electricity and consequently the ability to pump fuel is not 
limited to hurricane-scale events: “It happens a lot, even now, when we had the power 
outage … in January [2014]. … Some small places do carry generators where they can 
get a pump running, a single pump. This is very uncommon though. It should be more 
common, given our climate” (NL Transport 123).78 The lack of a back-up system for gas 
pump failures is remarkable given the reliance on fossil fuels for day-to-day functioning 
in the automobility culture of Newfoundland. Echoing experiences during Hurricane Juan, 
this qualifies fuel resilience as a sub-issue within the field of transport resilience. 
Further, it is notable that fossil fuels are required even for back-up equipment 
such as generators and equipment used in recovery efforts, such as chain saws. There are 	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 From January 2 to 8, 2014, Newfoundland experienced rolling blackouts. Planned temporary power 
outages were scheduled to allow for utility upgrades. However, unplanned outages resulted from a fire at 
the Sunnyside substation and a failure at the oil-powered Holyrood generating station. As a result, almost 
300,000 Newfoundland Power customers lost service. Newfoundlanders lacked heat and electricity at a 
time when temperatures reached lows of -18˚ Celsius with wind chill making it feel like -35ºC. To 
complement my doctoral research, I collected sampling of public response at the St. John’s Art Marathon 
(darknl.tumblr.com). 
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limited efforts to address issues such as the distribution and pumping of gas, nonetheless 
the problematic reliance on one fuel type. Stuart concedes: “I think if there was another 
Igor … maybe we’d have the same thing happen again and we’d just have to suffer 
through it like we did last time. Hopefully, the road holds up this time” (NL Transport 
123). Hope, rather than action, is a precarious strategy.  
The official response to the various sources of friction (e.g. safety, financial, 
emotional) that occurred in Newfoundland’s mobility web were limited to restoring the 
road network, albeit with upgraded infrastructure and improved practices. From a 
Foucauldian perspective, the security of the population was framed in the narrow terms 
of reconnecting the mobility web in the short-term, rather than broader considerations of 
how to mitigate future road washouts through infrastructure maintenance, generator 
distribution, development of alternate mobility webs, and/or addressing potential food, 
water and medicine shortages.  
 
 
Engineering passive resilience  
 
Engineering or passive resilience is defined as ‘getting things back to normal as quickly 
as possible,’ and it characterized the response to Hurricane Igor; it was a response at 
which the government excelled. A prominent frame that emerged in the dataset was a 
‘ten-day recovery’ narrative; this frame is characterized by an urgent pace or rhythm. For 
example, politician Chris recounts: 
 
so over the next few days (and it was ten days really), we had our goals set. We wanted to 
make sure that we connected every community in as short a possible time. And everybody 
stepped up. I mean we had our workers working 18-20 hours a day. (NL Government 
107)  
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He recalls: “we hauled [contractors] off the west coast, we hauled them off the east coast. 
They all came together… but it went like clockwork, bang, bang, bang. We knew all the 
gaps. It was quantitative in the sense that we knew how many communities were out”  
(Figure 5.5). Chris provided ongoing updates to the media on the status of the road 
network, counting down the repairs so the public “had some sense that all through this … 
that we were getting ahead, not falling behind.” In Newfoundland a count down approach 
focused on reconnecting roads, while in Nova Scotia a count down approach focused on 
reconnecting the electrical grid, illustrating different infrastructure focal points. Hage 
observes how the practice of lining up, as in the case of Igor for gas and road repairs, is a 
form of governmentality that “valorizes self-control even in times of crisis” (2009: 9). 
Focusing on a countdown approach, mobilizing workers from across the province and 
long work hours define the frenetic rhythm of recovery.  
Phil, a road manager, reflects “the estimation was weeks, if not months, to put it 
all back together and we did it in ten days. Now, I mean, let’s face it, it’s three years later 
before we got it all straightened out” (NL Transport 106). In the span of ten days, some 
form of physical connection was made with the more than 100 communities that were 
isolated by road and bridge washouts. The Canadian Forces assisted with the installation 
of temporary bridges that, when the original structures washed out, isolated the Bonavista 
(Barbour Bridge) and Burin (Long Pond and Rattlebrook bridges) peninsulas 
(Government of Newfoundland and Labrador 2010b). Roads were reduced to one lane 
and weight restrictions were imposed (Masson 2014). Over the course of the following 
years, permanent measures replaced the temporary repairs. One reason for the slower 
  209 
pace of recovery was that asphalt and tar plants required for road rebuilding are seasonal, 
shutting down in winter (Masson 2014).  
While things were restored to normal, they were not the same: “knowledge was 
gained regarding road stability and necessary construction in the face of rainfall and peak 
stream flow” (Masson 2014: 629). Based on continual learning from previous events 
improvements were made, such as installing larger culverts, installing concrete abutments 
to keep culverts in place, monitoring weather more closely, getting work crews out in 
advance of storms to clear culverts and catch basins, coordinating with other 
organizations and practicing disaster simulation exercises.79 As a consequence of Igor, the 
Water Resources Management Division of the Newfoundland and Labrador Department 
of Environment and Conservation recommended using intensity-duration frequency 
curves, which are useful in determining how rare a given event is, combined with flood 
mapping to adapt to climate change (Government of Newfoundland and Labrador 2014b). 
In some places, such as Marystown, culverts were replaced rather than upgraded 
and were subsequently washed out again during post-tropical storm Ophelia (Canadian 
Broadcasting Corporation 2011, Mason 2014). Mayor Sam Synard asserts: “I'm just 
stating the obvious. If a hurricane blows through and knocks out culverts that are some 
four feet in diameter, it might be a better idea to put them back six feet in diameter, or 
something [with] increased capacity” (Canadian Broadcasting Corporation 2011). Then 	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 In 2006, prior to Hurricane Igor, an emergency preparedness exercise, Operation Dolphin, was held at 
Channel-Port-aux-Basques and focused on hurricane preparedness (see McMillan (2006) and Senguin 
(2006) for accounts and assessments). Based on the experience of Hurricane Igor, such exercises could be 
amended in future. For example, Operation Dolphin focused on one smaller coastal community, Channel-
Port-au-Basques, compared to the regional impact of Hurricane Igor. Further, though the scenarios included 
cancelled ferry service, blocked roads and collapsed bridges, the recommendations do not overtly reference 
transport (though, for example, communication redundancies are referenced) (Verge 2008). 
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Minister of Transportation, Tom Hedderson, responded to the concern stating, “when you 
get a significant flow as we've got [Monday], we do expect that there will be some 
damage, and hopefully damage that we can mitigate very quickly” (Canadian 
Broadcasting Corporation 2011). This exchange reflects a larger tension in the data set 
between upgrading infrastructure construction standards incurring guaranteed upfront 
costs versus simply allowing infrastructure to wash out and incur replacement costs if, 
and when, needed.  
In terms of maintaining mobility webs, the former is more in line with a transport 
resilience approach. The difference in approaches suggests differing perceptions of risk 
(Catto and Tomblin 2013). Further, it highlights that Igor was framed largely in terms of 
passive, engineering resilience: “the difficulties were seen as the result of inadequate 
preparation (the failure to install larger culverts, lack of maintenance), and it was assumed 
that better pre-storm management would have resolved most issues” (Catto and Tomblin 
2013: 101). Passive resilience was embraced, rather than provoking more fundamental 
questions related to climate change mitigation and social-ecological adaptation measures 
characteristic of transformative resilience.  
 Research participants expressed pride in the collective experience and efforts of 
various levels of governments, the military, contractors and communities to restore the 
road network, often praising employees who went above and beyond the call of duty. Just 
as there was a sense of loss for the transformed landscape, there was almost nostalgia for 
the cooperation that occurred under Igor. The Chief Administrative Officer of one 
community recalls, “our fire department and our [public] works are excellent examples of 
this. … They were out trying to save other people’s properties when their own homes 
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were home getting flooded out. It was a really amazing – I was proud to be associated 
with them. I really was” (NL Government 104). What emerges in the ‘ten-day recovery’ 
narrative is a form of community resilience where stakeholders were able to pull together 
with an all-hands-on-deck mentality, uniting behind a concrete common goal of 
reconnecting the road network, or in other terms, restoring the mobility web (NL 
Government 119). However, the road network itself proved catastrophically vulnerable 
and therefore the merits of re-establishing it to ‘normal,’ while understandable, are 
simultaneously questionable. Anecdotally, it was mentioned that for some companies 
road building contracts are a lucrative source of income indicating that there may be 
economic resistance to increasing road resilience. 
While the road rebuilding effort was impressive, it raises concerns about the 
resilience of the road network moving forward. One issue is rebuilding policies and 
practices. Phil reflects: “We have a very strict Public Tendering Act for our hiring 
contracts. All bets were off. I was told by my executive, do whatever you got to do” (NL 
Transport 106). This included waiving environmental assessment processes and hiring 
less experienced machine operators. Phil continues: “we had [contractors] digging holes 
in the side of the road and everything trying to get enough fill to fill in a washout.” 
Depending on how and where fill was removed it might actually promote further erosion 
and flooding. The use of heavy equipment near rivers could compact the natural 
riverbanks and bed, making it more conducive to flooding. Another issue that arose was 
with regard to public perception of how best to prevent flooding. Debris, such as trees, 
blocked some culverts impairing their flow, contributing to the road washout (Photo 5.2). 
In response, public sentiment was that  “you go back in the country and clean all the 
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brooks out so that the debris doesn’t come down again” (NL Transport 106). However, 
withdrawing biomass could potentially disrupt natural flooding buffers. 
The frame ‘getting back to normal as quickly as possible’ is in tension with 
another dominant frame, ‘never seen anything like it.’ This conceptual gap mirrors the 
literal gaps that occurred in road network during Igor (Photo 5.2). An editorial in the 
Clarenville Packet reads, “in this province, we’re used to being at the mercy of the 
weather, but rarely has the weather been so merciless” (Frampton 2010). Likewise, a 
town manager states, “I’d never seen anything like it that severe. … I realized how 
forceful nature could be, but I’d never seen it” (NL Government 104). He continues: 
“we’ve been through wind and rain …but nothing like this … we didn’t anticipate the 
seriousness of it because we’d never seen anything like this before” (emphasis added).  
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Photo 5.2: Gap in road network as mirroring conceptual gap between a ‘return to 
normal quickly’ and ‘never seen anything l ike it ’   
(Chance Cove Road, Avalon Peninsula, Newfoundland) (Care2 2010) 
 
 
 
One resident wryly captures the dissonance between expectation and reality: “Tied my 
barbecue down. Forgot to tie the house down” (The Telegram 2010). Igor was unique in 
Newfoundland’s storm history in terms of the geographical extent of the storm, impacting 
numerous communities simultaneously and straining response and recovery resources 
(Masson 2014). As reflected in all data sources, the scale of Igor was beyond previous 
experience, giving Newfoundlanders a new and sobering appreciation for the power of 
the environment. Just as infrastructure was under stress, so too were residents (Masson 
2014).  
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Inundating events 
 
However, though the severity was new, such flooding events in Newfoundland were not. 
Flooding has occurred almost every year in Newfoundland since 2001, from tropical 
storms like Gabrielle (2001) and Chantal (2007) to the Stephenville floods (2005) and the 
Northern Peninsula storm surge (2007): “a plethora of meteorological and geological 
events since 2000 has necessitated intense activity by first responders and government 
agencies” (Catto and Tomblin 2013: 96) (Table 5.1). Costs incurred, as measured in terms 
of Federal Disaster Assistance provided, range from a low of $1.3 million for the Burin 
Flood to a high of $28.3 million for the Stephenville floods, putting the $100 to 200 
million cost of Hurricane Igor in perspective.80  
In media coverage of Igor, as well as legislative transcripts, policy documents and 
interviews, references to past weather events were surprisingly sparse given their 
frequency and compared to the frequency of references in media coverage of Hurricane 
Juan. The most common reference, mentioned three times, was to Tropical Storm Chantal 
and its related costs. Catto and Tomblin suggest that such flooding events are “perceived 
by residents as a feature of the local environment to be endured, rather than a hazard to be 
combatted,” perhaps accounting for the textual silence (2013: 100). There is a 
disconnection between past severe weather events – they appear to be treated in media 
accounts as isolated incidents rather than as components of a larger integrated frame of 	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 Founded in 1970, the Federal Disaster Financial Assistance Arrangement (DFAA) program compensates 
provinces for expenses that are incurred while managing disasters. Expenses are eligible when the cost of 
the disaster exceeds three dollars per capita. A state of emergency must be declared to enact the DFAA. The 
DFAA is notoriously slow in administering compensation. For example, as of 2013 costs incurred during 
Tropical Storm Gabrielle (2001) has not fully been repaid (Catto and Tomblin 2013; Grieve and Turnbull 
2013).  
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severe events as is the case in Nova Scotia. This echoes a larger disconnection in 
Newfoundland between emissions and climate change impacts.  
By contrast, provincial departments such as Fire and Emergency Services, the 
Office of Climate Change, Municipal Affairs, and Municipalities Newfoundland and 
Labrador are cognizant of, and concerned about, extreme weather trends. A climate 
change workbook designed for municipal managers states:  
 
Globally, the number of severe damage-causing storms gas increased from an 
average of 150 per year in the early 1980s to between 250 and 300 per year in the 
period from 2000 to 2004. In Canada, scientific models show shorter return 
periods of extreme weather events (the estimated interval of time between 
occurrences). (Government of Newfoundland and Labrador No date a)  
 
 
The workbook outlines five extreme weather events that occurred between 2007 and 2010, 
including the Daniel’s Harbour landslides (2007), the Middle Cove rogue wave (2008), 
storm damage to the St. John’s Battery (2009), the Ferryland road washout (2009) and 
Hurricane Igor (2010). The concepts of reactive versus anticipatory adaptation are 
introduced. Reactive adaptation refers to examples such as the permanent relocation of 
residents in the aftermath of the Stephenville floods, while anticipatory adaptation 
planning refers to projects such as including sea level rise projections in the construction 
of the Confederation Bridge that connects New Brunswick and Prince Edward Island 
(Government of Newfoundland and Labrador No date a). The workbook promotes 
anticipatory adaptation as ultimately more cost-effective and structurally effective than 
reactive adaptation. 
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Table 5.1: Weather events in Newfoundland and Labrador that tr iggered the 
Federal Disaster Financial Assistance Arrangement Program, 2001-2010  
(Fire and Emergency Services-Newfoundland and Labrador 2014) 
YEAR EVENT FEDERAL ASSISTANCE 
($M) 
2001 Tropical Storm Gabrielle81 6.1 
2003 Badger Flood 8.2 
2003 West Coast Flood 9.6 
2005 Stephenville Flood 28.3 
2006 North East Coast Flood 4.6 
2006 Burin Flood 1.3 
2007 Northern Peninsula Storm Surge 2.9 
2007 Daniel’s Harbour Landslides 2.7 
2007 Tropical Storm Chantal 24.5 
2008 North East Coast Flood 1.8 
2010 Hurricane Igor 95.0 
 TOTAL $185M 
 
Links with climate change  
The expertise of transport operators, given intimate experience of weather, constitutes a 
valuable data source. A number of the transport managers interviewed occupy senior 
positions with decades of experience in their field. A Newfoundland road manager 
observes changes in storm frequency: “I’ve been here 26 years now. I’ve got to say, it 
seems like it’s more frequent. And that certainly impacts what we do because one of these 
storms certainly sets you back a long ways” in terms of damage to infrastructure (NL 	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 Tropical Storm Gabrielle hit on September 18-19, arriving just as the last passengers diverted by the 
events of 9/11 left, illustrating the potential for compound extreme events (Catto and Tomblin 2013).  
  217 
Transport 104). A Newfoundland marine operator speaks to changes in wind conditions at 
sea: 
 
… bad storms are worse than they used to be, it seems. Like we had a period one 
time last year. I remember one of our ships was in the Corner Brook area, and 
for six hours straight it had, I think it was 180 kilometres plus [wind speeds on 
par with a Category 3 hurricane]. It was totally unheard of, right? I mean, I 
never! The periods of bad weather are definitely different. They’re more extreme. 
So obviously over time that will degrade everything at some stage. Is that going 
to continue? Well, who knows? I mean they had 380 kilometres in Asia recently 
[referring to Category 5 Typhoon Haiyan]. So maybe it could come here too. 
(NL Transport 113) 
 
Another marine operator speaks to the impacts of service delivery: 
 
I think last year we had in the vicinity of 30 days that we actually had to cancel. 
That was last year. … That’s increased [over past years]. There were probably 
more impacts, but they wouldn’t have necessarily meant cancellations. So there 
would have been delays probably arriving in port because of wind conditions, 
but actually cancellations would be about 30 days. … In this month alone, 
yesterday we lost all [sailings] yesterday. Last week we lost two days that we 
were out. (NL Transport 110) 
 
 
Transport operators’ first-hand experience involves managing and monitoring the 
inextricable interface of the environment and mobility webs. 
The concept of an one hundred year storm as an historical measure for severe 
storm recurrence intervals was mentioned frequently – most often in terms of the out- 
datedness of such measures. One Newfoundland transport manager quotes a peer who 
exaggerates for effect: “He says we’re having a 100-year storm every two months” (NL 
Transport 113). Phil observes that 
 
…we’ve come through [Igor] relatively good. So some people are saying it’s the 
storm of the century; we’ll never have another one. But all you’ve got to do is 
watch the news in other parts of the world. Climate change is here, for sure. So 
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that was one opportunity, I guess. But we haven’t [taken advantage of it]. (NL 
Transport 106) 
 
 
A thematic through line – captured in the frame ‘never seen anything like it’ – in the 
interview dataset is a sense that we are entering new territory where severe weather 
events are common and a recognition that the climate is changing.  
However, while convinced that the climate is changing, not all participants were 
convinced that the cause is anthropogenic, which has important implications for both 
disaster and climate change mitigation. Finnis, Sarkar and Stoddart (2015), for example, 
find that conflation of climate change and natural climate variability in western 
Newfoundland may undermine climate action efforts during period of natural, cooling 
climate variability. While in the dataset as a whole there was consensus that the climate is 
changing and is caused largely by humans, there were a few exceptions in Newfoundland.  
A town manager reflects: 
 
And everybody keeps blaming all the stuff we’re putting into the atmosphere. I 
wonder if that’s true or not. I just wonder, like we’ve had climate change 
throughout our history, ice ages and receding. I just wonder if we’re not part of 
that bigger cycle. I don’t know. I’m convinced that there is a change, but I don’t 
know if we’re part of the bigger million-year transition or it is something that 
we’re doing. (NL Transport 104) 
 
Similarly, a Newfoundland marine operator reflects: 
 
I read an interesting article a few weeks ago about sunspots, and some guy made a 
lot of sense that it’s really tied to sunspots, and in actual fact the earth is going to 
start cooling down. It’s not getting warmer at all. And that’s not hard to understand. 
I just came back from Florida, and a couple of mornings I got up it was warmer here 
than there. (NL Transport 113) 
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While climate change is related but peripheral to the occupations of both of these research 
participants, it is interesting to note their engagement with the issue and efforts to 
reconcile their experience and the information to which they are exposed. Differing 
understandings arise as a form of friction in terms of linking the experience of severe and 
changing weather events with the contribution of the transport sector to climate change. 
This context sheds light on the apparent internal tension between the perception of 
the event and the response to it. Stakeholders are grappling with this tension, uncertain of 
how to proceed given that storm events are forcing and surpassing the upper edges of 
infrastructure design limits, while also cognizant that building to higher standards, 
nonetheless maintaining current infrastructure, is difficult to achieve financially. A road 
manager aptly illustrates this struggle: 
 
One of the things that we’ve noticed - and we’ve discussed this a lot since Igor - 
is that when it comes to storm systems, we don’t design for hurricanes. We 
design for 50- to maybe 100-year maximums. To design for a hurricane is 
financially unfeasible. But what we’re finding is that extreme weather events 
seem to be happening more often, and when they do they’re more severe. So it 
looks to me there may have to be some work done in that area, but I certainly 
can’t see... I mean, we just can’t afford to design and build for something that’s 
going to happen for 200 millimetres of rain. We just can’t. (NL Transport 106) 
 
Such uncertainty, related to storm recurrence rates, was a common source of friction in 
terms of limiting action. In the interviews a sense of discomfort surfaced akin to being 
stuck between a rock and hard place – the experience of changing weather conditions and 
limited resources and knowledge to act. Constructively, Phil suggests the creation of a 
“provincial think tank on this or some kind of committee” to provide practical direction 
on how to move forward (NL Transport 106). Transport resilience, though not articulated 
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as such, is a matter of concern at both municipal and provincial levels of government, in 
the private sector and among residents. Igor in particular sparked a conversation that now 
needs more formal means, whether in the form of a task force, committee, review or other 
process, to articulate and reflect on more fully. It would be interesting to learn if a 
stronger connection were made between extreme weather events and Newfoundland’s 
contribution to climate change, whether mitigation and adaption measures might gain 
more traction. 
 
The resilient Newfoundlander 
Shadow mobility webs 
In the media, legislative and interview datasets, a central theme is ‘community spirit,’ that 
is, the tendency for neighbours and families to help each other get back on their feet. 
Particular to Newfoundland, the sub-theme of the ‘resilient Newfoundlander’ emerged 
when political leaders laud the ability of communities to respond to crisis. There appear 
to be corollary concepts in other disaster-impacted regions, such as the ‘neighbourly 
Nova Scotian’ (i.e. neighbours helping neighbours in the aftermath of Hurricane Juan) or 
the ‘connected Calgarian’ (i.e. use of Twitter during 2013 Calgary floods). The historical 
concept of ‘resilient Newfoundlander’ has connotations of being hearty, strong, 
resourceful and competent in dealing with hardship and stems from a tradition of isolated 
communities, independent of government, dealing with emergencies through informal 
means (Catto and Tomblin 2013). For example, in Clarenville a local grocery store 
manager and community members organized the transport by boat of food and water to 
communities isolated by the Hurricane Igor (NL Other 105) (Photo 5.3). 
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This is emblematic of a shadow mobility web that came to the fore in the absence of 
the dominant road network. Phil states: “What I find with Newfoundland[ers] is that 
they’re very diversified. …. A lot of them have quads and Ski-Doos and boats and 
generators. .... They coped very well” (NL Transport 106). 82  He continues, 
“Newfoundlanders are very diverse. Yeah, the bridge was washed out, but they get down 
there with a quad to make it over to the other side” (NL Transport 106) (Photo 5.4). The 
term ‘diversified,’ another word for which is ‘redundancy,’ is a key element of resilience. 
Here residents demonstrate transport resilience through substitute modes (e.g. off-
highway vehicles, boats and, in winter, ski-doos), as well as back-up energy sources such 
as generators, though notably stores of personal back-up fuel are not referenced in the 
dataset.  
Provincial and local governments also practiced transport resilience by activating 
both alternate modes and routes. Chris, the politician, states: “people were cut off, but we 
started immediately to look at how can we get to them by sea. Could we use our 
provincial ferry system? Our helicopters?” (NL Government 107). Just as a forest fire 
clears room for new growth revitalizing biodiversity in a process of disturbance ecology, 
so too did the hurricane, through a social-ecological-technical disturbance, create space 
for alternate forms of mobility. Ferries, ships, helicopters and off-highway vehicles filled 
the gap left by cars and trucks – though critically these modes are all fossil-fuelled (see 
Fardink (2011) for a discussion on the role of helicopters in Hurricane Katrina). A 
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 Quad is a regional term for Off-Highway Vehicles or All Terrain Vehicles.  
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government news release issued three days after the storm provided an update illustrating 
the shadow mobility web: 
 
The Department of Transportation and Works has established marine and air 
support for communities isolated as a result of Hurricane Igor. A ferry vessel 
stationed at Clarenville will be dedicated to moving supplies to isolated 
communities on the Bonavista Peninsula. A second ferry vessel is also positioned 
at Portugal Cove, awaiting shipments of gasoline to be taken to Marystown. As 
well, two helicopters are stationed at Clarenville to be dedicated exclusively to 
addressing any essential transportation requirements to and from isolated 
communities. (Government of Newfoundland Labrador 2010b) 
 
In this description, for example, Clarenville morphs into a multimodal transport hub. 
In addition to different modes, different routes were used. One road manager 
recalls, “we used some alternate routes that were, like old cabin roads. We got some fill 
on them, and we used gravel roads. We used some old bridges that hadn’t been used in 
the last 20 or 30 years” (NL Transport 106). The central ties of the road network (i.e. 
automobility) were supplanted by peripheral ties within the road network, as well as by 
the peripheral ties of ferries (i.e. aquamobility) and helicopters (i.e. aeromobility) (Barton 
2011). 
Following Igor, other measures were taken to further improve redundancies such 
as distributing emergency Bailey bridges across the island, rather than just storing them 
on the west coast, as done previously.83 As well, measures such as storing extra road fill, 
(baseball-sized rocks used to create a roadbed) are used as low cost measures to expedite 
responses to future road washouts. The shadow mobility webs forged new routes and 
modes  – as well as activating old routes and modes – that have their own often slower 	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 Prefabricated Bailey bridges were first used in World War I to advance troops and equipment.  
  223 
speeds and urgent but more idiosyncratic rhythms that contrast with the rhythms of 
commuting (whether locally or via the fly-in, fly-out that characterizes out-of-province 
work in the oil sector) and just-in-time delivery. Hurricanes as a source of intense 
disruption temporarily revert contemporary mobility, seemingly fixated on immediacy, to 
an earlier and slower and smaller-scale mobility constellations that exist in the present 
rather than straining for the future. Such disruption was for some initially welcomed, as 
described in a Telegram editorial:   
 
Of how being without phone and electricity meant enjoying the uncharacteristic 
quiet, giving us even more excuse to have romantic candlelight dinners, and 
seeing the brightness of the stars, undiminished by light pollution. How, 
sometimes, it’s in the midst of swirling confusion that we can see things most 
clearly (Frampton 2010). 
 
However, after an initial ‘honeymoon’ period, residents are generally anxious for services 
to be restored and for normal life to resume. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  224 
Photo 5.3: A grocery store manager and community members organize the 
transport of food and water by boat to Random Island (Co-op Atlantic 2010) 
 
 
Photo 5.4: Off-highway vehicles (quads) emerged in the shadow mobil ity web 
(Ayer 2010) 
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Directing attention from House to homes 
 
Political and public figures recognized the diversity and resilience of individuals and 
communities. In the provincial Telegram then Premier, Danny Williams, states: 
 
It was a truly humbling experience to see people, faced by their own hardship, 
putting others before themselves and going above and beyond to assist in any 
way humanly possible. … Newfoundlanders and Labradorians have a 
reputation for being some of the kindest and most resilient people in the world, 
and this past week was certainly a testament to this claim (emphasis added). 
(Bartlett 2010) 
 
 
Williams reflected on one scene: “there were at least 20 people on their knees in the mud, 
cleaning up so these elderly people could get back in their home.... You know, we turned 
this around. We turned this around because we’re resilient, we’re tough.” Likewise, Prime 
Minister Harper stated that residents “are facing the aftermath of the storm with their 
characteristic resilience and determination” (The Telegram 2010a). Speaking to the 
Canadian Forces contribution to relief efforts, the Minister of Defence states, 
“Newfoundland-Labradorians have great resilience. They’re getting on with sorting 
themselves out and helping their own situation” (The Telegram 2010b). What emerges is 
a normalizing frame, the ‘resilient Newfoundlander,’ which from a Foucauldian 
perspective, serves as a tool of governmentality, simultaneously celebrating the 
individual’s response and diverting attention from government responsibility. The 
capability of individuals and communities to cope is highlighted, while discussion of 
larger issues that require government action, such as climate change mitigation and 
adaption (e.g. road construction), is absent. 
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Such praise, while deserved, risks focusing attention on the domestic and lived 
experience of individuals, directing attention away from the House of Assembly. Just as 
blame can stall the generation of “alternative imaginaries” as in the case of the response 
to the Icelandic ash cloud event in the United Kingdom, so too can praise (Birtchnell and 
Butchener 2011: 2). The first sitting of House of Assembly, governed by the 
Conservatives with the Liberals in Official Opposition, was in December more than two 
months after Hurricane Igor. The storm was mentioned in half of the House sittings the 
following year, for example, acknowledging the role of volunteers and discussing the 
closure of Port Union fish processing plant damaged by the hurricane. By comparison, 
Nova Scotia’s Legislature, governed by Progressive Conservatives with New Democratic 
Party in Opposition, met two days after Hurricane Juan, and the storm was discussed in 
three-quarters of sessions the following year. The discussions were more substantive in 
Nova Scotia, including links with climate change, impacts on workers and landowners, 
and the status of emergency preparedness. 
Discussion pertaining to mobility webs was limited largely to the issue of 
infrastructure maintenance and economic development. In terms of maintenance, Kelvin 
Parsons, Liberal Member of the House of Assembly for the District of Burgeo-La Poile in 
southwest Newfoundland, expresses concern about the outsourcing of highway 
maintenance jobs: 
 
…in this Province we have a tremendous amount of highway maintenance and 
repair work needed in communities, particularly in the aftermath of Igor. 
Government has surpluses, major maintenance work is required, they are laying 
off these [highway] depot workers when, at the same time - in my District of 
Burgeo, for example, on the Burgeo Road - we are seeing government contract 
out work to put signs up. Can the Minister of Transportation and Works explain 
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the logic of us closing down depots, laying off workers, and contracting the work 
out to others? (NL Hansard April 7 2011) 
 
Later the same month, in the Budget Speech the Minister of Finance, Tom Marshall, 
outlines how the economic benefits of the offshore oil and gas industry, will be invested 
in road infrastructure including repair of damage incurred by Igor illustrating disjuncture 
between climate change causation and impacts: 
 
In many ways, including a multi-year infrastructure strategy currently valued in 
excess of $5 billion, we have reinvested those revenues in communities throughout 
Newfoundland and Labrador, laying a solid foundation for investment attraction 
and new economic growth…. In 2011-12, the Province of Newfoundland and 
Labrador will invest $216.4 million in roads and bridges for a total federal-
provincial investment this year of $251.6 million. Initiatives will include: Funding 
to repair roads damaged by Hurricane Igor, a portion of which is recoverable from 
the Federal Disaster Financial Assistance Program. (NL Hansard April 19 2011) 
 
 
Likewise Yvonne Jones, Liberal Member of Parliament, questions the lack of financial 
support for community members who lost work due to Igor, speaking to the oil economy 
but not drawing a linkage to climate change. She implies that the resilient 
Newfoundlander is being worn down by challenges such as Hurricane Igor and fisheries 
decline: 
 
These are the people who pay in their hard-earned money to the government 
every day … that you are using to drill holes in the ground for oil, that you are 
using to buy shares in oil companies, and that you are using for all of these 
things. That is their money, and today a lot of them down in the Port Union and 
Bonavista area are out of a job, have damages to their homes, and are not getting 
any help from the government [following Igor]. Mr. Speaker, you can 
understand why people would be frustrated. There is a complete dependency as 
well in that area around the fishery. (NL Hansard May 10 2011) 
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Following Igor, the fish processing plant in Port Union was closed due to structural 
damage resulting in 170 workers losing their jobs. 
The lack of discussion in Newfoundland’s House of Assembly about larger and 
fractious issues, such the integrity of road infrastructure, disaster preparedness and 
climate change implies the perception, or at least promulgation of the perception, of an 
unproblematic status quo. A focus on smaller scale questions of engineering and 
maintenance diverted attention from bigger picture issues such as safety, “over-
dependency” on mobility and climate change mitigation and adaptation (Budd et al. 2011: 
39). The focus on the purified lived experience of individuals serves to nullify, rather than 
address, frictions between the environment, mobility and society lending weight to Borins’ 
(2011) observation that official narratives tend to focus on the upbeat and heroic. 
Jennings (2011) similarly notes that neoliberal governance tactics were employed 
in response to the 2004 flooding in England, where responsibility for environmental 
impacts was diverted from government to the individual through a discourse centred on 
bottom-up adaptation measures. In the case of Newfoundland, praise is a form of 
persuasion. Such admiration is deserved and genuine. However, when there is a 
concomitant lack of discussion, whether intentionally or unintentionally, about 
macrosocial issues such as the resilience of transport or electrical systems, the result is a 
naturalization of the status quo. As used by political figures and media, the ‘resilient 
Newfoundlander’ frame illustrates the risks of resilience terminology which, just as with 
the term sustainability, can be used so broadly that it gives rise to reinterpretation and 
appropriation (see Adkin (2009) and Luke (2006) on the erosion of the concept of 
sustainability). 
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The Government’s, and equally the Opposition’s, handling of Hurricane Igor 
contributes to non-problematicity. Compared to the blaming tactics identified by 
Freudenburg and Alario (2007), high-level figures use praise as a diversionary tactic. 
Such flattery diverts attention away from macrosocial questions about the resilience of 
infrastructure (including tourism and oil infrastructure), disaster preparedness or climate 
change mitigation, to a microsocial focus on the role of individuals, possibly pre-empting 
more critical assessments of infrastructure design and maintenance, as well as disaster 
response. Blaming shifts questions about legitimacy and competency from one social 
actor or organization to others. Rather than responding to questions about an 
organization’s own practices, representatives divert attention to a real or constructed 
opponent. Two related tools used in blaming are asking questions and raising doubts. 
However, the case of Newfoundland illustrates how praising and an absence of critical 
questions likewise serve to legitimize a problematic status quo. 
Gramling and Freudenburg (2012) elaborate on the role of distraction with the 
concept of double diversion, where the first diversion is that of public access to resources 
and related revenues and the second diversion is that of attention, by framing such a 
transfer as a means to foster domestic energy production and energy independence. In the 
case of Newfoundland, a double diversion occurs in the form of a disjuncture or friction 
between the development of oil and tourism sectors on one hand and the experience of 
extreme weather events of the type expected under a changing climate on the other hand. 
Following Norgaard’s tools of innocence, the story of Newfoundland enjoying an 
economic traction after decades of hardship facilitates this disconnection. 
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Social-ecological mobility webs 
Efforts are being made in Newfoundland to mitigate and adapt to climate change 
including, central to this discussion, the development of two voluntary workbooks 
designed to assist communities with adapting to climate change: 7 Steps to Assess 
Climate Vulnerability in Your Community and Managing Municipal Infrastructure in a 
Changing Climate. As politician Chris states: “[Igor] really fed into our Climate Change 
Office because it was only, I think, about less than a year ago [two years after Igor] that 
we released a document with regard to infrastructure and predicting storms and what’s 
going to happen” (NL Government 107). Other measures include producing climate 
change impact projections to give decision-makers a sense of local impacts (e.g. change 
in local annual precipitation) (see Finnis 2013), raising public awareness via the public 
education campaign called Turn Back the Tide, and encouraging a green economy via 
measures such as renewable energy and energy efficiency.  
Under the federal-provincial Atlantic Climate Adaptation Solutions project, a 
federal-provincial initiative, several Newfoundland municipalities undertook climate 
change vulnerability assessments (Atlantic Climate Adaptation Solutions 2013). 
Communities can voluntarily complete a 400-page workbook (7 Steps to Assess Climate 
Vulnerability in Your Community) that assesses seven issues related to climate change 
adaptation: flooding, slope movement, coastal vulnerability, drinking water, winter issues 
and wildfire, based on the criteria of location, infrastructure, society, economy, 
environment and options. The findings are intended to inform the development of a range 
of municipal plans (i.e. emergency, land use, transport, etc.) and are to be updated 
regularly to reflect changing conditions (Atlantic Climate Adaptation Solutions 2013). 
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Though not formally a social-ecological systems initiative, this project echoes a social-
ecological systems approach as it centres on adaptation and resilience in local contexts 
and has the potential to contribute to transformations at the regional scale.  
The Managing Municipal Infrastructure in a Changing Climate is a 40-page 
workbook designed to be completed in three hours. It includes a primer on climate change, 
severe weather and infrastructure and provides instructions for three breakout sessions 
related to identifying municipal infrastructure assets, identifying local climate change 
impacts and identifying measures to protect municipal infrastructure. Further, it provides 
infrastructure-costing charts (e.g. cost per metre of culvert) to assist in concrete 
calculating and planning. Transportation is addressed in both workbooks though both 
assessing past and potential impacts on transport infrastructure. While valuable tools, the 
voluntary approach raises questions about creating and supporting adequate momentum in 
the face of low financial and human resource capacity and the likelihood and timeliness 
of larger adaptive and transformational resilience. In addition, these activities (i.e. 
voluntary workbooks) and actions (i.e. greening of government vehicle fleets) are 
happening in the shadow of an oil industry that accounts for approximately one-third of 
provincial revenue. 
Discussing the status of emergency measures in Newfoundland and Labrador, 
Catto and Tomblin identify barriers to reform that are transferable to, though not wholly 
explanatory of, barriers to climate action: 
 
Renewing governance and transformation are influenced by the levels of 
perceived crisis but also by the power of inherited processes and mechanisms 
when compared with new paradigms or visions. In small NL communities, 
without the expertise, personnel, financial resources, and institutional support 
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required to effect major reforms, promote integration, construct a viable 
alternative, or even to cope with events as they unfold, any reform will be slower 
than in places where the prospects for change are better. (2013: 93) 
 
 
Igor, while a major event, appeared insufficient to contribute significantly to an 
emancipatory catastrophism. In lieu of substantive policy action, incremental change is 
being fostered through community engagement such as the community workbooks (Catto 
and Tomblin 2013).  
The Climate Change Action Plan (CCAP), references the impact of severe storm 
events such as Igor, particularly on infrastructure: 
 
Climate change is an important issue for Newfoundland and Labrador. As a large 
coastal province with over 90 per cent of the population living near the sea, 
Newfoundland and Labrador is exposed to many long-term impacts of climate 
change including sea-level rise, more storm surges, greater coastal erosion and 
volatile changes in seasonal weather patterns. These have important social and 
economic implications:  
• Storm surges and flooding can affect infrastructure, services, and business activity, 
as seen with Hurricane Igor.  
• Coastal erosion and sea-level rise can impact community development and place 
homes, businesses and coastal infrastructure at risk, such as wharves and 
causeways.… (2011: 7) 
 
The CCAP addresses the transport sector, which it identifies as a limited source of 
greenhouse gas emission reductions: 
 
These are unique challenges in Newfoundland and Labrador with respect to the 
transportation sector. Newfoundland and Labrador is the most rural province in 
Canada, with 50 per cent of the population living in rural locations. Its largest 
centres do not have sufficient population to support mass transit options such as 
rail and the provincial population is too small to support unique vehicle efficiency 
standards. In addition, biofuels are not readily available in sufficiently large 
quantities to power the province’s vehicles. As a result, GHG savings in the 
transportation sector will largely depend on individual decisions concerning 
means of transportation, vehicle purchases, driving habits and distance traveled, 
for the foreseeable future. (2009a: 51) 
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The fact that the Government of Newfoundland and Labrador does not have a sustainable 
transport strategy is likely due to the cultural-techno lock-in of automobility.84 This 
reflects a powerful path dependency considering that road transport is relatively new to 
Newfoundland and Labrador, a region where travel by boat was until recent decades 
commonplace.  
As with Hurricane Juan, the static infrastructure of roads in Newfoundland is 
particularly vulnerable to wind and storm surge. A sense of new and disconcerting normal 
materializes, both in terms of climate and of expectations of mobility disruption. However, 
perhaps due to the more rural composition of the province, combined with the relatively 
new but pervasive automobility, minimal consideration is given to emissions mitigation in 
a growing transport sector. According to Catto and Tomblin “effecting change requires a 
sense of problem (or crisis), a new vision that reflects core values and objectives, a 
coalition in support of new reforms, and institutions capable of getting the problem onto 
the radar screen and implemented” (2013: 94). The impacts of Igor were insufficient to 
spark a sense of transformative crisis. This may, in part, be due to the combination of the 
praising discourse employed by officials, as well as the genuine sense of pride and feeling 
of accomplishment in effectively managing the crisis and restoring the road network 
within ten days. 
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 The Government of Newfoundland and Labrador (2006) developed a sustainable transportation 
discussion paper pertaining to Labrador, however it focuses solely on transportation infrastructure 
investment and economic development. The document does not reference climate change, notable given the 
impact of extreme weather and melting permafrost in northern regions (see Andrey, Kertland and Warren 
2014). 
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Disciplining emissions in the transport sector is viewed as almost futile at the 
provincial scale, however the disciplining of water though flood management practices is 
an active area of focus. The circulation of water (i.e. dihydrogen monoxide) rather than 
emissions (i.e. carbon dioxide) is leveraged as a means to secure the circulation of people, 
goods and services. Through mapping of flood prone areas, as well as modelling and 
forecasting of potential flood events, the movement of water is the focus of government 
surveillance, echoing Usher’s (2014) analysis of the management of circulations of water 
in Singapore. Notably, homes in Stephenville were permanently relocated after the 2005 
floods, though such relocations are limited compared to the more comprehensive and 
transformative approach taken in the Netherlands’ Room for the River (2015) project. 
While discipline is characterized by efforts to “concentrate, contain and control” nature, 
and security “adapts to the reality of natural processes, respects their autonomy and seeks 
to identify, optimise and work through nature’s discernable laws rather than stifle them,” 
Newfoundland and Labrador is engaged more at the level of surveillance, monitoring and 
forecasting flood events, with forays into the disciplining of water (Government of 
Newfoundland and Labrador 2014; Usher 2014: 558).  
While flood management is moving in a promising direction, it is important to 
note that significant attention is simultaneously paid to circulations of oil. For example, 
the Premier of Newfoundland Labrador, Paul Davis, recently stated:85 
 
Based on the work that has been done and what we know about potential oil 
reserves off our shores, we know that there is a long-term future for oil and gas 	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 Dwight Ball replaced Paul Davis as premier in December 2015. With three premiers in  two years, there 
is also fluidity of political leadership. 
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business in Newfoundland and Labrador. … Of course it would depend on 
markets, and I don’t think the oil and gas markets are going to end in the next 
decade or two. …We’ll have markets for many years to come; the reserves are 
significant. (Brake 2015) 
 
Efforts to facilitate circulations of oil to markets (but not to intervene beyond) and to 
manage circulations of water, particularly storm and flood waters, illustrates a disjuncture 
between the production of greenhouse gas emissions and adaptation to the impacts of 
climate change. 
 
Towards an ecopolitics of mobility 
 
Courtesy of Hurricane Igor, Newfoundland experienced two types of resilience, 
community and engineering, both of which have merits and both of which are necessary. 
The community spirit and resourcefulness embodied by the ‘resilient Newfoundlander’ 
are critical, but need to be paired with larger policy conversations in the House of 
Assembly. Likewise, Newfoundland demonstrated capability in terms of engineering 
resilience, but the absence of discussion regarding more transformative forms of 
resilience is a notable source of vulnerability.  
By applying Cresswell’s six elements of mobility – motive force, velocity, rhythm, 
route, experience and friction – I elaborate an ecopolitics of mobility, detailing the 
interface and power dynamics inherent between the environment and contemporary 
social-technical mobility assemblages. The route of Hurricane Igor was erratic, changing 
course as it approached Newfoundland and making an unanticipated turn landward. Upon 
continuing in its path, the track of the storm traced critical road infrastructure for an 
unfortunate alignment of natural and human mobility. Further, the combination of one 
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fuel and one main road is at the crux of Newfoundland’s mobility vulnerability. The lack 
of redundant routes renders Newfoundland’s mobility web brittle.  
In terms of motive force, the utter reliance on fossil fuels for both the dominant 
and shadow mobility webs, is simultaneously startling and taken for granted. The 
experience of fuel scarcity, due to the failure of electricity, the lack of generators and 
depleted fuel reserves, left an impression on residents shaping their preparation in 
subsequent events. In the marine sector, the keen sensitivity to weather routing, that is, 
the practice of optimizing the interface of routing and fossil fuel use to maximize profit, 
offers lessons that if transferred to a consciousness of emissions could transform the field 
of transport resilience as currently understood and practiced (see Chapter 7: Navigating 
Transition).   
The shadow mobility webs – demonstrating a depth of both community and 
engineering resilience – are characterized by differing speeds and distinctive rhythms that 
contrast starkly with the dominant inclination for speed and connectivity. Rhythm was 
expressed in the urgent, flat-out pace of the ten-day recovery effort. The speed of workers 
and coordination of organizations contrasts with the slower pace and idiosyncratic rhythm 
of the shadow mobility web, a temporary reversion to an older style and experience of 
mobility that was simultaneously a source of interpersonal community-building and 
frustration. The pressure for speed channelled into efforts to restore the pre-storm 
mobility web defined a ‘ten-day recovery’ frame.  
The frame ‘getting things back to normal as quickly as possible’ was in tension 
with another dominant frame that emerged in the dataset of having ‘never seen anything 
like it before.’ The scale of Hurricane Igor took all by surprise, giving a taste of a new and 
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disconcerting normal. Uncertainty regarding return periods of severe weather events and 
the sense that measures such as 1-in-100 year events have entered the realm of fiction, 
render infrastructure investment, planning and management more precarious. While there 
is agreement on the fact that the climate is changing, the reasons behind the change are a 
source of friction. The disconnection between anthropogenic climate change and the 
experience of severe weather at the individual level mirror a larger disconnection between 
the contributions of Newfoundland to climate change. For example, fossil-fuelled 
transport generally, the costs and losses associated with Hurricane Igor specifically, and 
the experience of increasingly severe and frequent weather by transport operators 
generally are largely disconnected from climate change. There is friction between efforts 
to develop the carbon-intensive oil and tourism industries and intentions to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions. Similarly, there is friction in terms of intermodal connectivity 
as disruptions to one transport mode (i.e. roads) hinder seamless exchanges with other 
modes (i.e. marine, air).  
The community and engineering resilience demonstrated in the aftermath of Igor, 
beg the question: What if the energy, finances and cooperation channelled into 
reconnecting the road network as quickly as possible was redirected to climate change 
mitigation and adaptation and/or to reimagining mobility webs that reduce social-
ecological contention, increase resilience and question the role of mobility? Ironically, the 
conditions permitted in times of crisis – intense focus on one common goal, 
interdepartmental cooperation, regulatory support and liberal financial resources – would 
benefit climate change mitigation and adaptation, as well as transport resilience, 
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overcoming long time lines, voluntary measures, interdepartmental cross-purposes and 
limited time and resource allocation. 
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6  ZONE OF IMPERFECT VISIBILTY: ANALYSIS 
 
We unearthed fear that day, our first act of real  
archaeology. Understand, at that point, maps charted roads 
 
and the humble footpaths between rumours crooked 
with love. The ocean took up the most room 
 
with its tidal pull and tentacled beasts inventing  
their own recipes. Some days we knew we were nothing 
 
but ingredients, other days we felt like honoured guests. 
But the day we brushed the dirt from fear’s forehead 
 
and got a look at its hands, well, our maps changed 
and the ocean got bigger, our nights, a great deal beastier. 
 
Sue Goyette 
Four 
2013 
 
Alex Colville 
To Prince Edward Island 
1965  
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The woman looks into the distance, but at the same time the binoculars obscure her eyes, 
reflecting the imperfect visibility of the Anthropocene. The position of humans relative to 
the environment is shifting: “Some days we knew we were nothing but ingredients, other 
days we felt like honoured guests.” 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Having journeyed to two ports of call – Hurricane Juan in Nova Scotia and Hurricane 
Igor in Newfoundland – I first compare the impacts of these severe weather events on 
mobility webs. I detail the responses and frames employed by transport operators, 
emergency managers and other key informants as they align with the four stages of 
disaster response cycle (i.e. prevention, preparation, response and mitigation). From this 
largely pragmatic description, I shift to a theoretical discussion of the ecopolitics of 
mobility, elaborating upon Cresswell’s work and incorporating a Foucauldian analysis of 
governmentality (including governmobility) and the circulation of societies and ecologies. 
I integrate theorizations from various approaches to resilience (e.g. transport, 
infrastructure social-ecological), disaster sociology and reflexive modernization, moving 
towards a more sophisticated conception of navigating disruption in mobility webs caused 
by severe weather events (Table 6.1). 
 
 
Mobility webs and hurricanes  
 
Disruptions and changes in mobility are “challenging, exciting, stressful, and sometimes 
deeply troubling” and consequently instigate a multiplicity of social responses (Harvey 
1989: 240). I use the term mobility webs – drawing on the metaphors of food and spider 
webs to reflect the environmentally-exposed, but also diverse and adaptable dimensions 
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of contemporary mobility networks – arguing for an approach that cooperates with, rather 
than dominates, the environment. This ecopolitical approach to mobility extends past and 
current approaches transport planning, namely conventional transport engineering and 
sustainable mobility (Table 6.2). 
 
Table 6.1: Analytical framework combining mobil ity and disaster l iteratures to 
create an ecopolit ical approach to mobil ity  
THEORY THEORISTS/PRACTITIONERS 
MOBILITY 
Mobilities paradigm 
   Politics of mobility 
Sheller and Urry 
   Cresswell 
 
Sustainable mobility Banister, Schwanen, Anable 
Resilience (with a mobility focus) 
   Transport 
   Infrastructure 
   Social-ecological 
 
Transport Canada;UK Department of Transport 
Brown 
Folke/Adger/Berkes/Holling 
 
Governmentality  
    Social and ecological circulations   
 
Foucault 
 
+ DISASTER 
Disaster sociology Freudenburg/Klinenberg/Murphy 
Reflexive modernization  
   Emancipatory catastrophism 
 
Beck 
= ECOPOLITICAL APPROACH TO MOBILITY   
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Table 6.2: Contrasting approaches to transport planning  
(Adapted from Banister 2008 and Marshall 2001) 
TRAFFIC 
PLANNING 
(MARSHALL 2001) 
SUSTAINABLE  
MOBILITY 
(BANISTER 2008) 
ECOPOLITICS OF 
MOBILITY  
(SODERO 2016) 
Physical dimensions Social dimensions Ecological, social and physical 
dimensions 
Mobility Accessibility Human accessibility and non-
human mobility 
Traffic/ car focus People focus, either in (or on) 
a vehicle or on foot 
People as part of larger 
ecosystem 
Large scale Local scale Interscalar 
Street as road Street as space Street as ecological corridor  
Motorized transport All transport modes in 
carbon-intensity hierarchy  
Ecological flows included 
within considerations of all 
modes of human mobility 
Forecasting traffic Visioning cities Transforming social-
ecological relationship 
Modelling  Developing scenarios and 
modelling 
Imagining futures (e.g. 
utopian, dystopian) 
Evaluating economic criteria Analyzing multiple criteria, 
including environmental and 
social  
Analyzing multiple criteria, 
including environmental (e.g. 
carbon budgeting), social, 
safety (e.g. disaster relief), 
economic (e.g. infrastructure 
maintenance)  
Travelling as derived demand Travelling as derived demand 
as well as a valued activity  
Travelling as derived demand, 
valued (in)activity and 
environmentally contingent 
Demand-based Management-based Ecologically-constrained 
Speeding up traffic Slowing down movement  Accommodating fast and slow 
social, ecological and 
technical movements  (e.g. 
tipping points, turbulence) 
Minimizing travel time Aiming for reasonable travel 
times and travel time 
reliability 
Recognizing timeless time 
including “longue durée” or 
“glacial time (Castells 2009) 
Segregating people and 
traffic 
Integrating people and traffic Incorporating ecological flows 
and turbulences with flows of 
people and traffic 
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The cases of Hurricanes Juan and Igor demonstrate the simultaneous rigidity and 
adaptability of mobility webs. Hurricanes vary, with different conditions exposing 
different resiliencies and vulnerabilities (Table 6.3). However, broadly, in the face of 
Hurricane Juan and Igor, human mobility contracts like a snail curling into its shell or a 
spider retracting its legs. The dominant transport modes, particularly static ribbons of 
infrastructure such as roads, demonstrate the social-ecological principle of highly 
optimized tolerance, whereby they are functional and flexible within a daily range of 
experience, but may falter and fail under less frequent and more extreme events.  
Just as in disturbance ecology (e.g. forest regeneration), the removal or absence of 
the dominant species (e.g. mature trees) allows other species – that is alternate transport 
modes and networks – to develop. I describe these as shadow mobility webs. In each case 
study, there is a simultaneous celebration of the capacity to innovate in the face of 
adversity and pressure to return to the status quo as quickly as possible. The former 
reflects a fledgling form of transformative resilience, whereas the later reflects passive 
resilience; the latter benefits from not only cultural familiarity, but significant social, 
political and economic path dependency (i.e. lock-in). A window of opportunity is opened 
but not passed through; the breeze felt, but then the window shut. This may be in part due 
to an uncertainty as to whether the event is a “portent of things to come or merely a 
fleeting immobility” (Birtchnell and Büscher 2011: 8).  
This both reinforces and contradicts Beck’s (2015) argument that climate change, 
though catastrophic, can have an emancipatory effect, shocking society into what 
Schwanen, Banister and Anable (2011) refer to as a durable reconfiguration. The 
experience of transformation while lauded is also uncomfortable and challenging.  
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Table 6.3: Comparison of mobil ity web resi l iencies and vulnerabil it ies in 
Hurricanes Juan and Igor 
 HURRICANE JUAN HURRICANE IGOR 
RESILIENCE   
Mobil ity web Versatility of public transit Emergence of multi-modal shadow 
mobility web 
Diversity of dominant mobility web Diversity of transport modes and 
operating skills  at individual level 
Preparation Familiarity with need to batten 
down hatches  
Familiarity with need to batten down 
hatches 
Response Cooperation between levels of 
government and other sectors 
Cooperation between levels of 
government and other sectors 
Integrated Emergency 
Management Organization, 
especially within one building 
 
Experience with a range of hazards 
and an ‘all hazards’ approach  
 
Recovery Coordination of recovery effort (~5 
days for urban transport) 
Coordination of recovery effort (e.g. 
ten road connection) 
Mitigation Recognition of the frequency and 
diversity of extreme events and the 
relationship with climate change 
Development of disaster 
management plans (local) 
Development of Climate Change 
Adaptation Plan (provincial and 
municipal) and Sustainable 
Transport Strategy 
Development of climate change 
adaptation workbooks, albeit on 
voluntary basis 
VULNERABILITY   
Mobil ity web Reliance on static road 
infrastructure (trees) 
Reliance on static road infrastructure 
(water) 
Reliance on fossil fuels  Reliance on fossil fuels 
 Lack of redundancy in terms of 
dominant mobility web (i.e. cars, 
trucks) 
Preparation Reliance on forecasting (i.e. 
underestimation of storm force) 
Reliance on forecasting (i.e. 
inaccuracy of storm track) 
Response Reliance on electricity to access gas Reliance on electricity to access gas 
Recovery Discrepancy between 
recommended mobility and actual 
mobility on part of residents 
Emphasis on re-establishing mobility 
web as it was prior to storm event 
Mitigation Reliance on fossil fuels Reliance on fossil fuels 
Focus on vehicle efficiency 
(personal and freight) rather than 
shifting modal split or reducing 
demand 
Lack of recognition of connection 
between greenhouse gas emissions 
and climate change 
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A reactive almost panicked reflex of returning to normal appears to supplant considered 
reflection of longer-term innovations and reimagined futures. This is understandable 
given the need to restore services. However, given the prospect of future such events, pre-
planning activities could leverage the emancipatory potential created by extreme events to 
facilitate a mobility metamorphosis (Beck 2015). Such an approach echoes social-
ecological systems theory, which advocates selective experimentation and intervention at 
smaller scales to precipitate transformational change at larger scales (Folke et al. 2010). 
 In the case of Nova Scotia, winds brought down trees and power poles blocking 
roads in a fibrous and electrical entanglement. The experience of Halifax was defined by 
the persistence of mobility even in the face of disrupted mobility webs, as illustrated by 
residents drawn to the coast to experience the oncoming storm, ‘charismatic mobility,’ 
and examples of disaster sightseeing in the aftermath of the storm, ‘charismatic 
immobility.’ With the blockage of streets, many forms of mobility – bus and ferry, car and 
ambulance, walking and cycling – proved challenging, if not impossible. Despite requests 
from emergency services to stay clear of the roads to prevent injury and allow clean-up 
crews to carry out their work, what occurred was a persistent, albeit perhaps more 
localized mobility. Mobility also took on poignancy as community members reflected on 
the changed urban treescape.  
Public transit in particular had a central functional and symbolic role, morphing 
from transport mode to shelter to recovery mobilization and back to public transport 
mode. However, the reliance on public transit directly on fuel and indirectly on electricity 
to pump fuel embeds vulnerability within this modal resilience. In the case of Nova 
Scotia a key source of vulnerability in the context of Hurricane Juan was the ‘big mess’ of 
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trees and power lines, leading to attention to and investment in the urban forest canopy as 
a resilience measure. More prominently, the experience of successive intentional, 
technical and ecological adversities fostered a culture of all-hazards disaster readiness. 
Key sources of resilience include the cultural instinct to ‘batten down the hatches,’ the 
adaptable role of transit, the coordination of emergency services, as well as the 
recognition of the frequency and diversity of extreme events. Further, residents appeared 
to successfully, if somewhat precariously, govern their own mobility (i.e. governmobility). 
In the aftermath, the experience of Hurricane Juan shaped both thinking on climate 
change and emergency preparedness. 
In Newfoundland, water, more so than trees, defined the experience of Hurricane 
Igor. Vast volumes of water overwhelmed the absorptive capacity of the landscape and 
rendered asphalt roads and bridges mobile, calving the road network like a disintegrating 
iceberg. Unlike the varied transport modes and road networks of urban Halifax, the 
washout of limited roads combined with limited modes (e.g. car, truck) and limited fuel 
sources and stores rendering Newfoundland communities even more vulnerable to 
disruption. In many cases, the dominant network allowed for only one route to access a 
community. However, the literal absence of the dominant network permitted a shadow 
network made up of quads and helicopters, boats and ferries to develop.  
Just as Lin (2013) analyzes the improvised aeromobilities that occurred in the 
aftermath of an ash cloud event, improvised mobilities emerged in the aftermath of Igor. 
All levels of government, as well as the private sector and private citizens activated the 
shadow mobility web. Pride was taken in quickly adapting to ensure basic needs were met. 
A key source of resilience was coordination and cooperation among different levels of 
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government, the private sector and communities. Further, Newfoundland demonstrated 
high capacity for passive resilience restoring the road network to a basic form of 
functionality within ten days. Indeed, in terms of frames, restoration of the status quo and 
reliance on the resilience of Newfoundlanders characterized media accounts immediately 
following the storm. In weeks following, a ‘ten-day recovery’ frame developed and was a 
source of pride for politicians and managers. However, the ‘ten-day recovery’ frame also 
had the effect of curbing more critical, longer-term assessments related to climate change 
mitigation and adaptation.  
To a greater extent than in Nova Scotia, the experience of Igor was conducive to 
passive/adaptive resilience rather than transformation. A key concern was the economic 
cost of rebuilding roads and contention over what standard to build roads in light of 
restricted budgets and uncertainty regarding the return period of future severe weather 
events. While Igor informed discussions on climate change, most notably through the 
creation of voluntary community workbooks and the development of downscaled climate 
models, communication on climate change overall has less prominence in the social and 
political realms than in Nova Scotia, relying more on peripheral voluntary measures than 
a changing culture spurred by regulatory measures and/or more proactive government 
approaches. Further, while Newfoundland has experienced numerous flooding events 
since 2000, only in policy documents and certain interviews were these events framed as 
part of a larger vulnerability to climate change. Particularly in the media archive, Igor was 
positioned as an isolated event with minimal acknowledgement of the possibility of future 
such events. The greatest area of certainty with regard to climate change in 
Newfoundland is the steadfast commitment to developing oil and gas resources and to 
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expanding the tourism industry, both of which are greenhouse gas intensive activities that 
contribute to long-term climatic precariousness. This is echoed in Nova Scotia where 
there is also a focus on expanding export and tourism markets. The degree to which 
“business models in manufacturing and leisure/tourism based on current global 
production chains and aviation networks [will] remain feasible,” is far from the purview 
of consideration (Schwanen, Banister and Anable 2011: 1004).  
Hurricanes Juan and Igor were different in key respects: Juan was defined by an 
urban epicenter subjected to high winds, while Igor was defined by extensive flooding of 
more rural areas. However, despite these differences important parallels occur suggesting 
a commonality of social response to the type of events expected under a changing climate. 
In both Nova Scotia and Newfoundland the impacts of the hurricanes were perceived as 
devastating, with analogies of war (e.g. bombs, battles, arsenal) used to describe the 
effects. In both cases it was felt that the storms tracked over key infrastructure: the 
backbone of the electrical transmission system in Nova Scotia and the road network in 
Newfoundland. The overlap was so uncanny that it was almost perceived to be intentional, 
effectively illustrating the inseparability of technological and ecological systems.  
Static ribbons of road, as well as electrical infrastructure, were particularly 
susceptible to storm impacts. By contrast, mobile infrastructure, such as cars, ferries and 
airplanes were often successfully sheltered, diverted or repositioned to avoid impact. 
However, while such modes were flexible their fuel sources were not. The mobility of 
fuel, whether from supplier to market or from holding tanks to gas tanks, was a theme in 
both case studies. Particularly for cars, buses and emergency vehicles, concerns about 
accessing fossil fuel were top of mind. Regardless of the diversity of modes, the majority 
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of transport energy is derived from fossil fuels. At an extreme, even pedestrians and 
cyclists often rely on food derived from fossil fuel intensive agriculture methods and 
markets. Further, the reliance on electricity, which in both provinces is derived in large 
part from fossil fuels, to pump liquid fuel highlights the tight coupling of fossil fuel and 
electricity whereby the provision of one relies on the other and, by extension, the absence 
of one prevents the provision of the other (Brown 2014). What comes to light is an 
energetic monoculture subject to cascading collapses. With the failure of electricity after 
each storm even available fuel stores became stranded assets.  
While vulnerabilities were identified, there are limited efforts to address issues 
such as the distribution and pumping of gas, nonetheless societal reliance on one fuel. A 
regional fuel provider concedes: “I think if there was another Igor (by a different name of 
course) maybe we’d have the same thing happen again and we’d just have to suffer 
through it like we did last time. Hopefully, the road holds up this time” (NL Transport 
123). This is a precarious system on which to base the majority of societal movement, 
particularly in the context of observations in both regions about the frequency of recent 
extreme weather events, the general sense that traditional measure of return period (e.g. 1-
in-100 year events) are now the stuff of lore (i.e. references to a disaster return periods 
being on the scale of months, not years), and the ominous sense that with just slight 
alterations in storm tracks and intensity Atlantic Canada could be exposed to events with 
the force of Hurricane Sandy. 
And yet both regions worked laudably and efficiently, coordinating multiple 
levels of government, the Canadian Forces, non-profit organizations and communities, to 
restore the system as quickly as possible, illustrating a robust passive resilience and mild 
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adaptive resilience that foregoes transformative resilience, which may in fact foster 
longer-term vulnerability. The emancipatory potential of catastrophes appears, at best, to 
be gradual. It is in the months and years after the event that it is processed and 
incorporated into incremental processes of policy renewal.  
 
 
Navigating disruption   
 
A myriad of strategies used by transport managers and other officials to navigate weather-
related mobility disruptions appeared in the dataset. These can be broadly categorized as 
managing mobility before the disaster (e.g. battening down the hatches, fuelling 
generators), adjusting mobility during and after the storm (e.g. rescheduling flights, 
rerouting cars, rebuilding roads) and building resilience of mobility webs for potential 
future disasters (e.g. building in redundancies, implementing operating standards). These 
loosely align with the disaster response cycle which includes preparation prior to the 
impact of the storm, emergency response during and immediately following the event, 
recovery in the form of restoration and reconstruction, and in the longer term building 
mitigation capacity (Figure 6.1). There is an iterative relationship between the phases, 
characterized by ongoing learning, with past experiences shaping preparation and 
response measures in later events.  
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Figure 6.1: Disaster response cycle (Osmania University 2013) 
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Thorough but not exhaustive, the following table provides a sense of the diversity 
and multitude of strategies employed in Nova Scotia and Newfoundland that relate 
directly and indirectly to mobility webs (Table 6.4). Both regions implemented these 
measures to varying degrees, in varying combinations and/or based on the experience of 
the storm, revised practices for future events. The similarity of approaches is notable 
given the geographic and modal diversity of the case regions, as well as the differing 
composition of the storms indicating a high level of transferability. While my research 
focuses on hurricanes, the lessons learned and analytical framework (e.g. ecopolitics of 
mobility) are transferable to diverse fast onset weather events in diverse regions (e.g. 
2016 Fort MacMurray wildfires), as well as to slow onset crises (e.g. the role drought 
played in contributing to the Syrian refugee crisis) and more infrastructural events (e.g. 
the 2015 Nova Scotia fuel shortage; 2016 Ottawa sink hole). My research is of value to 
transport practitioners, climate change managers, emergency managers, humanitarian 
organizations and politicians. Further, through my elaboration of an ecopolitics of 
mobility, inspired by Cresswell’s politics of mobility, I forward an approach that 
considers both social and ecological flows of value to mobilities scholars and disaster 
sociologists. 
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Table 6.4: Examples of measures for managing mobil ity before, during and after 
hurricanes (alphabetical)   
BEFORE THE STORM: 
PREVENTING 
UNDESIRABLE MOBILITY   
AFTER THE STORM: 
RESTORING MOBILITY 
FUTURE STORMS: 
BUILDING MOBILITY WEB 
RESILIENCE  
PREPARATION RESTORATION86 MITIGATION 
Activating emergency plans Assessing situation 
(i.e. situational awareness) 
Analyzing risk 
Advocating caution 
(e.g. stay indoors, stay off roads) 
Containing/allowing flooding 
 
Building in redundancies  
(e.g. back up equipment, 
alternate routes) 
Battening down hatches  
(i.e. tying down loose objects, 
tying up boats) 
Coordinating with other 
organizations 
Conducting research  
(e.g. generating data and 
statistics) 
Barricading roads 
 
Dealing with political tensions 
(e.g. urban/rural, 
federal/provincial) 
Coordinating with other 
organizations 
Charging cell phones 
 
Distributing relief  
(i.e. food, water) 
Creating new 
departments/expanding existing 
departments87 
Cleaning out catch basins 
 
Using temporary structures  
(i.e. Bailey bridges) 
Developing Early Warning 
Systems 
Coordinating with other 
organizations 
Prioritizing responses  
(i.e. triaging restoration of 
mobility infrastructure) 
Evaluating responses 
 
Creating berms 
 
Providing shelter 
 
Implementing operating 
standards  
(e.g. wind threshold policy) 
Declaring state of emergency Reconnecting roads and transit Investing in equipment and 
technology (e.g. radios) 
Evacuating residents 
 
Repurposing transport  
(i.e. buses as shelters) 
Maintaining infrastructure and 
equipment 
Fuelling generators 
 
Rerouting, guiding, detouring  
(i.e. physical adaptation) 
Managing retreat of development 
from zones prone to flooding 
Monitoring weather 
 
Resuming, continuing, carrying on Managing stormwater  
(e.g. Urban Forestry Strategy) 
Prepositioning personnel and 
goods (i.e. cots) 
Searching and rescuing Promoting living shorelines 
Putting up signage Waiving normal approval 
processes (e.g. tendering, 
environmental assessments) 
Regulating fuel and mobility 
Rescheduling, postponing, 
closing, cancelling 
 Updating construction standards 
(e.g. culvert diameter) 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
86
 The restoration category includes the response and recovery phases of the disaster cycle given the 
similarities of the measures. 
87
 For example, Newfoundland and Labrador Fire and Emergency Services grew from five to 27 positions 
between 2008 and 2012 (Catto and Tomblin 2013). 
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However, each measure needs to be tailored to local context (e.g. climate change 
projections, culture). Though beyond the scope of this research, there is potential to 
develop a resilience toolkit, including case study examples, photos, budget estimates, for 
Canadian transport, land use and emergency management practitioners. This toolkit could 
complement existing workbooks, for example, 7 Steps to Assess Climate Vulnerability in 
Your Community and 12 Steps to Developing an Effective Emergency Management Plan 
(Government of Newfoundland and Labrador no date b, c), while highlighting how to 
meet longer-term community needs in the face of a compromised dominant mobility web. 
The toolkit would extend existing tools by introducing more systemic rethinking of our 
societal reliance on fossil-fuelled mobility (e.g. beyond infrastructure fixes) and beyond 
short-term disaster response. Such a toolkit could be informed by stakeholder 
consultations (e.g. creative and interactive workshops with visioning components) 
focusing particularly on the potential to spur adaptability and transformability, not just 
passive, resilience.	   Community Resilience Techniques: A Compilation of Approaches 
Used to Increase Resilience, a toolkit developed by the State of New York (2013) in the 
aftermath of Hurricane Sandy provides a practitioner-friendly template. 
 
Ecopolitics of mobility 
Based on the empirical cases of Hurricanes Juan and Igor, I develop an ecopolitics of 
mobility attuned to the interface of the social, ecological and technical. I adopt 
Cresswell’s six elements of the politics of mobility – motive force, velocity, rhythm, route, 
experience and friction. The result is fresh theoretical insights into mobility in the context 
of a changing climate. I reframe mobility as ecologically-situated, both in terms of the 
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impact of the transport sector on the environment and in terms of the impact of the 
environment on the transport sector. Mobility – socially, ecologically and technically – is 
a source of achievement and risk. For Cresswell, all mobility is political in that it is 
“implicated in the production of power and relations of domination” (Cresswell 2010: 20). 
This ecopolitical approach builds upon conventional transport planning and sustainable 
mobility (Banister 2008).  
 Motive force is compelled internally, such as physically through fossil fuels or 
behaviourally through practices of charismatic mobility, and externally, such as through 
pressures for economic expansion or the desire to see storm damage. In the context of my 
research, the prominence of fossil fuels as the means of movement is striking not only for 
the climatic implications of a greenhouse intensive fuel source, but due to the lack of 
redundancy in mobility webs both normally and during disaster. The fact that generators 
and chainsaws, key tools of disaster response and recovery, are fossil- fuelled illustrates 
the precariousness of such tight coupling (Brown 2014). Motive force arises as a key 
problem within the field of transport resilience. A reflexive risk analysis illustrates how 
mobility webs contribute to climate change and, in turn, are impacted by climate change. 
This raises questions regarding not only how to mitigate the reciprocal impacts, but also 
how mobility webs can play an active role in societal adaptation to climate change. At 
this point, the reciprocal impacts are largely unacknowledged with governments aiming to 
expand mobility webs and simultaneously decrease emissions.  
Velocity is characterized by extremes. At one end of the spectrum, the vast 
majority of the affected population is immobilized, at least in the immediate term, 
encouraged – but not necessarily persuaded – via safety bulletins and more coercively by 
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mandatory evacuations permitted under a state of emergency, to stay at home and off the 
roads. At the other end of the spectrum, essential workers such as emergency 
management officials and work crews (e.g. power, road) are thrown into a state of 
intensive mobility, travelling to and/or between impacted sites and working long hours 
under strenuous conditions. Extreme weather contributes extremes in the velocity of 
mobility. Further, pressure to keep the market economy moving is a central consideration. 
In both cases, there is a push to keep things moving and growing, and to recover from 
disruption as quickly as possible. The economy is afforded consideration, both in the 
immediate aftermath of the event and on an ongoing basis; consideration which the 
climate is only beginning to be afforded in practice. This prompts consideration of what a 
more climate-centric mobility web might look like (see Chapter 7: Navigating Transition). 
Under a changing climate, hurricanes may be more severe, potentially intensifying 
impacts generally and on mobility webs specifically (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change 2012a, 2012b). Movement may become more fractured as more complex 
mobility webs operating at greater speeds and shorter timelines are subject to more 
frequent weather-related disruptions.  
 Similar to velocity, the concept of rhythm can be applied to the functioning of 
mobility webs. In the face of severe weather events, mobility webs morph, perhaps 
expanding briefly as residents make preparations, travel home in response to work and 
school closures or even are drawn to coastal regions to experience the force of the 
oncoming storm. Mobility webs contract for the duration of the storm, with the exception 
of a small essential workforce, and then gradually as recovery occurs, expand with a 
return to the normal rhythm celebrated. Hurricanes illustrate their power by wreaking 
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havoc on the multitude of rhythms that constitute daily social functioning, from journeys 
to school to global supply chains, from surgical schedules to food deliveries. Further, 
hurricanes as a meteorological phenomenon have a rhythm that begins with their 
formation off the Cape Verde coast and their dissipation in the North Atlantic. However, 
a given hurricane may be arrhythmic or sporadic, erratically gaining and losing strength 
as it progresses northward and possibly changing course. This was the case in 
Newfoundland where 24 hours prior to making landfall Hurricane Igor turned landwards; 
forecasters and emergency officials struggled to adapt human rhythms to the arrhythmia 
of the hurricane. Overall, there is a sense among research participants that traditional 
measures of storm return periods (i.e. 1-in-100 years), that is temporal rhythms, are 
changing.   
The track or route of the storm is a matter of concern, with forecasters and 
residents alike closely monitoring whether the storm will turn landward. In the case of 
both Hurricanes Juan and Igor, the storms made landfall with the storm tracking over key 
infrastructure. In Halifax, residents learned to navigate urban streets blocked by fallen 
trees and power lines, for example, by climbing over or around trees, or opting to use 
alternate streets. In Newfoundland, new routes across water and air were forged to replace 
the routes of asphalt highways washed out by rivers carving new routes. Experienced 
mariners practice weather routing, using tidal, current and wind conditions to reduce the 
physical resistance of vessels moving through water. The practice of selecting and 
undertaking (or not) a route, particularly during and following stormy conditions, is a 
skill.  
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Routing is closely related to friction, in that most routing, whether human or non-
human is focused on minimizing friction. Like the Canadian fishing and racing schooners 
that characterized marine activity in the 1930s, ships carve a course to maximize the 
efficiency of their route. Hurricanes are disruptive precisely because they add multiple 
layers of friction: environmentally in the form of water and wind; infrastructurally in the 
form of fallen power lines and washed out roads; and legally in the form of states of 
emergency. Emotional friction is also experienced during and following a storm, ranging 
from the frustration of cancelled travel plans to financial concerns over missed work, 
from the grief of an altered landscape to the strain of rescheduling a long-awaited medical 
procedure. These frictions are complemented by a range of emotions related to 
Hurricanes Juan and Igor, including disbelief at the scale of impact, pride in the recovery 
effort, anxiety about how to proceed with infrastructure projects given uncertain return 
periods and certain costs, and a desire to return to normal as soon as possible.  
Friction also emerges in the bigger picture, with a range of uncertainties from the 
course and intensity of current and future storms, sea level rise projections, decisions on 
whether and how best to rebuild infrastructure in the face of such events and the 
uncertainties associated with future events, as well as for some, uncertainty about 
anthropogenic contributions to climate change. Friction arises between recognition by 
some  of the need for transformation  and resistance to significant change. There is larger 
financial friction as the costs of cumulative events are incurred. Severe weather events, of 
the type expected more under a changing climate, could be perceived as a form of carbon 
taxation, where the externalized costs associated with a fossil fuel-reliant mobility web 
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are incurred eventually.88 Critically, switching from mobility from the status quo into an 
alternate state (e.g. adaptive or transformative) is frictious. 
The overall pictures that materializes, based on the six elements of an ecopolitics 
of mobility, is a fossil-fuelled mobility web that is geared towards speed and volume and 
connectivity between modes that, like a finely-tuned race car, is vulnerable when exposed 
to less than optimal conditions. Mobility is perceived as desirable, with disruptions 
viewed as an inconvenience to be overcome as quickly as possible. While innovations and 
teamwork are lauded in the process of returning to normal, the overall short-term 
tendency is towards a passive engineering resilience.  
 
Circulation, surveillance, discipline and security 
I complement an ecopolitics of mobility with a Foucauldian analysis of circulation of 
societies and ecologies, exploring related issues of discipline and security. Foucault 
argues that power is “never localised here or there, never in anybody’s hands,” rather it 
circulates in networks (1980: 98). Castells (2009) describes contemporary society as a 
network society, characterized by the logic of self-organization and transience. Similarly, 
Latour employs the concept of actor networks, whereby society is continuously made and 
remade through interactions of human and non-humans actants. While there are dominant 
players in such webs, the power is not held in isolation nor permanently. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
88
 Hurricane Juan incurred an approximate per capita cost of  $107 ($100 million divided by the 2003 
provincial population of 936,000) and Hurricane Igor an approximate per capita cost of $192 to $383 
($100-200 million divided by the 2010 provincial population of 522,000). 
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Ecological circulation 
A circulatory approach is useful in analyzing the intersecting mobilities of societies and 
ecologies. In addition to capturing the movement intrinsic to both spheres, they also 
highlight resiliencies and vulnerabilities that characterize these flows. The flows of 
molecules of oil, carbon dioxide and water provide a lens with which to track these 
movements. The earth is continually changing: fossil fuel formation occurs in the order of 
millennia, hurricanes seasonally and weather hourly. Sedimentary substances formed 
through bio-chemical processes of compressed ancient wetlands are the source of fossil 
fuels that now power the vast majority of transport energy. Glacial retreat carved our 
current landscape and annually icebergs break off the Greenland ice sheet and migrate as 
far south as Newfoundland. Carbon circulates through the geosphere, biosphere and 
atmosphere, combining with water, nitrogen and sunlight to support life on the planet.  
Through complex interactions of wind, currents and temperature Hurricanes Juan 
and Igor originated off the coast of Cape Verde in Africa and dissipated in the North 
Atlantic. Such storms often sweep tropical birds and fish along with them. Through wind 
and rain, hurricanes erode land and transport massive amounts of sediment to the ocean 
where it is circulated by global currents. Hurricanes transfer massive volumes of heat 
from warmer to cooler regions and water from the ocean to land. Storm surges leave salt 
in soil, creating habitat for salt-tolerant plants and related insects, birds and animals, 
fostering biodiversity. 
 When humans are added to the mix complications arise. Seismic testing used in 
oil exploration to tap ancient reservoirs disrupts the communication and migration 
patterns of marine mammals. Schedules of global tourists intersect with the migration 
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patterns of whales and seabirds. Icebergs are tugged out of the path of fixed platform 
oilrigs (Photo 6.1). Globally- and locally-sourced workers are flown by helicopter to oil 
platforms where oil is extracted from the sea bed, carried in fossil-fuel powered ships for 
refining and then shipped to new destinations, where it fuels further flows. The flows of 
wind and water that constitute hurricanes disrupt the flows of humans, and related goods 
and services. 
 
Photo 6.1: Intersecting social and ecological f lows: Oil workers tow an iceberg, 
Newfoundland and Labrador (Reuters/STR News No date) 
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Capital circulations 
 
Environmental flows can be viewed as disrupting capital flows. Contemporary mariners 
use technology to optimize navigation and reduce fuel use and travel time – as one 
Newfoundland mariner stated, “we’ll weather route to allow us to maintain the maximum 
speed with the minimum amount of energy” (NL Transport 113). Historically, mariners 
took advantage of trade winds, dominant easterly winds that cross the Atlantic, which 
facilitated European exploration and trade of the Americas (Figure 6.2). Hurricanes 
follow the trade winds. The ecological interface of marine mobility with local economies 
has a storied history (see Peréz (2001) on the economic impacts of hurricanes in Cuba). 
 Control of time and space are integral to power in capitalistic systems, “the 
incentive to create the world market, to reduce spatial barriers to annihilate space through 
time is omnipresent, as is the incentive to rationalize spatial organization into efficient 
configurations of production…circulation networks… and consumption” (Harvey 1998: 
232). Time is equally as prominent in Weber’s (1958) analysis of how the Protestant 
work ethic shaped capitalism. The ascetic value of work prompted the productive use of 
time; “waste of time is thus the first and in principle the deadliest of sins” (Weber 1958: 
157). At an extreme, the minute movements of workers are analyzed in Tayloristic time 
management studies to both maximize efficiency and control alienated labour (Braverman 
1974). In short, “time is money” (Harvey 1989: 227). Given the centrality of interrelated 
concerns of speed, volume and intermodality to contemporary mobility practices, it was 
unsurprising that they surfaced as considerations, particularly on the part of interview 
participants. Movement, growth and distance are lauded, with different concessions made 
for extenuating circumstances such as weather.  
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Figure 6.2: Dominant trade winds and ocean currents in the Atlantic Ocean  
(Seven Seas 2012) 
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In both Nova Scotia and Newfoundland there is a tension between expanding mobility 
networks through resource extraction and tourism on one hand and reducing greenhouse 
gas emissions on the other hand. Both governments and the private sector in Nova Scotia 
and Newfoundland aim to expand passenger and freight markets. For example, Nova 
Scotia is positioning itself as Atlantic Gateway in an integrated and intermodal global 
supply chain. Newfoundland aims to double its tourism revenue by 2020. 
 
Surveillance 
Surveillance of mobility is increasingly prevalent. The movement of passengers, 
particularly post-9/11, is the subject of scrutiny. With cyber surveillance, virtual travel is 
tracked. Likewise, freight and the system of containerization means that movement of 
goods can be monitored en route. For example, marine operators use Geographic 
Positioning Systems (GPS) to track the location and movement of their fleet and other 
vessels (Figure 6.3). Ecologically, from a climate change mitigation perspective, 
greenhouse gas emissions are now tracked and accounted for in regular audits 
(Schwanen, Banister and Anable 2011). In terms of climate change impacts, sea level 
rise and stream flow volume are monitored. 
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Figure 6.3: GPS tracking of vessels in eastern Newfoundland (August 19, 2015) 
(marinetraffic.com 2015) 
 
 
Just as hydrology is closely monitored, so too is meteorology. Humans are 
drawing on increasingly sophisticated meteorological techniques and technologies to 
reduce the uncertainty associated with hurricane events. Knowledge, obtained through 
surveillance, surfaces as a form of control over the environment. Monitoring the weather 
involves a complex socio-technical assemblage, including meteorologists, satellite 
images and weather buoy data. Data is collected passively via remote sources such as 
satellites and buoys, as well as actively by flying airplanes with scientific crews into 
hurricanes to take readings (Photo 6.2).  
Individual transport operators often employ meteorologists to prepare forecasts 
tailored to their sector and operations. Intimate familiarity with, and forecasting of, 
weather conditions are viewed as invaluable information in the transport sector. A 
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number of research participants observed the improvement in the accuracy and range of 
weather forecasts in recent decades. Just as Global Positioning Systems can provide real 
time information on transport movements, forecasting provides real-time data and 
forecasts on the movement of weather systems, with both transport managers and 
meteorologists anticipating the intersection of heavy traffic and heavy weather. With the 
manifestation of climate change and the socio-economic centrality of mobility, 
meteorological data will only grow in import.  
 Notably, due to the force of the Hurricane Juan, a weather buoy at the mouth of 
Halifax Harbour actually snapped its moorings, illustrating human power in the form of 
surveillance relative to the physical power of the marine environment. In part due to the 
experience of Juan, the Halifax Port Authority, Dalhousie University, Environment 
Canada, among other organizations, partnered to fund the installation of a weather buoy 
(Photos 6.2 and 6.3).89 More buoys means more information and therefore more power to 
adequately prepare for storms. However, cost is a limiting factor. Knowledge of the 
environment, in the form of meteorological and climatic data, emerges as power. Whereas 
previously knowledge was associated with power in the form of control or strength (as 
epitomized by the Titanic), due to shifting social-ecological dynamics, power may now be 
equated with identifying and preparing for hazards such that they do not transpire into 
disasters. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
89
 Funded through the federal Networks of Centres of Excellence, the Marine Environmental Observation, 
Prediction and Response Network (MEOPAR) develops disaster and risk reduction tools and proposes 
positive adaptation measures allowing Canada to be better positioned to manage all forms of ocean hazards. 
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Photo 6.2: Hurricane Juan research f l ight conducted by National Research Council 
and Environment Canada (Environment Canada 2013b) 
 
Photo 6.3: Deployment of f irst inshore weather buoy in Halifax Harbour  
(Marine Environmental Observation, Prediction and Response Network 2013) 
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Discipline  
Governmentality, with its focus on the self-regulation of (mobile) subjects, is useful in the 
analysis of liminal states of disruption and emergency that characterize hurricane events 
(Sheller 2011). More specifically, a form of governmobility occurred with residents in 
Nova Scotia treating states of emergency as suggestions tempered by their own needs and 
contexts. In Newfoundland, the activation of a shadow mobility web by residents 
creatively met community needs. Governmobility was complemented in both regions by 
declaring a state of emergency, allowing officials, if needed, to impose exceptional 
restrictions on the movement of the citizenry, such as curfews and evacuations. In the 
overlap between the extremes of reliance on the common sense of residents on one hand 
and extraordinary regulatory measures on the other, a form of disaster mobility was 
negotiated and practiced.  
 Another aspect of discipline relates to the mobility of greenhouse gas emissions 
(see Paterson (2014) on the mobilization of carbon markets). The creation of regulatory 
emission reduction targets in Nova Scotia and Newfoundland is a form of aspirational 
societal discipline. Notably, the shared emissions reduction target of ten per cent below 
1990 levels by 2020 are insufficiently disciplined compared to the suggested targets of 80 
per cent reductions by 2050. Nova Scotia does include a long-term target in its Climate 
Change Action Plan: “By 2050, the province will reduce GHG emissions from human 
sources by up to 80 per cent below current levels, guided by the most up-to-date scientific 
consensus on required reduction”  (Government of Nova Scotia 2009). However, as an 
initial target, though ecologically inadequate, it speaks to the process of learning how to 
discipline emissions (e.g. auditing, target setting, reporting).  
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Security 
From a Foucauldian perspective, decision-makers are responsible for the management of 
the natural environment and resources upon which the population relies. Gerth and Mills 
(1958) in their analysis of Weber, observe that the state is looked to for security in times 
of risk and danger. In this vein, Tiryakian argues that 9/11 “produced a massive national 
solidarity” overcoming, for a period, a particularly divisive phase of relations between 
Republicans and Democrats (2005: 314). In the management of crises such as hurricanes, 
heat waves and ice storms, governance entails an ensemble of institutions, procedures, 
analyses and reflections, calculations and tactics, that is mechanisms of power, employed 
by government, ranging from the non-action of the wait-and-see approaches, to voluntary 
energy and water conservation measures, to more authoritarian measures requiring police 
and military intervention such as declaring states of emergency and organizing mass 
evacuations (Burchell et al. 1991).  
Manufactured risk and the resulting fear poses specific governance challenges: 
“there is a new moral climate of politics, marked by a push and pull between accusations 
of scaremongering on the one hand, and of cover-up on the other” (Giddens 2003: 29). 
When managing unknown, non-linear risks, providing advice and direction to the public 
is fraught with risk and challenge (Giddens 2003). In his analysis of the 1998 North 
American ice storm, Murphy (2004) details the deliberations undertaken by Hydro-
Québec officials, the Premier and the Mayor of Montreal in the face of a pending water 
shortage. Deciding that openness could exacerbate the problem by leading to hoarding, 
they opted for secrecy. One option considered by this powerful and burdened elite was 
the evacuation of Montreal, “a drastic measure for a large population when transportation 
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had broken down and there was nowhere to go” (Murphy 2004: 258). In the management 
of unknown, non-linear risks “we cannot know beforehand when we are actually 
scaremongering and when we are not” (Giddens 2003: 30). In this scenario, time, space 
and mobility intersect: time in the form of hours before the water supply runs out, space 
in the form of water and population distribution and mobility in the form of a potential 
full-scale evacuation of an urban population. By contrast, the mass evacuation of Fort 
McMurray due to forest fire (May 2016) were immediate, leaving residents with minutes 
to connect with loved one, collect belongings and physically evacuate. 
In the case of Atlantic Canada, security was incentivized, leveraging the financial 
benefits of the federal gas tax agreement that allocates a portion of tax revenue to 
municipalities via provinces. In Nova Scotia, access to the funds was stipulated on the 
development of municipal climate change action plans, while in Newfoundland 
development of community disaster management plans was one of several eligible 
investments. Given competing demands and limited resources, both provinces shaped the 
local agenda towards a specific security agenda, longer-term in the case of Nova Scotia 
and shorter-term in the case of Newfoundland, reflecting the overall tenor of response to 
Hurricanes Juan and Igor respectively. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Through this exploration of Hurricanes Juan and Igor, a fundamental shift in power from 
the human to the non-human emerge as dominant themes. The case studies show power to 
be diffuse and enrolled in complex, polycentric assemblages which include, but are not 
limited to: humans, non-human nature, transportation, meteorology, communication 
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technologies, fossil fuels and weather (Latour 2005). Power continually shifts in these 
networks, flickers like streetlights subject to variable fluctuations in the voltage of the 
power supply, but is not actually ‘held’ – or necessarily expressed – contrasting with 
classical and more static notions of power. Power is mobile though it sits in particular 
locales for periods of time. 
Applying an ecopolitics of mobility framework illustrates how the six elements of 
mobility – motive force, velocity, rhythm, route, experience and friction – are readily and 
richly amenable to the ecological dynamics upon which passenger and freight mobility is 
contingent and in turns shapes. An ecopolitical approach to mobility offers a valuable 
elaboration of past and current approaches to transport planning, namely traffic 
engineering and sustainable mobility (Banister 2008). A Foucauldian analysis of 
ecological and capital circulations, as well as surveillance, discipline and security as they 
relate to co-constructed mobilities of societies and ecologies, is useful in identifying and 
articulating the meaning ascribed to, and responses prescribed for, various states of 
mobility (or immobility), such as disruptions caused by hurricanes. Combining the 
ecopolitics of mobility with a Foucauldian approach results in an effective elaboration of 
social-ecological power inherent in contemporary mobility, illuminating dynamics that 
are suggested but not elaborated in literatures such as resilience (e.g. transport, 
infrastructure, social-ecological systems), disaster sociology and reflexive modernization. 
In sum, this empirical research combined with original theorization, generates 
potentially profound shifts for the emerging field of transport resilience. In the context of 
the Anthropocene, humans are in a “zone of imperfect visibility” (Potter and Romano 
2012: 3). We are “experiencing that which we do not have the word for,” observes Beck, 
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“the processes we observe, reflects that reality is still emerging (2015: 77). The cases of 
Hurricanes Juan and Igor provide a vantage point to explore the impact of severe weather 
events on mobility webs, and the concept of an ecopolitics of mobility provides 
theoretical leverage to discuss the human and ecological circulations that constitute 
contemporary society. What comes to light is a far more all-encompassing view of 
transport resilience than currently employed, bringing together threads of climate change 
causation, mitigation and adaptation more fruitfully. 
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7  NAVIGATING TRANSITION: CONCLUSION 
 
Children were given crayons 
and instructed to make welcome banners. Boats panted 
 
on their ropes. Spoons were silent propellers geared up 
to start a current. We had become the new tide: leaning in 
 
to call the ocean then leaning back to watch it come. 
 
Sue Goyette 
Fifty-Three 
 
 
Alex Colville 
Embarkation 
1993 
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Here, decades later, we revisit the couple we met on the beach at the outset of our 
journey. The ocean is even more central, emphasized by a bird’s eye view. A humble gas 
tank acts as a focal point. Just as the couple has matured, so too has society’s 
relationship with the environment: “We had become the new tide.” 
 
 
Travelogue reflections 
 
At this, the end of our journey, I conclude by considering the research process and 
proposing future research directions. First, I contemplate the overall state of mobility in 
storm-impacted Atlantic Canada in the Anthropocene, followed by reflections on the 
theoretical and methodological contributions of my research. I forward a socially-
ecologically enriched concept of transport resilience and elaborate potential components 
of a climate routing framework, including creating a transport resilience task force, 
deliberating decentralization, internalizing externalities, planning for green and blue 
flows, rebranding redundancies and thinking flex. Finally, I suggest future research 
projects and outline past and potential knowledge mobilization, before disembarking.  
Having traced the ports of call of Hurricane Juan and Hurricane Igor, what 
transpires is a sense that mobility webs are increasingly precarious. Just as the carbon 
cycle has tipped with the excessive combustion of fossil fuels, the balance of power is 
tipping from the human to the non-human in mobility. Uncertainty and loss of control are 
the ‘order’ of the day. Urry’s description of a “massive out-of-control 'juggernaut' 
lurching onwards but with no driver at the wheel” is fitting (2003: 2). Bauman observes 
simply: “no one seems to be in control” (1998: 58). Precisely by exercising control over, 
and disregard for, the natural environment, humans are sowing the seeds of manufactured 
risk, the impacts of which through climate change are already being experienced. The 
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field of transport resilience came into being directly in response to shifting social-
ecological dynamics. By combining a Foucauldian analysis with Cresswell’s politics of 
mobility, I supplant traditional traffic planning and expand sustainable mobility, 
forwarding an ecopolitical approach that illuminates power shared by assemblages of 
human, technical and environmental elements and that questions the centrality and 
volume of mobility.  
Murphy states that “the significant question is, will risk be perceived and 
acknowledged, expectations about nature’s dynamics improved, foresight developed, and 
mistakes diminished?” (2009: 27). Through a comparative case study approach I explore 
theoretical insights that surface when the mobilities paradigm, including the politics of 
mobility, is informed by resilience literatures, disaster sociology and reflexive 
modernization. I employ a definition of power that accounts for the reciprocal, continuous, 
often invisible and shifting influence and co-construction of the human and non-human 
environment. What emerges in this zone of imperfect visibility is that risks are only 
partially perceived and acknowledged, expectations about nature’s dynamics are 
improved and foresight developed but not at the speed or scale needed to diminish 
negative impacts. The vulnerabilities inherent in Newfoundland’s road network and Nova 
Scotia’s electricity grid largely still exist; if storms on par with Hurricane Juan or Igor 
were to make landfall tomorrow the scale of impact would be similar. 
Through analysis of the dynamics of mobility webs, which I define as the 
integration of mobility via nodes in complex and adaptable social, ecological and material 
constellations, I explore how mobility webs are impacted by, and respond to, the interface 
of the social, ecological and technical, identifying areas of resilience and vulnerability. I 
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adopt Cresswell’s politics of mobility to further elaborate an ecopolitics of mobility – 
motive force, velocity, rhythm, route, experience and friction – describing the texture of 
the interface between the environment and contemporary social-technical assemblages of 
mobility. Foucault’s work on circulation, as well as surveillance, discipline and security 
permit further elaboration on social-ecological power dynamics in the realm of mobility. 
In the cases of Nova Scotia and Newfoundland, I learned through expert and 
official accounts how transport providers and others interpret and respond to the risk 
posed by severe weather. I identified a suite of responses and frames employed prior to, 
during and in the aftermath of severe weather events to explore and elaborate a socially 
and ecologically informed transport resilience. Further, I identify sources of resilience 
and vulnerability, and in combination with theoretical insights, explore how greater social 
and ecological resilience can be achieved with respect to mobility webs. Key sources of 
resilience include cultural awareness of the need to batten down the hatches in the face of 
oncoming storms, administrative and cultural contexts that are conducive to cooperation 
and communication, and the creative leveraging of shadow mobility webs. Key sources of 
vulnerability include reliance on single modes, routes and fuels that constitute a dominant 
and precarious automobility, incremental and partial approaches to climate change 
mitigation and adaptation, and a lack of critical reflection on society’s reliance on 
mobility.  
Given these areas of resilience and vulnerability, greater social and ecological 
resilience with respect to mobility webs can be facilitated through a clearer and more 
profound articulation of the reciprocal impacts of the transport sector on the climate and, 
in turn, climate change on the transport sector. The ecopolitics of mobility and 
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Foucauldian attention to the power dynamics of circulation are pivotal to this task, 
creating a language and conceptual space to reflect on the interface of the social, 
ecological and technical.   
The cases of Hurricanes Juan and Igor beg questions for consideration. Given a 
changing climate, what is the prospect of returning to normal? As one participant stated: 
“It’s like we are having a 100 year storm every two months.” Storms like Igor and Juan, 
Sandy and Katrina, are surpassing engineering design limits. Do we continue as is and 
rebuild if needed? Do we build to higher design standards in communities already 
experiencing infrastructure deficits? Do we question our societal reliance on mobility? 
Different contexts require different approaches. Profound shifts in the global carbon cycle 
are disturbing surface continuities in the global mobility complex. Humans are 
experiencing fear and anxiety, and governments are faced with states of emergency where 
significant decisions regarding the welfare of the population must be made in a timely 
manner. Governmentality morphs from art to triage. 
 
Analytical contribution 
My research is grounded within the mobilities literature and informed by the disaster 
literature to elaborate an ecopolitics of mobility. I complement the applied areas of 
sustainable mobility (i.e. climate change mitigation) (Banister 2008) and resilience (i.e. 
transport, infrastructure, social-ecological) (Brown 2014; Folke 2010), with the 
theoretically oriented mobilities paradigm (Sheller and Urry 2006), including the politics 
of mobility (Cresswell 2010). Further, I inflect the politics of mobility, which provides a 
nuanced approach to the analysis of power within mobility systems, with Foucault’s work 
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on governmentality and circulation of societies and ecologies.  Each literature offers 
analytical insights that when combined illuminate mobility in the context of climate 
change.  
These diverse and interrelated literatures, when applied to the empirical case 
studies of Hurricanes Juan and Igor, contributes to creating a social-ecological 
theorization of mobility, including concepts of mobility webs, the ecopolitics of mobility 
and climate routing. This analytical framework is transferable to other regions and other 
types of extreme events, including diverse fast onset weather events in diverse regions 
(e.g. 2016 Fort MacMurray wildfires), as well as to slow onset crises (e.g. the role 
drought played in contributing to the Syrian refugee crisis) and more infrastructural 
events (e.g. the 2015 Nova Scotia fuel shortage; 2016 Ottawa sink hole).  
Overall, I develop an ecopolitical approach to transport planning that evolves out 
of past transport planning approaches including traffic management and sustainable 
mobility. In an ecopolitical approach to mobility, focus shifts from navigating disruption 
to navigating transition. Power shifts from the discipline of control to security created 
through knowledge of social-ecological dynamics. In sum, my research offers innovative 
contributions by orienting mobilities research to social-ecological considerations – 
extending previous work on sustainable mobility even further – and orienting disaster 
sociology to mobility and related transport considerations. 
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Methodological contribution 
 
In addition to diverse literatures, I draw on diverse data sources. Through media articles, 
legislative transcripts and policy documents, in addition to semi-structured interviews 
with key informants, I identified and analyzed the resulting responses and frames as they 
pertain to social-ecological resilience and vulnerability. For the media scan, I selected a 
sample of national, provincial and local print media articles for one month following each 
event. While useful in gaining a sense of the events across scales, for the purposes of this 
research I largely drew on provincial coverage as it focused on regional mobility webs. If 
I were to conduct a similar study might opt to focus solely on provincial media and draw 
a sample for the year following the event in order to capture coverage related to policy in 
addition to recovery. Further, the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation online reporting 
was a valuable data source that I would use more centrally in future research. Legislative 
transcripts analysis is a surprisingly underused data source in the fields of climate change 
and disaster. These documents highlighted heroic narratives, acknowledged 
vulnerabilities and offered important policy critiques.  
 Analysis of policy documents was valuable in identifying how the severe weather 
events of Hurricanes Juan and Igor permeated the longer-term policy agenda. Given the 
range of possible documents I focussed on provincial government documents produced 
directly in response to the experience of the hurricane and flagship documents pertaining 
to mobility so as to maintain attention on the official responses to the hurricanes. 
Incorporating municipal documents, particularly in the case of Halifax, which is active on 
the issue of transport and climate change, would augment this research. However, due to 
both limits of capacity and a focus on a provincial scale, I opted to exclude these 
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documents. This speaks to the challenge of defining a research scale given the interscalar 
nature of mobility and climate change. Analyzing local documents and comparing local, 
provincial and national documents, particularly areas of accordance and discordance, is a 
valuable area for further study. 
In both Nova Scotia and Newfoundland, interview participants expressed pride in 
cooperation that tended toward more, though not entirely, heroic narratives in terms of 
disaster response and recovery (Borins 2011). Murphy (2009) explores how leaders, such 
as politicians and senior civil servants, navigated the 1998 ice storm. On one hand, 
Murphy finds that officials embraced a policy of “transparency and openness” in 
communicating with residents (2004: 258), and on the other hand, Murphy determines 
that “nature’s prompts were used politically” to frame the federal and Quebec 
governments, as well as the Canadian Forces, as competent (2004: 255). For example, the 
Canadian Forces, recently disgraced by the Somalia affair, were volunteered by the Prime 
Minister to provide highly visible ground relief (Murphy 2004).90 In both Nova Scotia 
and Newfoundland, though more so in the latter, a similar approach was taken. Frames of 
community resilience and cooperation dominate, which is understandable and even 
desirable (so long as it reflects reality) during a state of emergency. The storms were 
framed as shared experiences. However, as my dataset encompasses only the month 
following the precipitating event more critical narratives may have arisen at later periods. 
By contrast, when interview participants reflect on the future instead of the past, more 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
90
 In 1993, members of the Canadian Airborne Regiment engaged in humanitarian efforts in Somalia were 
found responsible for the torture and murder of a Somali teenager. 
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modest narratives arose, characterized by uncomfortable uncertainty with regard to 
climate change impacts, storm tracks and budgets. 
In terms of case study selection, comparing Hurricanes Juan and Igor offered 
surprising contrasts given their physical proximity, with Juan defined by wind and Igor by 
water. Likewise, comparing the epicenters of both storms, Halifax in Nova Scotia and the 
Bonavista Peninsula in Newfoundland, highlighted the impact of hurricanes on urban 
versus more rural mobility webs. Despite these differences, common considerations of 
resilience and vulnerability arose, suggesting transferable practices. Exploratory research 
I conducted on the impacts of Hurricane Sandy on mobility webs in New York suggest 
commonalities across scale and context, such as aging infrastructure, disruptions to gas 
distribution and the emergence of shadow mobility webs, such as the use of bicycles in 
relief efforts. Further such research would yield insights into the similarities and 
differences between the impacts of severe weather events across scales, from rural 
Newfoundland to urban America.  
 
Social-ecological transport resilience  
Social-ecological systems theory forwards resilience, adaptability and transformability as 
potential trajectories. What emerges in my research is the necessity of all three in the 
context of severe weather events: with resilience needed to regain basic functioning, 
adaptability needed to respond to changing climate dynamics and transformability needed 
in terms of transitioning to post-carbon mobility and questioning the status quo in terms 
of mobility volume and acceleration. However, in the cases of Hurricanes Juan and Igor, 
transport resilience dominates, with adaptation and transformability as more peripheral 
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considerations. Transport resilience, as implemented in the United Kingdom and Canada, 
focuses on engineering approaches that retain the status quo, or restoring the status quo 
promptly if disrupted (e.g. installing larger culverts). There is a movement in the disaster 
risk reduction field to incorporate an ecological lens in all four phases of the disaster 
response cycle (e.g. preparedness, response, recovery, mitigation) (i.e. eco-DRR). What 
happens when an ecological lens is added to the concept of transport resilience generally 
and in light of extreme weather events such as hurricanes specifically?   
 Ecologies fluctuate and change. Disturbance ecology studies natural adaptive 
cycles and reorganizational processes. For example, hurricanes, through intense wind and 
rain erode land and transport massive amounts of sediment to the ocean where it is 
circulated by global currents. In addition, hurricanes transfer massive volumes of heat 
from warmer to cooler regions and water from ocean to land. Storm surges salinate soil, 
creating habitat for salt-tolerant plants and related insects, birds and animals, fostering 
biodiversity. In ecosystems, disruption is natural and healthy. This contrasts with societal 
perceptions of, and responses, to turbulence, where the economy and infrastructure are 
less amenable to disruption. Equilibrium conditions are perceived as ideal and society 
aims to minimize disruption and practice seamless intermodal movement. The question 
then arises as how to best reconcile dynamic and variable ecologies with more rigid 
structures of the human built environment and strictures of society and economy. How 
can an ecological lens inform and strengthen the resilience of mobility webs? How do we 
allow necessary natural disturbances and maintain or adapt human connectivity and social 
structures? 
There is already a strong awareness of the weather-exposed nature of transport 
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modes, especially among transport managers and the general travelling public. Rain, 
snow, wind, fog, cold and heat are routine considerations for transport managers and 
commuters alike. Hefty snowfalls and fog paralyze the St. John’s International Airport. 
Extreme heat causes rail tracks to expand, kinking lines and delaying travel. High winds 
restrict truck travel on the Halifax Harbour and Confederation Bridges, as well as in 
western Newfoundland. Intense rainfall washes out bridges and roads such as experienced 
in Meat Cove, Nova Scotia. Cargo ships constantly weather route, adjusting their course 
to accommodate conditions at sea. And cyclists and pedestrians face the elements head on, 
dressing and adjusting their practices of movement. However, while at the operational 
level weather considerations are routine, there is greater scope for consideration of the 
social-ecological interface of mobility webs in a changing climate, a suite of approaches I 
term climate routing that may facilitate a transition to a transformative, social-
ecologically informed transport resilience. 
 
Climate routing 
In the marine sector, the keen sensitivity to weather routing, that is, the practice of 
optimizing the interface of routing and fossil fuel use to maximize profit, offers lessons 
that if transferred to a consciousness of emissions could transform the field of transport 
resilience as currently understood and practiced. Brown notes that while there are 
examples of next generation infrastructure, there lacks a “policy and development 
framework” to systematically transform infrastructure design (2014: 3). Under the 
umbrella concept of climate routing, I explore a framework for moving towards 
transformative transport resilience via a spectrum of measures  – creating a transport 
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resilience task force, deliberating decentralization, internalizing externalities, planning for 
green and blue flows, rebranding redundancy and thinking flex – where primary 
considerations are reducing social-ecological contention, increasing resilience, 
questioning the role of mobility in contemporary society and improving quality of life.  
 How can mobility transition into a post-carbon era characterized by a post-normal 
climate? Mobility webs must both be decarbonized (or at least lower carbon) as well as 
adaptable to extreme events, such as the movement of 50 to 350 million climate migrants 
anticipated by 2050 due to climate change impacts, including desertification, disease and 
hurricanes. How can turbulence, rather than assumptions of laminar flow, be 
accommodated (Cresswell and Martin 2013)? A paradigmatic shift, such that smooth 
mobility is considered the exception and turbulence the rule may be a warranted 
recalibration of expectations. 
There is a well-established suite of common sustainable transportation initiatives 
such as increasing vehicle efficiency, reducing the carbon content of fuels, shifting to 
more sustainable modes and land use planning that promotes compact, mixed use 
development that reduces the needs for car transport (Schwanen, Banister and Anable 
2011). These initiatives can be promoted through infrastructure investments, zoning by-
laws, financial measures (e.g. carbon tax, insurance rates), education and regulation.  
The State of New York, for example, developed a broad community resilience framework 
that provides seven focal areas: conserve, enhance, restore natural protective features; 
resilient construction; structural defences; land use planning and regulation; market-based 
methods; awareness, information and preparedness; and systemic resilience.  
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Further, there is an emerging suite of transport resilience measures (e.g. passive 
and adaptive) that include initiatives such as investing in ongoing infrastructure 
maintenance, flood-proofing infrastructure and related electrical systems, and identifying 
critical routes to be prioritized during times of crisis (UK Department of Transport 2014). 
However, transport and infrastructure resilience, as currently practiced, tend towards 
“predict-and-provide” emphasizing infrastructure provision in contrast to questioning the 
mobility status quo (Schwanen, Banister and Anable 2011: 997). Given the fact that both 
the climate and transport technologies are rapidly changing, I recommend broader 
principles and structures to complement such initiatives. The following measures – 
creating a transport resilience task force deliberate decentralization, internalize 
externalities, planning for green and blue flows, rebrand redundancy and think flex – are 
intended to build upon and augment passive transport resilience facilitating a paradigm 
shift to transformative transport resilience (Table 7.1).91 Elements of Urry’s (2013, 2008) 
potential futures, including transitioning to a locally based, low-carbon-society and virtual 
interactions mediated by digital technology, inform my approach.  
 
 
 
Table 7.1: Potential cl imate routing measures 
MEASURE ACTION 
 
CREATE Create provincial interdepartmental transport resilience body (e.g. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
91
 See Banister (2008) for a discussion of seven elements for promoting sustainable mobility that 
complement climate routing: providing information, involving and communicating with stakeholders, 
packaging push and pull measures in policy bundles, selling the benefits, adopting controversial politics in 
stages, and ensuring consistency between different measures and policy sectors. 
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TRANSPORT 
RESILIENCE  
TASK FORCE 
committee, office, commission), including a focus on fuel resilience 
 
Create university-based transport resilience research lab 
 
Develop a transport resilience strategy that brings together the 
field of transport, disaster management and climate change 
mitigation and adaptation, as well as drawing economic 
development into discussions of transport resilience  
 
DELIBERATE 
DECENTRALIZATION 
Incorporate potential disruptions due to extreme weather events 
into calculations regarding the centralization of schools, hospitals 
and other critical infrastructure  
 
INTERNALIZE 
EXTERNALITIES 
Implement provincial carbon tax with portion of revenue 
dedicated to climate change mitigation, climate change 
adaptation and/or disaster prevention, preparedness and recovery 
 
PLAN FOR  
GREEN AND BLUE 
FLOWS  
 
Incorporate consideration of environmental flows, including 
disruption ecology, in transport planning 
 
REBRAND 
REDUNDANCY 
Build redundancy (e.g. modal, technical, material) into mobility 
webs at multiple scales from infrastructure to individual 
 
THINK  
FLEX 
Incorporate flexibility into mobility webs in terms of fuels, modes, 
routes and infrastructure 
 
Explore communication (e.g. Skype), printing (e.g. 3-D) and 
alternative vehicle (e.g. UAVs ) technologies as a means to render 
mobility webs more flexible 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Create transport resilience task force 
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The substantive spheres of sustainable transport, climate change mitigation and 
adaptation, and disaster preparedness, as well as economic development, all intersect 
under the umbrella of transport resilience. A sense of trepidation was apparent among 
transport managers in particular as they aimed to meet their primary mandates (e.g. 
delivery, and often growth, of transport services) with more peripheral but also pressing 
concerns about infrastructure investment, emissions management and disaster 
preparedness. One Newfoundland transport manager constructively suggested the 
creation of a “provincial think tank on this or some kind of committee” to provide 
practical direction on how to move forward (NL Transport 106). Such a body (e.g. task 
force, think tank, working group, commission, lab, clearing house) would create space for 
interdisciplinary consideration and experimentation with proactive adaptive and 
transformational approaches to transport, extending beyond reactive passive resilience. 
Dalhousie University in Nova Scotia (which includes Faculties of Planning and the 
College of Sustainability) and Memorial University in Newfoundland (the province’s 
only university) could have parallel research bodies that focus on theoretical and 
pragmatic aspects of transport resilience, asking what counts as “appropriate movement” 
in a carbon-constrained and potentially decarbonized society (Cresswell 2010: 27)? 
Big picture questions such as safety, “over-dependency” on mobility and climate 
change mitigation and adaptation could augment ongoing conversations pertaining to 
engineering and maintenance (e.g. culvert sizing)  (Budd et al. 2011: 39). The “interplay 
of disturbance and organization” – or flow and turbulence – could be a guiding theme 
(Brand and Jax 2007: 27). Such big picture questions could leverage the emancipatory 
potential of events such as Hurricanes Juan and Igor and other transport disruptions. An 
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interdisciplinary approach, including meteorologists, coastal biologists, forest 
conservationists, in addition to transport providers, infrastructure experts and risk 
managers and policy and governance experts, would help create a larger brain trust in 
which to learn “about errors of expectations concerning nature’s dynamics, about the 
material consequence of such errors, and about the social barriers to learning from the 
prompts of nature” (Murphy 2004: 255). 
Rather than focusing on maintaining carbon intensive mobility webs, how can we 
mitigate their climatological impact (Cowen 2014)? How can extensive mobility webs be 
decarbonized? While the aspirations of a lower carbon transport system are stated 
(especially in Nova Scotia), a task force would create time and space to consider how to 
navigate a mobility transition, as well as could play a role in facilitating public discussion 
of such issues. A task force could be a forum to consider and address questions raised by 
Schwanen, Banister and Anable: 
 
• What is the kind of world that we would like to live in and find desirable and 
how should mobility be configured in that world?... 
• Will business models in manufacturing and leisure/tourism based on current 
global production chains and aviation networks remain feasible? 
• Is mobility in principle a right to which people are entitled? (2011: 1004) 
 
 
In addition, more specific questions regarding budget allocations and design practices 
could be discussed.  
A related area in need of attention is that of the resilience of fuel supplies. Fuel 
resilience emerged as an issue during both hurricanes as well as during other events (i.e. 
the 2014 rolling blackouts in Newfoundland, the 2015 fuel drought in Nova Scotia). 
While sustaining fuel supplies may appear at odds with a transition away from fossil fuels 
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in the transport sector, the experience of Hurricane Juan and Igor revealed the 
vulnerability created by relying on one fuel source. Diversifying the fuel supply to 
include lower carbon products and decreasing demand for fuel may also benefit societal 
resilience during disasters. 
The ideal time to create such a task force may be in the aftermath of an extreme 
weather event in order to garner political will and momentum. A time-limited format such 
as a commission or independent review might facilitate the transfer of conditions 
permitted in times of crisis – intense focus on one common goal, interdepartmental 
cooperation, regulatory support and liberal financial resources – to emerge and be 
leveraged during a period of non-crisis (e.g. the Ivany Commission structure). Potential 
outputs might include developing a vision for transport resilience, facilitating province-
wide consultations (in-person and virtual), and developing a transport resilience, 
adaptation and transformation discussion paper and/or toolkit (see Cresswell et al. 2015 
for an ongoing study of mobility transitions in 14 countries). 
 
Deliberate decentralization  
There are constant downward financial pressures to streamline government and 
businesses. Moves to centralize schools and health care services mean that transport is 
built into our education and health care systems. Disruptions to transport can therefore 
translate to disruptions in the lives of students and patients. Hurricane Juan led to the 
disruption of surgical schedules, exacerbating already lengthy wait times. This past winter 
in Nova Scotia, the issue of how to make up for days of school cancelled due to snow was 
raised (The Chronicle Herald 2015) (see Fothergill and Peek (2015) for a discussion of 
  291 
the impacts of disaster on children, including school closure). One controversial strategy 
proposed offsetting lost curriculum time was by holding classes on Saturdays. Strategic 
decentralization – both of services as well as electrical grids – may allow for a quicker 
resumption of services in the face of severe weather. Likewise, more creative and flexible 
means of delivering key services, such as education and health (e.g. e-consultations) may 
warrant exploration.  
 
Internalize externalities 
Extreme weather events are expensive. It is estimated that Hurricane Juan’s direct costs 
were $100 million, while a decade later the Alberta floods incurred $5 billion in damages 
– the most expensive disaster in Canadian history. Severe weather events can be thought 
of as a form of indirect carbon tax. For example, Hurricane Juan incurred an approximate 
per capita cost of  $107 and Hurricane Igor an approximate per capita cost of $192 to 
$383.92 By pricing carbon emissions, institutions, industry and individuals, may be 
prompted, depending on the price point and availability of low-carbon options, to reduce 
their carbon emissions.93  
Importantly, the actual effectiveness of any given carbon tax is determined by its 
design and the implementation of complementary policies. In 2013/14, British 
Columbia’s carbon tax raised $1.2 billion dollars, all of which was returned to residents 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
92
 Nova Scotia: $100 million divided by the 2003 provincial population of 936,000. Newfoundland and 
Labrador: $100-200 million divided by the 2010 provincial population of 522,000. 
93
 Labour costs are also externalized. See McLean (forthcoming) for a discussion of how hours of service 
regulations in the Canadian long haul trucking industry artificially lower the cost of trucking (i.e. labour 
costs), and by extension, consumer goods. 
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and businesses via a myriad of tax reductions, such as for home renovations and skills 
training, and was attributed with a 16 per cent reduction in emissions (Pembina Institute 
2014). The revenue generated by a tax can be offset via tax reductions in other areas (e.g. 
income), as is done in British Columbia, or directed to sustainability initiatives, such as 
public transit. A further option that will help underline the connection between severe 
weather events and fossil fuel use is to direct funds to disaster prevention, preparedness 
and response initiatives – an option that may be more politically palatable in some 
jurisdictions, such as Newfoundland.  
 
Plan for green and blue flows 
Tightly coupled social, ecological and technical systems are complex and dynamic. 
Increasing attention is being paid to how to accommodate environmental flows by 
explicitly including ecological considerations (e.g. blue flows of water, green flows of 
trees) into mobility management. 94  While discipline is characterized by efforts to 
“concentrate, contain and control” nature, security “adapts to the reality of natural 
processes, respects their autonomy and seeks to identify, optimise and work through 
nature’s discernable laws rather than stifle them” (Usher 2014: 558). Green or next-
generation infrastructure (e.g. creating more flood tolerant and water permeable urban 
environments) is a term used to describe efforts to build with, rather than dominate, the 
natural environment (Brown 2014). Brown identifies five guiding principles to reimagine 
society’s approach to infrastructure: 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
94
 Blue urbanism (Beatley 2014) is a similar approach that proposes a more meaningful relationship 
between coastal cities and the ocean. 
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1. Systems should be multipurpose, interconnected, and synergistic. 
2. Infrastructure should contribute few or no carbon emissions. 
3. Infrastructure should work with natural processes. 
4. Infrastructure should improve social contexts and serve local 
constituencies. 
5. Infrastructure should be resilient and adapt to predicted changes brought 
along by an unstable climate. (2014: 11) 
 
Likewise, the related field of ecosystem-based disaster risk reduction advocates for the 
restoration of natural environments to prevent and mitigate against hazards (e.g. 
reforesting a slope to prevent flooding; restoring wetland habitat to buffer the impact of 
storm surges). The elegance of such solutions is that they mitigate disaster through softer 
and less expensive ecological measures rather than, solely, harder and costlier 
engineering approaches (United Nations Environment Program 2013).  
Following Hurricane Juan one urban planner reflects on how to manage a stretch 
of coastal highway: 
 
One of my areas of key concern is sections of Highway 107 along the eastern 
shore .… I think there’s all sorts of saltmarsh complexes in through there, and the 
highway has no room to move. And so that’s more of a question for provincial 
transport planners. There’s no sense of retreat there. I guess it would have to be 
putting in a causeway or a bridge or I don’t know. (NS Government 114) 
 
 
With sea level rise, such spatial pressures will only increase. One response implemented 
in the Netherlands was to prioritize the spatial needs of the non-human environment over 
those of society. The Room for the River (2015) project is a nation-wide, multicomponent 
initiative to allow rivers greater latitude. It is guided by questions such as what does 
nature need to do and how does nature need to circulate? The project is scheduled to 
complete ecological-engineering interventions (e.g. deepening floodplain, relocating 
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dykes, constructing a bypass channel) at 30 locations that will allow the river to flood 
safely. Accommodation replaces older approaches of confinement. An ecopolitical 
approach to mobility is a logical evolution of traditional transport planning and 
sustainable mobility. Mobility infrastructure, in addition to the electrical grid as a tightly 
coupled system, will increasingly need to be designed around a changing climate.  
 
Rebrand redundancy  
Redundancy gained a bad reputation in recent decades, synonymous with bureaucratic 
inefficiency. Another way to think of redundancy is having a back-up plan – what social-
ecological systems theorists refer to as functional redundancy. Redundancy is needed at 
multiple scales. At the infrastructure level, the use of old cabin roads and retired bridges 
during Hurricane Igor proved useful. Ideally there would be greater redundancy of routes, 
modes and fuels in the regular mobility web, so that communities are not reliant upon one 
road to meet all of their supply and emergency needs. Back-up equipment such as 
generators, chainsaws and radios are also necessary redundancies, as are contingency and 
continuity plans. Redundancy is further supported by distributing disaster recovery 
infrastructure (e.g. Bailey bridges) and materials (e.g. cots, fill) throughout a region. At 
the household and individual level, the availability of alternate transport modes, as well as 
the skill to use them, are a source of redundancy that proved particularly valuable in the 
aftermath of Igor.95 Skills such as boating, snowmobiling and off-roading, as well as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
95
 With the decline of the fisheries in outport communities, shadow mobility web infrastructure such as 
boats may less readily available. 
  295 
biking, canoeing, cross-country skiing, swimming and snowshoeing – in both urban and 
rural environments – may characterize post-disaster mobility webs in future.  
 
Think flex 
Through my research, a greater expectation for and accommodation of turbulence in the 
movement of people, goods and services surfaced. A paradigmatic shift, such that smooth 
mobility is considered the exception and turbulence the rule may be warranted. Hage 
reflects that, “Crisis today is no longer felt as an unusual state of affairs which invites 
citizens to question the given order. Rather, it is perceived more as a normalcy… a 
permanent state of exception” (2009: 8). Managing both charismatic movement and 
mandatory evacuations promises to be a feature of increasingly frequent storm events. 
Official attempts to repress circulation were countered by governmobility on the part of 
the population where residents appeared to assess – largely successfully according to 
injury and mortality rates – the appropriate level and type of mobility based on their 
direct experiences of friction, route, motive force – or overall experience of turbulence. 
What emerges is a new normal, both in terms of climate and of expectations of mobility 
disruption.  
Personal vehicle infrastructure “changes the environment or fitness landscape for 
all other existing and future users…. Automobility adapts as it spreads along the paths 
and roads of each society, it draws in many aspects of the environment which are then 
reconstituted as components of the system” (Urry 2007: 134). Hurricanes Juan and 
particularly Igor reveal an overreliance on automobility that increases vulnerability. There 
is a need to reduce the rigidity of automobility by introducing flexibility in terms of fuels, 
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modes, routes and infrastructure, as well as through technologies, such as communication 
(e.g. Skype), printing (e.g. 3-D) and alternative vehicles (e.g. driverless cars and trucks, 
drones).96 While the concept of the driverless car is gaining traction, given the impact of 
Hurricane Juan and Igor on static infrastructure, it is worth considering the possibility of 
roadless transport. Could helicopters provide flexibility in the face of severe weather 
events? What role can drones play in disaster assessment and response? Each mode has 
its vulnerabilities – helicopters and drones are susceptible to wind and fog conditions – 
however Juan and Igor demonstrate the need to diversify beyond the dominant 
automobility network.  
 
Future research  
My research offers theoretical generalizations and policy lessons that are applicable to the 
North American contexts and to other extreme weather events, such as blizzards, rain 
storms and forest fires. Further, this research yields possibilities for future comparative 
case studies, including between Atlantic Canadian communities and other communities 
along and extending beyond the Eastern seaboard (e.g. Boston, New York, Miami, 
Bermuda and Cuba), as well as between Atlantic Canada and other hurricane-exposed 
locales in the North Atlantic (e.g. Reykjavik, Iceland; Oslo, Norway). 
 Methodologically, there are interesting avenues for future research that were 
beyond the scope of this project. The majority of interview participants were male, 
representative of the gender bias in the transport sector and senior governmental and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
96
 See Birtchnell et al. (2013) for a discussion of the impact of 3-D printing on the freight sector.  
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political positions. It would be valuable to compare approaches to decision-making and 
policy directions undertaken by demographically dominant versus minority decision-
makers. In addition, the conspicuous absence of women in leadership roles in the 
transport sector is worthy of reflection and policy intervention. Would the inclusion of 
women in decision-making result in qualitatively and/or quantitatively different outcomes, 
or does the professional training (e.g. civil engineering) dilute such difference?  
Just as the lived experience of policy makers and transport operators would 
benefit from further research, the lived experience of disrupted mobility is a peripheral 
aspect of my research that would be an intriguing area for future research. Examples of 
such dynamics that emerged in the cases of Hurricane Juan and Igor include tensions 
involving youth, frictions between urban and rural communities, and adverse impacts on 
lower-income households and individuals who are precariously employed. Research into 
these issues, as well as issues of longer-term recovery, is valuable and necessary. How is 
turbulence navigated? What social, technical and ecological networks are leveraged to 
achieve or replace mobility? What steps can be taken to assist those individuals and 
communities particularly vulnerable to mobility disruptions? The intersection of mobility 
and states of emergency is of particular interest. In the context of Hurricane Juan, the 
state of emergency resulted in a strongly advised but ultimately voluntary immobility. 
Community members appeared to largely disregard official advice, governing their own 
mobility to meet their needs, whether material, informational or interpersonal. The 
communication, navigation and enforcement of voluntary, as well as compulsory, states 
of immobility (including evacuations) during severe weather events is ripe for further 
research. 
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 There are also potentially interesting visual aspects of this research, for example, 
analyzing photos and images included in media coverage, weather forecasts/warnings and 
social media threads. Other possibilities include creating a dynamic visual representation 
of the six elements of the ecopolitics of mobility and mapping the turbulent journey of 
one person, good (i.e. supply chain resilience) or service in a form of mobile method 
and/or institutional ethnography.   
 
Knowledge mobilization 
Findings from this paper were published in the inaugural issue of Environmental 
Sociology (Sodero and Stoddart 2015). I submitted a paper on the ecopolitics of mobility 
to Environment and Planning D, where Cresswell’s (2010) politics of mobility was 
originally published. Future papers include: a submission to Transport Policy forwarding 
an ecopolitics of mobility as an extension of Banister’s (2008) discussion in the same 
publication of sustainable mobility; a review of transport resilience academic and applied 
literatures for Applied Mobilities and a case analysis of disaster-specific employment-
related geographical mobility for Mobilities. I have also published preliminary findings in 
non-academic venues such as the Newfoundland Quarterly, The Independent and Between 
the Issues. 
I shared my research findings with academics and practitioners in fields of 
transport management, disaster preparedness and climate change mitigation and 
adaptation, both in Canada and internationally. I presented my findings at a Transport 
Canada webinar on transport resilience that included an audience of provincial, municipal 
and private sector transport planners and managers across Canada. I also presented in a 
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Department of National Defence Domestic Operations Military Professional Education 
Session attended by senior and non-commissioned officers. I presented to the Canadian 
Risk and Hazards Network (dedicated to sharing knowledge and innovative approaches 
that reduce disaster vulnerability) and the Harris Centre of Regional Policy and 
Development, (dedicated to stimulating informed discussion on important provincial 
issues and the key facilitator of conservations between academics, policy makers and 
communities in Newfoundland and Labrador). Through the Harris Centre, I delivered a 
synergy session, which was an opportunity for government officials, representatives of 
non-governmental organizations and academics to come together to discuss public policy 
issues, and a pecha kucha talk designed to share current academic research with the 
public.97 
In addition, I am affiliated with two relevant projects that will provide 
opportunities to further disseminate my research findings: On the Move: Employment-
Related Geographical Mobility in the Canadian Context Partnership and the Marine 
Environmental Observation Prediction and Response Network (MEOPAR). On the Move, 
established in 2012 and funded by the Social Science and Humanities Research Council, 
is composed of social scientists exploring the intersection between employment and 
mobility (On the Move Partnership 2014). MEOPAR, established in 2012 and funded 
through the Government of Canada’s Networks of Excellence program, is composed of 
Canadian natural and social scientists who are researching how to reduce coastal 
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 A pecha kucha talk specifies a structured and brief format (a six minute talk with 20 slides shown for 20 
seconds each). 
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vulnerability to marine hazards such as hurricanes (Marine Environmental Observation 
Prediction and Response Network 2013).  
Though beyond the scope of this research, there is potential to develop a resilience 
toolkit, including case study examples, photos, budget estimates for Canadian transport, 
land use and emergency management practitioners. Such a toolkit could be informed by 
stakeholder consultations (e.g. creative and interactive workshops with visioning 
components), focusing particularly on the potential to spur transformative, not just 
passive, resilience. The State of New York Community Resilience Techniques: A 
Compilation of Approaches Used to Increase Resilience provides a pragmatic example. 
 
Disembarking 
Two intersecting trends help define our times: an intensification of transport mobility and 
an upsurge in severe weather events. Movement is central to our society and mobility 
disruptions are “challenging, exciting, stressful, and sometimes deeply troubling,” 
consequently instigating a multiplicity of social responses (Harvey 1989: 240). The 
concepts of mobility webs, the ecopolitics of mobility and climate routing, as explored 
through the example of two record-breaking hurricanes in Atlantic Canada, provide a 
fresh perspective on how to navigate disruptions in mobile society. What comes into 
focus through the cases of Hurricanes Juan and Igor is a picture of robust capacity for 
passive transport resilience and a nascent recognition (at least among some actors), 
prompted by tensions in current responses and frames related to mobility and extreme 
weather, of the need for transformative resilience. 
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Appendix A 
List of potential research participants 
Key informants were drawn from this list of mobility managers, environmental managers, 
and secondary personnel.  
 
Mobility managers  
Mode 
    Active  
- Cycling network planners 
- Pedestrian network planners 
 
         Air 
- Freight air managers 
- Helicopter managers 
- Passenger air managers 
 
   Bus 
- Access-a-bus managers 
- Intercity bus managers 
- Public transit managers 
 
 General 
- Road engineers 
- Transportation planners 
- Transportation demand managers 
 
   Marine 
- Coast Guard navigation managers 
- Harbour masters 
- Port authority managers 
 
   Personal vehicles  
- Car rental company managers 
- Off road vehicles association representatives  
- Taxi company managers 
 
   Rail 
- Freight rail managers 
- Passenger rail managers 
 
   Truck 
- Trucking association representatives 
 
  
Environmental managers  
- Climate change adaptation specialists 
- Flood managers 
- Hydrographers 
- Hurricane prediction and preparedness specialists 
- Land use planners 
- Urban foresters 
 
Secondary personnel 
- Community volunteers 
- Environmental advocacy organizations 
- Emergency management organizations  
- Fuel providers 
- Insurance sector representatives 
- Mobility advocacy organizations 
- Political representatives (e.g. municipal, provincial, federal) 
- Utility providers 
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Appendix B: Introductory email 
 
Dear [Name],  
 
You are invited to take part in a research project entitled “The social-ecological 
resilience of transport mobility networks: Lessons from Hurricanes Juan and Igor.” This 
project examines the relationship between transport systems, hurricanes, and resilience. 
Given your experience with [transport, environmental, secondary sector], I am interested 
in learning your perspective on this topic. 
 
You are invited to participate in a research interview that will take approximately 
40-60 minutes.  
 
This research project is funded by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council 
of Canada and has been approved by Memorial University’s Interdisciplinary Committee 
on Ethics in Human Research. 
 
In order to decide whether you wish to participate in this research study, you should 
understand enough about its risks and benefits to be able to make an informed decision.  
Please take time to read the attached Informed Consent Form that provides further details 
regarding your involvement. 
 
Should you agree to participate, please let me know if there is time and place that is 
convenient for you to be interviewed. I will be in [province] during [month].  
 
Please contact me with any questions of concerns. 
 
Sincerely, 
 
Stephanie Sodero 
PhD Candidate 
Department of Sociology 
Memorial University 
sbs105@mun.ca 
709-730-9274 
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Appendix C: Informed consent form 
 
 
Faculty of Arts 
 
Department of Sociology 
St. John’s, NL, Canada A1C 5S7 
Tel: 709.864.8862 Fax: 709.864.2075  
 
Informed Consent Form 
 
Title:   The social-ecological resilience of transport mobility networks: 
                                    Lessons from Hurricanes Juan and Igor  
 
Researcher: Stephanie Sodero 
 PhD Candidate 
 Department of Sociology 
 Memorial University 
 Email: sbs105@mun.ca 
 Phone: 709-730-9274   
 
Supervisor:  Dr. Mark C.J. Stoddart 
 Department of Sociology 
 Memorial University 
 Email: mstoddart@mun.ca 
 Phone: 709-864-8862 
 
 
You are invited to take part in a research project entitled “The social-ecological 
resilience of transport mobility networks: Lessons from Hurricanes Juan and Igor.”  
 
This project examines the relationship between transport, hurricanes, and social-
ecological resilience. You are asked to participate in a research interview that will take 
approximately 40-60 minutes.  
 
In order to decide whether you wish to participate in this research study, you should 
understand enough about its risks and benefits to be able to make an informed decision.  
Please take the time to read this carefully and to understand the information given to you.  
Please contact the researcher, Stephanie Sodero, if you have any questions about the 
study before you consent. 
 
It is entirely up to you to decide whether to take part in this research. If you choose not to 
take part in this research or if you decide to withdraw from the research once it has 
started, there will be no negative consequences for you, now or in the future. 
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Introduction 
I am a PhD candidate in the Department of Sociology at Memorial University. In order to 
better understand the relationship between transport, hurricanes, and social-ecological 
resilience, I am conducting interviews with transport managers, environmental managers, 
and others (e.g. emergency responders, insurance representatives). This research project 
is funded by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (SSHRC). 
 
Purpose  
This research project is guided by the question: How do disruptions to transport mobility 
networks caused by hurricanes highlight areas of social-ecological resilience and 
vulnerability? 
 
Participation 
As a participant in this research, you will be asked a series of interview questions about 
your experience of Hurricane Juan and/or Hurricane Igor in terms of mobility and related 
issues of risk perception, work responsibilities, management approaches, coping 
mechanism, policy coordination, key decisions, and adaptation and transformation in the 
policy context. The interview will be conducted by Stephanie Sodero. The interview will 
be scheduled at a location and time that is convenient to you. The interview may be 
conducted over phone.  
 
Duration 
The interview will last approximately 40-60 minutes. 
 
Withdrawal  
You may withdraw from the study at any time, up to the point where data are included in 
the final report (i.e. three months from day of interview). If you choose to withdraw from 
the project, your interview recordings, transcripts, and related data will be removed from 
the project.  
 
Possible benefits 
Research respondents will not receive any direct benefits from their participation in the 
research. Indirect benefits may include the opportunity to discuss the timely and 
professionally relevant issues of social-ecological resilience, severe weather events, and 
climate change adaptation. 
 
This project will contribute to our knowledge about how to manage transport mobility 
networks in the context of a changing climate. Fossil fuel-powered mobility contributes 
to climate change and climate change disrupts mobility. The atmospheric accumulation of 
greenhouse gas emissions released in the course of fossil-fuel based transport exacerbates 
climate change. Under changing climatic conditions, the frequency of severe weather 
events is projected to increase. In Atlantic Canada, for example, hurricanes are projected 
to become more active as ocean waters warm. Hurricane Juan (2003) and Hurricane Igor 
(2010) are examples of the type of severe weather events projected to become more 
frequent under climate change. Such events disrupt the movement of people, goods, and 
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services central to our society and economy. This research aims to shed light on the 
interactions between mobility and climate change, and possibilities for fostering social-
ecological resilience. 
 
Possible risks 
The interview questions, which centre on risk perception, work-related responsibilities, 
management approaches, coping mechanisms, policy coordination, key decisions, and 
adaptation and transformation in the policy context, do not deal with overtly sensitive 
topics. However, the experience of the hurricane was for many a stressful period, both 
professionally and personally. Should you experience unanticipated emotional distress 
you may skip the question, as well you may stop the interview at any time, or withdraw 
from the project, without penalty.  
 
As participants for this research project will be selected from a small community of 
professionals in a specific geographic region (ie Atlantic Canada, New York), it is 
possible that you may be identifiable to other people (ie colleagues) on the basis of what 
you have said. Please keep this in mind during the course of your responses, should you 
agree to participate. 
 
Confidentiality and data storage 
Interview materials, including digital audio recordings of the interviews, and typed 
interview transcripts, will be kept on two password-protected computers, one belonging 
to Stephanie Sodero and one belonging to a professional transcriber. Your name will not 
appear on the audio file or interview transcript. A separate password protected file will 
link participant names with identification numbers. Only Stephanie Sodero will have 
access to this file. Once this information is entered, the original interview schedule will 
be shredded and disposed. Only this identification number will appear on interview 
transcripts or in data analysis files. Only Stephanie Sodero and the professional 
transcriber will have access to the interview data; the transcriber will sign a 
confidentiality agreement. Names and other identifying information will be removed 
from interview and transcripts prior to data analysis. Data will be kept for a minimum of 
five years, as per the Memorial University policy on Integrity in Scholarly Research. 
 
A legal “duty to disclose” details of criminal actions may override participants’ 
confidentiality. Participants’ confidentiality will be breached only if legally obligated to 
do so. 
 
Data recording  
Interview data will be collected using a digital audio recorder. 
 
Member checking 
The researcher will provide you with an electronic copy of the edited transcript for your 
review. After the interview, and before final data analysis (three months after interview 
date), participants will be able to review interview transcript and to add, change, or delete 
information from the transcripts.  
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Reporting results 
Every reasonable effort will be made to ensure confidentiality in the reporting of research 
results. Data from this research project will be published and presented at academic and 
non-academic settings; however, the identity of participants will be kept confidential. 
Names will not be attached to quotations, rather pseudonym and/or descriptors such as 
‘transport manager’ or ‘climate adaptation specialist’ will be used. In addition, quotations 
will be edited to remove details that could be used to identify participants. However, 
because the participants for this research project are selected from a small community of 
professionals in a specific geographic region (ie Atlantic Canada), it is possible that 
participants may be identifiable to other people (ie colleagues) on the basis of what they 
have said. Please keep this consideration in mind during the course of the interview, 
should you choose to participate. In the unlikely case of a confidentiality breach (e.g. data 
loss), such precautions will minimize social risk to participants. 
 
Sharing of results 
If you would like to receive a summary of the research findings and/or academic and 
non-academic publications resulting from the research, you will be asked to provide your 
contact information which will be stored in a password protected electronic file on a 
password-protected computer. After the data collection and analysis are completed, a 
summary of results will be sent to you by e-mail or by mail. The research report will 
describe aggregated results from all participants, rather than individual results. 
 
Questions 
You are welcome to ask questions at any time during your participation in this research.  
If you would like more information about this study, please contact:  
 
 Stephanie Sodero 
 PhD Candidate 
 Department of Sociology 
 Memorial University 
 Email: sbs105@mun.ca  
 Phone: 709-730-9274 
 
Ethical concerns 
The proposal for this research has been reviewed by the Interdisciplinary Committee on 
Ethics in Human Research and found to be in compliance with the ethics policy of 
Memorial University. If you have ethical concerns about the research (e.g. the way you 
have been treated or your rights as a participant), please contact: 
 
  
 Chairperson 
 Interdisciplinary Committee on Ethics in Human Research 
 Memorial University 
 Email: icehr@mun.ca  
 Phone: 709-864-2861 
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Consent 
Your signature on this form means that you: 
- have read the information about the research; 
- have been able to ask questions about this study; 
- are satisfied with the answers to all your questions; 
- understand what the study is about and what you will be doing; 
- understand that you are free to withdraw from the study up to the point of final 
data analysis, without having to give a reason, and that doing so will not affect you 
now or in the future;  
- understand that any data collected from you up to the point of your withdrawal 
will be destroyed. 
 
If you sign this form, you do not give up your legal rights and do not release the 
researchers from their professional responsibilities. 
 
Signatures 
I have read and understood what this study is about and appreciate the risks and benefits.  
I have had adequate time to think about this and had the opportunity to ask questions and 
my questions have been answered. 
 
  I agree to participate in the research project understanding the risks and 
contributions of my participation, that my participation is voluntary, and that I 
may end my participation at any time, up to three months after the interview 
date. 
 I agree to be audio-recorded during the interview. 
 I agree to the use of quotations with the understanding that my name will not 
be identified in any publications resulting from this study. 
 
A copy of this Informed Consent Form has been given to me for my records. 
 
 ______________________________  __________________________ 
Signature of participant    Date 
 
I have explained this study to the best of my ability. I invited questions and gave answers.  
I believe that the participant fully understands what is involved in being in the study, any 
potential risks of the study and that he or she has freely chosen to be in the study. 
 
 ______________________________  _____________________________ 
Signature of researcher    Date 
 
Oral Consent (if applicable) 
I have read and explained this consent form to the participant before receiving the 
participant’s consent, and the participant has knowledge of its contents and appeared to 
understand it. 
______________________________  _____________________________ 
Signature of researcher    Date 
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Appendix D: Interview schedule  
 
Interview #: 
Participant’s name: 
Participant’s sex: 
Sector: _Mobility   _Environment   _Secondary  
Date: 
Time: 
Scripted introduction used: _Yes   _No 
Participant consents?: _Yes   _No   _Qualifications: 
 
Introduction/Consent 
• You consent to participate in an interview as part of the research project, “The social-
ecological resilience of transport mobility networks: Lessons from Hurricanes Juan and 
Igor.” This project explores how to increase the resilience of transport networks at a time 
when severe weather events are occurring more frequently.  
• I will ask you a series of questions about the short-term coping mechanisms and long-term 
policy implications in terms of Hurricane Juan/Igor and its impact on transport networks. 
The interview will take approximately 40-60 minutes, and will be recorded on a digital 
audio recorder. 
• The interview questions do not deal with sensitive topics. However, individual participants 
may have unanticipated emotional distress. If this is the case, you may skip any questions 
you do not want to answer. 
• You may withdraw from the study at any time, up to the point where data are included in 
the final report (ie three months from interview date). If you choose to withdraw from the 
project, your interview recordings, transcripts and related data will be removed from the 
project.  
• Interview materials will be kept on a password-protected computer. Your name will not 
appear on the audio file or interview transcript. A separate password protected file will 
link participant names with identification numbers. Only the principal researcher will have 
access to this file.  
• Every reasonable effort will be made to assure confidentiality in the reporting of research 
results. Quotations from interview transcripts may be used in conference papers, journal 
articles, books, research reports, or other communication material resulting from this 
research, such as podcasts or videos. Your name will not be attached to these quotations. 
Pseudonyms will be used for all quotations and quotations will be edited to remove 
identifying details.  
• However, because the participants for this research project will be selected from a small 
community of professionals in a specific geographic region (ie Atlantic Canada), it is 
possible that you may be identifiable to other people (ie colleagues) on the basis of what 
you have said. Please keep this in mind during the course of your responses, should you 
agree to participate. 
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• You are welcome to ask questions at any time during your participation in this research.  If 
you have any questions about this study, please contact Stephanie Sodero 
(sbs105@mun.ca; 709-738-9274). 
• The proposal for this research has been reviewed by the Interdisciplinary Committee on 
Ethics in Human Research and is found to be in compliance with Memorial University’s 
ethics policy. If you have ethical concerns about the research (such as the way you have 
been treated or your rights as a participant), you may contact the Chairperson of the 
ICEHR (icehr@mun.ca; 709-864-2861). 
• Do you consent to participate in this research interview? 
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Introduction 
1. a. What is your current position?   
      b. What responsibilities does your position entail? 
2. a. What position did you hold during the time of the hurricane?  
      b. [If different than above] What responsibilities did this position entail? 
 
PART 1 
a. Hurricane preparedness 
3. Thinking back to the days preceding the hurricane, what were your expectations 
of the severity of the storm?  
4. Did you make any special preparations in light of the pending hurricane? If so, 
what? If not, why not? 
 
b. Immediate experience  
5. a. What was your experience of the hurricane?  
 b. How did your experience of the hurricane compare with your expectations? 
 
c. Coping/Recovery  
6. In what ways were transport networks were strong? Weak? Please expand. 
Prompt: Geographic, structural, services (e.g. emergency services, food supplies, 
commuters, etc.)  
7. What strengths and weaknesses emerged in terms organizational coordination? 
Prompt: With which other organizations were you in contact? What was nature of  
your coordination with other organizations? 
8. a. Did you have an emergency plan in place? 
 b. If so, to what degree was this followed? 
 c. In what ways did you need to improvise?  
 
PART 2 
d. Policy implications  
9. a. Since the hurricane, what has changed with regard to how your organization 
does its work? Prompt: Climate change mitigation, climate change adaptation 
 b. How has the nature of your work changed since the hurricane? Prompt:           
 Responsibilities before versus after the hurricane  
10. Has your organization experimented with different approaches to managing 
extreme weather events? If so, how? If not, why not? 
11. In your organizations, has the emphasis placed on system redundancies and back-
up plans changed since the hurricane? Please describe. 
12. a. Such severe events are viewed by some as “windows of opportunity” to pursue 
alternate development trajectories or implement systemic changes. To what 
degree do you feel the hurricane provided such as opportunity?  
      b. To what degree was this opportunity acted upon? 
 
e. Projections 
13. Thinking forward, what is your perception of how hurricanes may impact 
transport networks in the future?  
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14. a. What are you reactions to other severe weather events that have occurred in 
recent years (e.g. Hurricane Sandy, Alberta floods, etc.)? 
      b. What lessons, if any, are important to take away from such events? 
15. In what ways do you anticipate your work changing in future? 
16. a. Where do you learn about how to prevent and cope with such extreme weather 
events? (e.g. media, professional networks, Federation of Canadian Municipalities, 
etc). 
      b. What barriers exist in terms of preventing and coping with extreme weather    
      events? 
17. What might the implications be if weather events of this severity occurred more 
frequently (e.g. every ten years)? 
 
Wrap-up 
18. Is there anything you would like to mention that we have not addressed? 
19. Who else would you recommend that I speak to on this topic? 
 
 
 
 
 
